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Abstract
The research explores three related questions about the ‘Next Steps’ 
agency model and agencification processes in the UK central state between 1988 
and 1998. First, how did the creation of agencies, or agencification, work in the 
period and was the reform a substantial change? Second, why was the reform 
adopted and did agencies bring about benefits in the delivery of services? Third, 
what is the likely course of future developments in the use of agencies?
The first question is explored in Part One. The agency model is identified 
as a set of institutions, or structures, for delivering public services proposed by 
government actors who developed the ‘Next Steps’ reform. The UK central state 
made extensive use of the agency model in the period 1988 to 1998. Over the 
period, 155 agencies were created. By 1998, 65 per cent of civil servants worked 
in 138 agencies. The ’Next Steps’ reform was predominately mitigated 
agencification, where there was already some separation of activities prior to the 
reform. This type of agencification accounted for 69 per cent of cases. There was 
pure agencification in 14 per cent of cases, in which the reform was an even 
more significant reorganisation; the case of the Benefits Agency was an example 
of this form of agency creation. However, in 14 per cent of cases, there was 
nominal change and the reform was largely a relabelling exercise. New function 
agencification was found in only 2 per cent of cases.
The second question is explored in Part Two. The official justifications 
for the reform were fragmented and, at some points, inconsistent. The public 
interest model, based on official accounts, suggests that senior officials and 
politicians had the goals of delivering public services in an efficient and effective 
manner with maximum economy, expressed through minimising transaction 
costs associated with delivering services. Agencies promoted this goal in 
handling routine, executive activities rather than non-routine, policy activities. 
However, the public interest model does not seem to be consistent with disputes 
between parts of the central state, the bracketing of nominal changes with more 
significant ones under the overall ‘Next Steps’ reform banner, and use of the
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agency model for non-routine policy work were inconsistent with the model. The 
performance of agencies did not match all the expectations of the public interest 
model.
The institutional rational choice approach, through Patrick Dunleavy’s 
bureau-shaping model, makes a substantial contribution to understanding why 
the reform occurred. But the original model is inadequate for explaining the 
‘Next Steps’ reform. The mark II bureau-shaping model overcomes the 
inadequacies of the original model and is an important theoretical advance. The 
model is supported by evidence about developments during the period. Senior 
officials in the departments saw their role primarily as policy work rather than the 
direct, hands on, management of executive activities. Entrepreneurial officials in the 
Cabinet Office Efficiency Unit had career incentives to come up with innovative 
organisational solutions to problems of public service delivery that were 
successfully implemented. They provided senior officials in departments with the 
agency model as a piece of bureau-shaping technology, enabling them to respond to 
politicians by passing on executive work to agencies. In departments with agencies, 
70 per cent of senior officials ended up working in the parent department after the 
creation of agencies.
The third question is explored in Part Three. The mark II bureau-shaping 
model suggests that bureau-shaping strategies will continue to be an important 
influence on reform in the future as will entrepreneurial officials in central units 
who have incentives to come up with new mechanisms for improving public 
services. The most likely future for most agencies appears to be continued use of 
the agency model with closure of implementation gaps. These developments are 
likely to be supplemented by additional mechanisms in agencies with moderate 
performance problems. In a few cases of very poor performance more radical 
changes are more likely. Partial dismantling of the agency model may occur in 
the Benefits Agency.
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Introduction
The research explores three related questions about the ‘Next Steps’ 
agency model and agencification processes in the UK central state between 1988 
and 1998. First, how did the creation of agencies, or agencification, work in the 
period and was the reform a substantial change? Second, why was the reform 
adopted and did agencies bring about benefits in the delivery of services? Third, 
what is the likely course of future developments in the use of agencies?
The first section of this chapter examines the official account of the 
reform and identifies problems with the account as an answer to these questions. 
The second section argues that existing academic research, whilst offering 
valuable insights, does not progress understanding much beyond the official 
account. The third section suggests that an analytical approach is required to map 
the agency reform using the agency model in order to evaluate official claims 
that it was a significant reform. The institutional rational choice approach offers 
an alternative to the official explanation of the reform. Within institutional 
rational choice, the bureau-shaping model developed by Patrick Dunleavy (1991) 
is a potential explanation for the reform that suggests likely future trends. 
However, the model requires further development to be useful for exploring 
agencies.
Section One: The Official Account
The official account of ‘Next Steps’ is taken as the starting point for trying 
to answer the three research questions. The official account was produced by 
government bodies, including the Cabinet Office, HM Treasury and other 
departments. In answer to the first question about the nature of the agency 
reform, official accounts set out the core features of ‘Next Steps’ agencies. The 
reform’s name famously came from the title of a Report, Improving Management 
in Government: The Next Steps conducted by the Prime Minster’s Efficiency 
Unit and published in 1988 (Efficiency Unit 1988). The Report suggested that 
agencies be established to carry out the executive functions of government, 
distinct from policy work. Responsibility for each agency was to be delegated to
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a chief executive who would handle day to day operations within a framework of 
policy objectives and resources set by the relevant minister in consultation with 
the Treasury (Efficiency Unit 1988: 9-10). The Government accepted these 
proposals in an announcement to the House of Commons by the Prime Minister 
on the 18th February 1988 (Goldsworthy 1991: 10).
However, the official account is of limited use for exploring variety in the 
agencies that were created because it lacked a framework to explore variation 
beyond the core characteristics of agencies in a systematic way. A crude attempt 
to identify types was made by an Efficiency Unit report in 1991. The typology 
distinguished mainstream, regulatory and statutory, specialist service agencies 
and peripheral agencies (Efficiency Unit 1991: 22-25). The categories were not 
mutually exclusive, for example, many agencies were simultaneously regulatory 
and specialist. There was no indication of how to apply the framework in these 
cases and the framework was not used to classify the set of all agencies. A key 
aim of the research developed here is to offer a clear classificatory scheme for 
different types of agencies applicable to bodies created under the banner of the 
‘Next Steps’ reform.
The official account presented the reform as a significant change. The 
first agency, the Vehicle Inspectorate, was officially launched in August 1988. 
By 1998, there were 138 agencies employing 65 per cent of all civil servants 
with further departments operating on ‘agency lines’ (Cabinet Office 1998). The 
White Paper Continuity and Change, published in 1994, looked back on progress 
in the reform and stated ‘.. .Next Steps has had a major impact on the shape and 
culture of the Civil Service’ (Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1994: 12-13). The White Paper 
continued ‘The success of Next Steps has been in its effective implementation’ 
(Ibid 1994:13). Officials interviewed for this study echoed this interpretation. A 
Cabinet Office official commented ‘Around Whitehall, the Next Steps reform is 
generally seen as a major success story’ (13 Senior Official, Cabinet Office). This 
interpretation was shared by staff in the Benefits Agency who commented 
‘Agencies are one of the biggest changes that happened to government in recent 
years’ (113, Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
14
However, there was no systematic analysis of the reform, comparing the 
creation of individual agencies with increased use of core features of the agency 
form. Such an analysis is necessary to identify instances where the creation of an 
agency was a major change, involving transformation of existing structures to 
agency forms, as different from cases where it largely constituted a re-labelling 
exercise, where units already had substantial autonomy or separate performance 
targets before the reform. The research developed here questions the official 
account to explore whether the reform was a substantial change or merely a 
nominal exercise.
The official justification for the reform does not provide a convincing 
answer to the second question of why the reform came about. Official accounts 
did not give clear reasons why the changes were supposed to be beneficial. An 
account written by a member of the team involved in setting up agencies 
concluded ‘Above all, reforms that will work in practice and produce results 
must be based on detailed knowledge of what actually happens in an 
organisation, not on theories about what should be happening’ (Goldsworthy 
1991:39). This suggests a common sense approach, with theory being seen as 
largely irrelevant because it is not only normative but also utopian.
However, fragments of a rationale for the reform were provided in 
official accounts. One reason was improving the operation of government in 
terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The original ‘Next Steps’ report 
suggested that increased economy would result from the recommendations, 
estimating a saving of over five per cent of Civil Service administrative or ‘running’ 
costs (Efficiency Unit 1988:16). But elsewhere the report argued that agencies were 
needed to deliver government services as ‘effectively as possible’ (Efficiency Unit 
1988:9) and that the primary aim was to ‘improve the delivery of services both to 
the public and Ministers’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:16). From this account, it appears 
that the reform was supposed to bring benefits in economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness, although the balance between the benefits was not specified.
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The official accounts did not clearly specify the mechanisms by which 
agencies were supposed to ensure good performance of executive activities and 
the agency reform was expected to bring about improvements. There was 
conjecture that management change and performance improvements were more 
easily brought about within discrete identified units, headed by a manager with 
clear responsibilities, than in larger, more diverse organisations (Prime Minister 
et al 1994:13). This research puts these fragmented parts of the official 
justification together as an answer to the second question.
There has been no systematic evaluation of whether agencies achieved 
what was expected of them or whether the agency reform brought about 
improvements. Instead there were some general, positive, comments about the 
reform. A White Paper in 1994 asserted that ‘the Next Steps initiative has 
fundamentally altered the way the Civil Service is managed’ (Prime Minister et 
al 1994:13). The annual reviews of agencies, published from 1990, mostly 
commented favourably on performance. The official in charge of the reform 
enthused in the first review that ‘As this Review shows, Next Steps is working 
where it matters -  out there on the ground. Agencies are improving the way they 
give value for money and deliver services to their customers. People are showing 
what they can do when they are enabled to give of their best rather than just told 
to do so.’ (Prime Minister and Minister for the Civil Service and the Minister of 
State, Privy Council Office 1990:7).
Interviews with officials conducted for this study reflected this view. An 
official in the Cabinet Office stated ‘It is difficult to evaluate performance across 
the board because agencies claim to be unique, so it is fair to say that there has 
only been a limited survey of overall performance, although where we do have 
information it is generally positive [about performance] (II Senior Official, 
Cabinet Office). Similarly, an official in the Benefits Agency commented ‘The 
[agency] structure has definitely allowed us to deliver a better service than 
before’ (14, Official, Benefits Agency). However, these statements are assertions 
rather than conclusions based on clear evidence and do not, by themselves, 
provide a convincing case that the official justification was adequate.
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The official accounts do not help explore the third question about the way 
agencies are likely to be used in the future. There were government statements 
suggesting that agencies were likely to be a continuing feature of the central 
state. The annual reviews of agencies suggested that, whilst changes might be 
made in individual agencies, the agency form was likely to remain in continued 
use. No plans for a substantial reversal of the reform were announced 
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1997: vi-viii; Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster 1998:iv; Minister for the Cabinet Office 1999:v-vi). However, the 
official account does not generate expectations about whether agencies will be 
favoured in the future, or whether alternative forms of organisation will be used 
instead. This research explores likely futures for use of agencies.
Section Two: Gaps in Existing Academic Accounts
The reform has received some interest from academics but the existing 
accounts offer only limited answers to the three questions that motivate the 
research. The academic studies of ‘Next Steps’ relied to heavily on uncritically 
adopting official descriptions of the reform and the official justifications for why 
the changes came about. In answering the first question about the nature and scale 
of reform, existing studies have not explored variety in use of agencies or 
agencification in a systematic way. The first book on agencies, Transforming 
Central Government (Greer 1994) was valuable in bringing together a lot of 
official documentation on agencies in one place. It offered a definition of the 
’Next Steps’ agency concept based on entities called an agency in official 
accounts, with most agencies involving the separation of steering or policy 
making, from rowing or service delivery and the use of performance contracts to 
set levels of service (Greer 1994:23-26). But Greer uncritically accepted official 
accounts about increased use of the model rather than exploring whether setting 
up agencies marked a substantial change. Greer’s study did not offer a clear 
benchmark for evaluating the significance of the reform in analytical terms. This 
approach led to a conclusion echoing the official line that the reform was 
‘transforming the face of Whitehall’ (Greer 1994:23).
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The existing studies do not explore variety in agencies in a systematic 
way. Some studies have stressed the unique features of different ‘agencies’ and 
grouped them primarily by listing under the responsible department (Hogwood 
1995,1997). More ambitiously, Greer developed a typology for exploring the 
agencies in the Department of Social Security (Greer 1994:18-19). But the 
typology was not applied consistently. The same agencies were classified as 
different types in different research using the same typology (Greer 1994: 41, 
1995:193). More fundamentally, the types were not based on a clear theoretical 
rationale for why differences were significant, in terms of why the form was 
chosen and the effects on the performance of using the type. The other major 
work on Next Steps had similar limitations. An edited book, Next Steps: 
Improving Management in Government? was published in 1995 (O’Toole and 
Jordan 1995). Whilst offering some valuable insights about particular agencies, 
the book did not pay much attention to distinguishing types of agency creation 
and their differing significance across the central state. Instead each of the main 
chapters dealt with a different aspect of ‘Next Steps’ in a different agency.
The most useful existing work relating to agencies is on the ‘New Public 
Management’. This research is a conceptually informed attempt to map changes 
in public service delivery structures in different countries and to discern patterns. 
In the early 1990s, Hood noted NPM changes in Anglo-American countries. 
These involved more ‘professional’ management in the public sector, explicit 
standards and measures performance, greater emphasis on output rather than 
input controls, shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, move towards 
greater competition in the public sector, stress on private sector styles of 
management practice and stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource 
use (Hood 1991: p4-5). A similar trend towards more ‘hands o ff steering based 
control of networks of public and private sector actors responsible for delivering 
services was characterised as a movement away from traditional ‘government’ 
towards ‘governance’ (Rhodes 1997). NPM trends throughout OECD countries 
have been noted (James and Manning 1996; OECD 1995; 1998). However this 
literature has developed at a high level of abstraction from individual reform 
initiatives. The use of agencies is central to NPM developments but its 
relationship with these broader changes is under-analysed. The research
developed here aims to situate developments with agencies in the UK central 
state within the broader context of NPM changes.
Existing studies are of limited help for pursuing the second question of 
why the reform occurred and the third question about likely future developments. 
The studies did not build distinctive explanations of the reform as alternatives to 
official accounts. Instead, the studies relied on officials’ own testimony which 
repeated the justifications given in the official account (see for example Kemp 
1990, Butler 1991, Butler 1994). The existing studies constructed explanations 
based on these official sources, positing some mix of motivations about 
improved efficiency, economy and effectiveness (see Zifcak 1994, Greer 1994, 
Drewry 1994, O’Toole and Jordan 1995, Massey 1995, Hogwood et al 1997). 
O’Toole and Jordan pointed out some of the contradictions in the official 
position, such as the disputes between Cabinet Office and Treasury officials in 
the early days of the reform (O’Toole and Jordan 1995:3-17). The recognition of 
officials’ conflicting positions is an important finding. But the study did not go 
on to develop an explanation for the reform incorporating this discovery. Their 
account did not explain why officials and politicians came together in the way 
that they did to influence the reform.
In contrast, Greer mentioned some approaches that potentially offer an 
explanation for the reform, including public choice theory and transaction cost 
analysis (Greer 1994:15-16). However, they were outlined in just two pages and 
were not developed in any depth or applied to the developments surveyed in the 
book. For this reason, Greer’s work shares the limitations of the official account, 
including not specifying the mechanisms by which agencies were supposed to 
bring about good performance, and did not include a systematic evaluation of 
whether agencies achieved the aims of reformers. Both the Greer and O’Toole 
and Jordan books were written just after the reform began to catch on, with many 
new ‘Next Steps’ agencies being set up in the early 1990s. At this time there was 
not much of a track record of agencies’ effectiveness and the material was not 
available to perform a systematic evaluation of the effects of the reform. 
Because these studies shared the atheoretical approach of the official account 
they did not generate expectations about future developments in the reform. The
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existing studies are of limited help in attempting to answer the third research 
question about likely future trends in use of agencies.
Section Three: Mapping Change Using the Agency Model and Explaining 
Change Using Institutional Rational Choice and the Bureau-shaping Model
The first question is explored in Part One. The agency model is identified 
as a set of institutions, or structures, for delivering public services proposed by 
government actors who developed the ‘Next Steps’ reform. The model contrasts 
agencies with alternative forms of organisation and identifies agencies as part of 
the New Public Management. Within the overall agency model, a typology of 
agencies is developed, derived from the official account, to explore variety in a 
systematic way to classify agencies by type. Agency creation, or agencification, 
is analysed to see if it was a substantial reform, as official accounts suggest, or a 
largely nominal change. A model of different degrees of change is developed as a 
benchmark for assessing the significance of the reform and applied to 
developments during the period
The research explores the first question in two ways, an overall mapping 
of the use of agencies and a case study. The overall mapping uses a quantitative 
survey of developments in use of the agency model, drawing on official 
documentation and other sources. The survey identifies the overall pattern of 
change. The case study of the largest agency, the Benefits Agency, uses 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of official documents, surveys and 
interviews with officials. The case study involves an in depth analysis of the 
creation and development of an agency. It is not possible to use the case study 
simply to generalise to the full population of agencies (Yin 1984). However, the 
Agency constituted a considerable part of the overall reform because it employed 
around a quarter of all civil servants operating in agencies during the period 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer 1999:9; Secretary of State for Social Security and 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury 1999:79). Findings relating to the Benefits 
Agency have some relevance for other agencies, because they used similar 
structures, and reveals differences between this case and the general pattern. The
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analysis enables the official view, that the reform was a major transformation, to 
be evaluated both for the overall reform and for the case of the Benefits Agency.
The second question, of why the reform occurred, is explored in Part 
Two. The explanation proceeds in two stages. Firstly, the adequacy of the official 
justification for the reform is explored using the public interest model. The 
model offers a coherent rationale for the change in terms of the improvements in 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness suggested by officials in the original 
‘Next Steps’ report. The model is evaluated as an explanation of developments 
during the period, including an analysis of whether agencies brought about 
performance benefits. The inconsistencies between the public interest model and 
observations of the changes suggest that it is not an adequate explanation of the 
agency reform.
Institutional rational choice is used to provide an explanation more 
consistent with developments in the period. Rational choice is a theoretical 
perspective that attempts to apply the methods of economics to studying politics 
(Mueller 1989). This perspective specifies micro foundations for social 
phenomena, grounded in the instrumental action of individuals and their 
interaction in pursuit of their interests. In a sense, all rational choice modelling is 
institutional because it involves specification of the structures that individuals 
build to pursue their interests and structures in which they operate, enabling and 
restricting the options available to them (Dowding 1994). In the context of this 
research, the institutions are the structures of the UK central state.
There are many potential theoretical explanations of administrative 
reform (Caiden 1991;Lane 1993; Howlett and Ramesh 1995). However, there are 
several reasons for using the institutional rational choice approach. The approach 
offers a novel perspective for exploring why the reform occurred, going beyond 
existing studies. There has been a general lack of use of the approach in UK 
public administration research. Rhodes comments 'there have been few such 
[rational choice] studies in British Public Administration...If rational choice is a 
major alternative to Public Administration, then its potential has yet to be 
realised.' (Rhodes 1997:175).
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The study uses institutional rational choice in a way that avoids some of 
the objections to the approach. In particular, rational choice has been criticised 
for being driven by the formal modelling techniques, which are chosen and then 
applied to a suitable case rather than as a way of exploring interesting 
phenomena and research questions. Those using the approach stand accused of 
getting research the wrong way around, and failing to contribute very much to 
understanding of empirical phenomena (Green and Shapiro 1996). In contrast, 
this research starts with a the three research questions and uses institutional 
rational choice as a theoretical tool for exploring them
Within the institutional rational choice approach, the research uses 
insights from Patrick Dunleavy’s (1991) bureau-shaping model. The bureau- 
shaping model interprets public sector reorganisation as a welfare enhancing 
strategy for public officials. The model offers an alternative to the public interest 
justification. Both rational choice and the public interest account focus on how 
actors purse their aims through organisation and reorganisation. However, the 
bureau-shaping model does not accept the official account that the reform was 
intended to enhance the public interest at face value. Instead, rational choice 
disaggregates the public interest into the interests of individual actors involved in 
the reform process, including politicians and public officials. The approach 
suggests that one reason why the official accounts conflicted with each other is 
because different actors had their own interests in making statements about the 
reform rather than acting in as part of a unitary state machine. The model offers 
the potential to make sense of seemingly contradictory statements in official 
accounts.
However, the existing formulation of the bureau-shaping model is 
inadequate for addressing the question of why the agency model was adopted in 
UK central government. The model is underspecified as an account of why the 
reform happened. The model does not seem able to explain why the reform 
happened at the time that it did nor the relative contributions of politicians and 
civil servants in bringing about the changes. The mark II bureau-shaping model
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is developed as an attempt to overcome these problems. The model is evaluated 
in terms of its consistency with events during the period.
Using the bureau-shaping model has implications for the methods used in 
this study. The approach taken by existing academic studies of ‘Next Steps’ 
places considerable reliance on official statements and raw interview testimony 
of officials. In contrast, following the conventions of rational choice, this study 
does not simply accept these statements at face value. The statements are 
potentially open to misrepresentation, because the actors sometimes have an 
interest in misrepresenting events. For example, comments by senior officials in 
the Cabinet Office that the reform was a success (II, Senior Official, Cabinet 
Office; 12 Senior Official, Cabinet Office; 13 Senior Official Cabinet Office) 
need to be viewed in the light of their responsibilities for undertaking the reform 
and career incentives to portray it as a success.
However, the possibility of misrepresentation does not mean that official 
statements or interview material is without any use. Interviews are one way the 
official account is defined. Where there is not an incentive for misrepresentation, 
such information is likely to reflect underlying actions and processes. A list of 
interviews conducted for this study and more information about the format of the 
interviews is given in Appendix 12. The methodological approach is to be aware 
of the potential problems with official statements and interview material and to 
cross check findings with evidence from other sources.
An important alternative source of evidence is the actions of individuals 
involved in the reform. Actions usually have a higher cost for an actor than 
making a statement because they imply a more substantial forgone alternative, 
and are more likely to reflect their underlying motivations and interests. Actions 
include choices made about organisational arrangements and career choices, for 
example the choice of working in one form of organisation rather than another. 
Whether officials who were involved in bringing about the reform eventually 
ended up working in agencies themselves is one indicator of whether they liked 
working in that type of organisational form. The model suggests that officials 
were constrained by the institutional environment in which they worked, so
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working in an organisational form is not unrestricted choice but choice of the 
best option from the opportunities available to them.
The third question, about future developments in use of the agency 
model, is explored in Part Three. A range of possible developments are explored 
including more use of the agency model, use of forms consistent with the model 
to supplement it and movements away from the model towards other forms, 
including reversal of the model. Because there is less material relating to future 
developments than past trends, the analysis of the third question is less extensive 
than that for the first two questions. However, the public interest model and mark 
II bureau-shaping model generate different expectations about future 
developments. Whilst the former model expects continued use of the model 
where appropriate, the latter model suggests that use of the model will be 
influenced by the interaction between politicians and civil servants operating in 
their institutional environments. The UK agency model is being emulated 
through conscious adoption of agencies by other countries based on the UK 
experience, as part of broader New Public Management changes. The models’ 
expectations enable future trends in use of the agency model to be suggested for 
the UK and for other countries.
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Part One: The Agency Model in UK Central
Government
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Chapter 1: The Agency Model, Agencification and the New Public
Management
‘We recommend that ‘agencies’ should be established to carry out the 
executive functions of government within a policy and resources framework 
set by a department.’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:9)
Part One asks the question: how did the creation of agencies, or 
agencification, work in the period and was the reform a substantial change? 
Chapter One defines the analytical approach. Section One derives the agency 
model in the context of the UK central state from official statements about agencies, 
including the recommendation of the Efficiency Unit Report quoted above. Section 
Two develops a typology of agencies to explore variety in the use of the form. 
Section Three defines agencification and situates the reform within the broader set 
of New Public Management changes.
Section One: The Agency Model
The ‘agency model’ is derived from the practice of the UK central state. 
The central state is defined as the organisations controlled directly by the central 
political authority, the 100 or so members of the government. This follows the 
conventions of previous studies mapping UK central government in the late 
1980s (Dunleavy 1989a, 1989b). It includes ‘core executive’ politicians, the 
Prime Minister and ministers of the central co-ordinating departments including 
the Cabinet Office and Treasury (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990, Smith 1998). It 
also includes organisations controlled by other members of the government. On 
this definition, minor organisations which are not subject to direct political 
control by members of the government are excluded1. The central state includes
1 Possible official lists for identifying bodies in the central state cannot 
straightforwardly be adopted because not all of the listed organisations satisfy this 
criterion. Potential lists include budget lists, employment lists and lists of legally 
established Crown bodies. Hood and Dunsire (1981) cite the example of attempting 
to use the definition of a Crown body, organisations considered direct emanations 
of the crown. By this definition the, now defunct, Manpower Services Commission
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ministerial departments, for example the Department of Social Security, and non 
ministerial Whitehall departments which are closely monitored by ministers, for 
example the Inland Revenue. The definition includes organisations directly 
controlled by ministers, staffed by civil servants, yet not officially counted as 
departments for example some ‘non-departmental’ public bodies, and bodies 
directly controlled by ministers but not staffed by civil servants, for example 
parts of the Ministry of Defence with armed forces personnel.
The ‘agency model’ is not the same as any particular case of an ‘agency’ in 
UK government. An history of the reform, written with the support of the Cabinet 
Office, stressed that ‘The essence of the concept was that each Agency would be 
different, its structure and operations tailored closely to the needs of its business. 
There could be no single model’ (Goldsworthy 1991:21). This statement reflects 
the reluctance of many officials to think analytically about the developments. 
Despite the protestations of some civil servants, agencies did share core 
characteristics which were defined in a few influential documents. The use of a 
model captures the main features of agency practice as was officially stated and 
implemented by UK government. The model is then used as a benchmark for 
exploring variation in the practice of the reform, rather than taking whatever 
happened in practice as part of the agency model.
There were a large number of official statements advocating use of the 
‘agency’ form in the central state in the period 1988-98 in published reports and 
policy documents including White Papers and in statements by politicians and 
officials. The main organisations from which this material emanated were the Prime 
Minister's and Cabinet Office ministers’ private offices, the Cabinet Office more
was part of the central state. However it was regarded as an independent body by 
the Civil Service Department and was not included on its lists of civil service 
bodies and was very different from other bodies which are commonly known as 
'Whitehall' and considered part of the central state (Hood and Dunsire 1981: 42). In 
the end Hood and Dunsire used estimates departments, receiving money and giving 
accounts of the use of funds to Parliament, to define the central state. They 
identified 69 government departments for the fiscal year 1976-77 by this means 
(Hood and Dunsire 1981:49). But this definition included national museums, which 
appear in estimates because of their civil service staff, but are not under close 
control by ministers in normal circumstances.
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generally and the Treasury, followed by government departments and agency 
candidates once the reform got underway. However, the first major statement, 
which is taken as forming the core of the ‘agency model’, was the 1988 report to 
the Prime Minister by the Efficiency Unit, titled Improving Management in 
Government: the Next Steps ('Efficiency Unit 1988). The Report’s title famously 
gave its name to the Next Steps' agency creation reform and contained 
recommendations about the organisation of departments, the experience of staff and 
pressures on departments to improve value for money. It suggested 'that agencies 
should be established to carry out the executive functions of government within a 
policy and resources framework set by a department' (Efficiency Unit 1988: 9).
The ‘Next Steps’ report defined agencies as 'any executive unit that delivers 
a service for government' (Efficiency Unit 1988:9). It continued 'In some instances 
very large blocks of work comprising virtually a whole department will be suitable 
to be managed in this way. In other instances, where the scale of activity is too 
small for an entirely separate organisation, it may be better to have one or even 
several smaller agencies within departments. There were no size limits set on 
agencies, the report said 'agencies may be large or small'. (Efficiency Unit 1988:9). 
The Report stated that the potential scope for agencies could be as high as 95 per 
cent of Civil Service activities (Efficiency Unit 1988:3). The Government adopted 
this definition of agencies in its acceptance of the report. In an announcement to 
Parliament by the Prime Minister on 18th February 1988 Mrs Thatcher said that 
'to the greatest extent practicable the executive functions of Government, as 
distinct from policy advice, should be carried out by units clearly designated 
within Departments., as 'Agencies' (Goldsworthy 1991:16).
The 1988 Report went on to set out in broad terms, the structure in which 
agencies should operate 'These units, large or small need to be given a well defined 
framework in which to operate, which sets out the policy, the budget, specific 
targets and the results to be achieved. It must also specify how politically sensitive 
issues are to be dealt with and the extent of the delegated authority of management. 
The management of the agency must be held rigorously to account by their 
department for the results they achieve.' (Efficiency Unit 1988:9). The report also 
said 'The main strategic control must lie with the Minister and Permanent Secretary.
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But once the policy objectives and budgets within the framework are set, the 
management of the agency should have as much independence as possible in 
deciding how those objectives are met.' (Efficiency Unit 1988:9). The departments 
were envisaged as being 'the definition of a rigorous policy and resources 
framework within which the agency management is set free to manage operations, 
and is held to account for results' (Efficiency Unit 1988:10). It was also noted that 
the framework needed to incorporate some mechanisms for dealing with politically 
sensitive issues as they arose (Efficiency Unit 1988:11). The report said that the 
head of the agency (later to be called a Chief Executive) should have a personal 
responsibility for achieving the best possible results within the framework set for 
the agency and that ministers are responsible for operational questions (Efficiency 
Unit 1988:10).
The main features articulated in the 1988 Report were reaffirmed in 
subsequent publications which also made some aspects of the model more 
concrete. The initial report suggested that some agencies may be more effective 
outside government (Efficiency Unit 1998:9). However, the government moved 
quite quickly to suggest that whilst privatisation was considered at the time of 
setting up agencies, agencies themselves were to operate within the public sector 
(Goldswothy 1991:18-19). The 1994 Government White Paper Continuity and 
Change argued that 'A key theme of Next Steps has been the delegation of 
management authority to Agency Chief Executives, enabling management to 
design organisational structures and processes which match the needs of their 
particular task (Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster 1994:13). The same document commented on the 
increasing structured relationship between those at the centre of departments and 
those in agencies and how the model was suitable for handling executive rather 
than policy work (Ibid. 1994:13).
The features described in the 1988 Report and White Paper relate define a 
distinctive form of ‘agency’ organisation. Organisational studies of the public 
sector note the various ways in which the resources including people, funding 
flows, rules, buildings and equipment are brought together to deliver publicly 
valued outputs. The limits of public sector activity are defined in different ways.
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Following Lane (1993) organisations can be considered part of the state if they 
undertake well known different types of activity-
1) Part of state general decision making and its outcomes (the authority definition).
2) Part of state consumption and investment i.e. the organisation forms part of the 
government budget (the government allocation or provision of goods and services 
definition).
3) An organisation transferred by government between owners in the private sector 
(distributive definition of the state).
4) An organisation owned by the state.
5) An organisation with employees paid by the state (as opposed to the state also 
owning the capital of the organisation in addition to employing people).
The agency model involves element 4) state ownership of the organisations 
because agencies are public sector bodies. However there were a variety of funding 
sources, many were set up with public financing of their activities from general 
state sources, but some raise a substantial part of their finance from the private 
sector. The agency model is one type of publicly owned organisation and can be 
distinguished from other forms in the way authority over organisational resources is 
structured. In broad terms, authority is the right to perform some action and is 
related to praise or sanctioning, for example the right to remove an individual 
from his or her post. Legal rational authority rests on belief in the legality of the 
law and the right of those in authority to issue commands based on their position. 
It contrasts with traditional authority, resting on the belief in rules that have 
existed for generations and charismatic authority rests in particular individuals 
chosen for some reason, such as because of past heroic deeds (Weber 1978:215- 
216).
The idea of legal rational authority is used as the basis for defining the 
agency model. Distinctions between different uses of authority and their 
corresponding organisational forms are summarised in Table 1.1. The first 
distinction is between the use of authority and its absence. The agency model 
consists of the use of authority by a super-ordinate section containing the 
political executive, the minister, over a sub-ordinate ‘agency’ for delivering
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services, rather than leaving the agency completely to its own devices. The split 
between an agency and a department creates an organisational boundary between 
the two, with the agency carrying out executive functions within a policy and 
resources framework set by the department (Efficiency Unit 1998:9). Because 
the agency model separates out those who set the overall goals for a public 
service and those who carry out action to achieve those goals it is similar to 
principal-agent analysis in organisational economics. These analyses examine the 
relationship between a ‘principal’ who passes authority to act on his or her 
behalf to an ‘agent’ to perform the activity (Weimer and Vinning 1996: 92-117). 
The ‘agency model’ involves the exercise of authority across organisational 
‘boundaries’ within publicly owned bodies.
The second distinction is between rule governed and ad hoc authority. Ad 
hoc authority involves directing people and resources in a particular and 
exclusive way suitable for an individual instance as the need arises. The ability to 
use ad hoc direction is normally associated with the essence of ‘ownership’, in 
terms of ultimately vested rights of control and the ability to direct action at will. 
When something is ‘owned’ after contracts have expired or if situations change, 
the owner can direct the use of the resource. Rule governed authority is an 
alternative to ad hoc authority by using sets of general procedures to govern a 
regulatory relationship. The rules specify what individuals can or cannot do 
including the relationship between the superior and the subordinate, what they 
are expected to achieve with sanctioning or praise for achievement. Whilst 
choosing to apply a rule in a particular case is a sense an individual decision 
there are regularities in rules and expectations about their applicability. The 
perception of the rule’s legitimacy and content is understood in advance by 
participants, restricting the scope for a single handed change to the rule and 
making them non-ad hoc.
The agency model places emphasis on the department exercising 
authority in a ‘rule governed’ way using the framework of objectives for 
controlling the agency rather in ‘ad hoc’ intervention. The 1988 Report noted 
that ‘the management of the agency should have as much independence as 
possible in deciding how those objectives should be met’ (Efficiency Unit
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1998:9). Although rules can be changed in the agency model the expectation is 
that this does not happen quickly. Rules are the main way to direct and ad hoc 
direction is not viewed as legitimate, the super-ordinate should not intervene 
across boundaries on ad hoc basis.
The agency model emphasises a particular focus to the exercise of 
authority, emphasising authority over output rather than input. Inputs to an 
organisation are generally taken to include staff, budget, procedures or ways of 
conducting business. In contrast, outputs are valued consequences from the 
organisation’s activities, for example meeting aims set for the organisation (Lane 
1993:190-204). The agency model places more reliance on output related 
authority rather than input oriented authority, with the exception of budgetary 
limits for agencies that are funded out of the public purse. The department 
controls the outputs of the agency by rules in a ‘regulatory’ system of 
performance standards relating to a range of valued services produced by the 
organisation. The chief executive’s tasks are set out as part of the rules. These 
constitute the ‘well defined framework.. ..which sets out the policy, the budget, 
specific targets and the results to be achieved’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:9) and 
reflect the Report’s demand that ‘the management of the agency must be held 
rigorously to account by their department for the results they achieve’ 
(Efficiency Unit 1988:9).
Although the main focus is control by the department, agencies remained 
part of the central state and subject to system wide features. These included the 
authority of central units, especially the Treasury in public expenditure and 
accounting procedures (Treasury 1989). Agencies were not supposed to alter the 
convention of ministerial accountability to Parliament, because agencies were 
ultimately controlled by ministers. However, agencies’ corporate identity 
entailed an associated responsibility to account for actions to other bodies as a 
distinct unit. In particular, agencies were to be held more directly accountable for 
‘operational’ matters as opposed to policy matters, reflected in the heads of 
agencies responding to MPs questions on routine issues (Efficiency Unit 
1988:10). But the main feature of the model is the relationship between
32
department and agency. In this respect, the agency model has the following key 
components-
1) Organisational separation between ‘agency’ and ‘department’ with autonomy 
from ad hoc direction and relatively few input rules.
2) Regulation of the agency by the department using output rules consisting of a 
quasi-contract and performance targets enforceable by sanctions including 
removal of the chief executive.
The agency model, is also called an output bureaucracy in Table 1.1 
because of the use of rules in authority relations relating to outputs, and contrasts 
with other combinations of authority. The three main pure forms of control are 
the ‘autonomous organisation’, the ‘ad hocracy’ and the bureaucracy. The 
autonomous organisation, in the bottom right cell, does not have an authority 
relationship with a superior body. Instead the organisation is an autonomous 
body allowed to make its own decisions about use of resources and its goals. In 
the ad hocracy, the organisation is controlled by a super-ordinate who uses ad 
hoc direction alone. The sections of departments acting as ministers’ private 
offices are examples of this form where officials are ready and expect to respond 
to the directions of the minister at short notice and in a flexible way. In contrast, 
in the bureaucracy type, authority is exercised over the body only by a system of 
rules. The other types are different combinations of use of authority. The 
traditional department from which the agency model was distinguished in the 
1988 Report was mainly an ad hocracy. Whilst they clearly made use of rules for 
systems, such as personnel controls, the ad hoc forms of control were relatively 
important. The 1988 Report commented ‘Middle managers in particular feel that 
their authority is seriously circumscribed both by unnecessary controls and by 
the intervention of Ministers and senior officials in relatively minor issues’ 
(Efficiency Unit 1988:3).
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Table 1.1 The Agency Model and other Forms of Authority in a 
Relationship between a Super-ordinate and Sub-ordinate Sections of a 
Publicly Owned Central State Organisation
Ad Hoc Output 
Controls
Rule Governed 
Output Controls
Few/no Output 
Controls
Rule Governed 
Input Controls
Rule Governed 
Input Ad Hoc 
Output
Rule Governed 
‘Bureaucracy’
Rule Governed 
Input
‘Bureaucracy’
Ad Hoc 
Controls
Input Ad Hocracy Ad Hoc Input Rule 
Governed Output 
Model
Output Autonomous 
Input Ad Hocracy
Few/no
Controls
Input Input Autonomous 
Output Ad Hocracy
Agency Model (or 
Output
‘Bureaucracy’)
Autonomous Model
The agency model, and all the forms in Table 1.1, differ from the 
relationship government has with private firms delivering services under 
contract. In dealing with private firms, there is an enforceable contract rather 
than the use of authority in either the regulatory or ad hoc direction senses, 
although this does not mean that firms are not also subject to other forms of 
broader state controls in other respects, for example in regulation of health and 
safety of employees. In a private contract, both parties enter into the agreement 
on the basis of voluntary exchange and can walk away if they do not like the 
terms of the relationship, subject to the contract. The contract is enforced by a 
separate third party, the courts. However, a contract has some strong similarities, 
with few input controls and instead broad specification of desired outputs. Most 
commercial contracts involve some degree of competition for provision of the 
service the agency model does not directly imply competition, except where 
agencies sell their products to consumers this could involve competition with 
other providers. But competition is not a core feature of the agency model as 
defined here, although the evaluation of the agency compared to alternative 
forms of delivery is a form of indirect competition for any incumbent agency, 
which is considered in the discussion of the creation of agencies. Finally, the
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agency relationship differs from ‘agreements’ to perform services between 
central government bodies. In this case the arrangements are more like the 
voluntary exchange in dealings with a private firm because there is no authority 
relationship but the agreements are not enforceable in courts.
Section Two: Types of Agency
The core features of the agency model defined in Section One were 
common to all agencies set up under ‘Next Steps’. However, there was 
organisational variety amongst the bodies set up under the reform. Rather than 
seeing each agency as unique, the approach developed here constructs a typology 
of agencies to place individual agencies with similar bodies. The typology 
developed here is for application to the entire set of agencies so it has to have 
categories that are jointly exhaustive to include all items of interest and which 
are mutually exclusive, so that an individual agency does not appear in multiple 
categories. However, beyond these criteria Miller and Friesen quote the view that 
‘there are virtually as many ways to classify organisations as there are people 
who want to classify them. Consequently it is fairly easy to find a single 
dimension on which a typology can be based and which will support any given 
philosophical position'. (Miller and Friesen 1984:70). The usefulness of a 
typology or taxonomy can only be assessed in terms of the research questions 
being addressed. In this section, the typology incorporates two key features of 
variety which were seem as important by the officials advocating the reform.
Firstly, differences in origin of the agency budget. The 1988 Report 
suggested that some agencies were to be involved in charging customers for 
services and that these contrasted with those that received a grant from their 
department to cover most of the cost of their activities (Efficiency Unit 1988:28). 
The presence of a customer group offers a supplementary form of influence over 
the agency through customers paying for services or choosing alternative sources 
of supply (Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster 1994: 22). This trading dimension introduced a ‘market­
like’ control form alongside the ‘regulatory system’ of control by the department. 
The government extended the 1973 Trading Fund Act by legislation in 1990 to
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cover agencies and used it to give some agencies financial freedoms. Trading 
funds were given a net running cost system of budget control, such that they 
could expand activities if covered by additional revenue, subject to the 
achievement of certain financial controls, such as a percentage return on capital. 
This framework contrasted with non trading agencies which had controls over 
their inputs and fewer ‘commercial style’ freedoms to expand their activities 
(Goldsworthy 1991:30-31).
Secondly, there were differences between agencies that kept their budget 
and spent it on their own activities and those that passed on much of their budget 
on to other organisations or individuals, for example in contracts to firms, grants 
or welfare payments. The agency model was suggested as a way of focusing 
management activity on the task at hand (Efficiency Unit 1988). However this 
meant different things in different types of agency. In the former agencies the 
model is mostly about the agency trying to improve its performance by focusing 
on its own activities. In the latter case improvements have to come from money 
passed on to others. The ‘bureau tools’ typology is developed here to reflect 
these two dimensions of variety in the agency model.
The bureau-tools typology synthesises the bureau-shaping typology 
developed by Dunleavy (1989a, 1989b, 1991) and Hood's tools of government 
approach (Hood 1983). Hood’s approach suggests that government bodies use 
'tools' to interact with their environment (Hood 1983). Tools can be used as 
detectors, which are tools used for taking in information, or effectors, tools used 
to influence or make an impact on the world outside the organisation (Hood 
1983:3). The tool types are nodality, treasure, authority and organisation.
Nodality- The property of being in the middle of an information or social 
network. A node is a junction of information channels which enables the 
drawing in and dispensing of information.
Treasure- The use of a stock of monies or anything which is fungible, that 
is can be used for exchange. This tool may be used to influence outsiders 
or buy goods and services.
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Authority- The use of legal or official power to demand, forbid, guarantee 
and adjudicate.
Organisation. The use of resources, such as land, people and materials in 
a formal structure.
The types of tools described by Hood form a near exhaustive list of ways 
government bodies can interact with their environment. The types also succeed in 
capturing tools which are peculiar to state organisations. The use of authority to 
coerce behaviour is usually denied to non-state bodies, for example business 
firms operate in markets using voluntary exchange and treasure. The key feature 
in terms of the variety of agencies is the use of treasure by the organisation. The 
bureau-tools typology uses insights from Dunleavy's bureau-shaping typology of 
public sector organisations to explore the use of treasure. Dunleavy’s typology is 
based on the components of a bureau's budget. Dunleavy splits a bureau's budget 
into parts.
The core budget (CB)- Includes monies the bureau spends on its own 
activities, often labelled operating or running costs, plus associated 
capital investment.
The bureau element (BE)- Consists of monies which the bureau receives 
as part of its overall budget but then passes on to private sector firms or 
individuals in the form of contracts or transfer payments.
The program element (PE)- Encompasses monies which the bureau 
receives but then passes on to the public sector bodies at lower tiers of 
government in the form of grants.
The folio element (FE)- Includes monies which the agency controls but 
passes on to other agencies at the same tier of government.
The overall budget flowing through the agency is the programme budget 
(PB) and consists of the sum of the four elements listed above.
Several different types of organisation are distinguished by Dunleavy, they
are-
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1) Delivery buraux- They use their own staff to implement policy, providing 
services directly to citizens or enterprises. They are most often labour 
intensive organisations. The core budget dominates the program budget. The 
key tool is administrative organisation, and they are weighted toward 
effectors.
2) Taxing bureaux- This type raises government taxes and the budgetary profile 
resembles that of the delivery type. The core budget is high and all other 
budget elements low; core budgets and staff sizes are relatively large. The 
origin of taxing agencies' budgets may also be distinctive if it is financed 
directly from the taxes it raises.
3) Contract bureaux- These agencies develop proposals for capital projects or 
for services which are then put out to tender. Contract agency staffs engage in 
R and D, project specification, and contract management. The 
implementation of projects or services is left to contractors. Because most of 
the budget is passed on to contractors the bureau element is large and the 
tools used are treasure allied with administrative organisation in the case of 
routine procurement.
4) Regulatory bureaux- These agencies limit the behaviour of individuals, 
enterprises or other government agencies by making and enforcing 
compliance. The core budget dominates the program budget because they 
spend most of their budget on running costs. They rely chiefly on authority in 
devising detectors or effectors, with an increasing emphasis also on organised 
expertise, especially in the current era of 'light touch' regulation. They place 
most emphasis on detectors.
5) Servicing bureaux- These bureaux resemble trading agencies because they 
raise most of their revenues by charging. However they provide goods or 
services to clients who are exclusively or primarily other government 
organisations. Because servicing agencies have no significant private sector 
clients they are distinctive in the origin of their budgets, even if they are set 
up in quasi-trading form. Servicing agencies have a budgetary profile similar 
to delivery agencies.
6) Transfer bureaux- This type consists of agencies handling payments of 
government subsidies or entitlements to private individuals or firms. Transfer 
payments dominate their budgets and they have a high ratio of core budget to
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program budget. Their work primarily involves making rules about and 
publicising the availability of transfers, establishing applicants' eligibility for 
subsidy and arranging payments. Making payments is fairly easy to automate 
and much of these agencies' effort goes towards detector mechanisms rather 
than effectors. Their primary detectors are authority and administrative 
organisation; their primary effector is treasure.
7) Trading bureaux- These bureaux raise finance by providing commercially 
equivalent services to a wide market, selling products or services in order to 
generate the bulk of their revenue. Trading bureaux operate in markets with 
private sector individuals or enterprises, while yet remaining subject to direct 
political control - in Britain ministers. Their budgets are provided by revenue 
obtained from selling their services.
8) Control bureaux- These agencies channel funding to other public sector 
bureaux at lower or subordinate tiers of government in the form of grants, 
approving applications and monitoring how receiving organisations spend the 
money and implement policy. The program element, which contains 
payments to other public sector bodies at a lower tier, dominates the program 
budget. The primary detectors are authority and nodality, while they rely 
almost solely on treasure for effectors.
9) Super-control bureaux- These bureaux are similar to control agencies, except 
that most of the budget they formally control goes to other public sector 
agencies at the same tier of government, without being in any formal grant 
system. Consequently the folio element dominates the program budget.
There was a limited attempt to classify 55 Next Steps agencies using the 
original bureau-shaping typology in June 1990 (Dunleavy and Francis 1990: 69- 
77). However, this framework is not suitable for this research without substantial 
alteration for several reasons. Firstly the framework does not produce fully 
mutually exclusive categories. For example delivery, regulatory, taxing, 
servicing and trading types have similar core budget to total budget ratios and 
contract and transfer types have similar bureau element to total budget ratios, and 
cannot be distinguished by budget composition alone. There isn’t a clear 
hierarchy for applying criteria when they conflict. A second problem is that the 
theoretical justification for all the criteria are not equally clear. Dunleavy uses
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the budget distinctions in a model of bureaucratic behaviour to suggest that 
individuals within organisations will have different attitudes towards different 
parts of their budget, because core budget is money that is used directly on their 
own activities whereas bureau and portfolio elements are passed on to other 
bodies (Dunleavy 1991). But the parts of the typology beyond the budget 
distinctions do not have a clear theoretical justification and appear ad hoc. These 
include the distinctions between taxing regulatory and delivery bodies which are 
not grounded in a theoretically justified dimension (or dimensions) of difference 
that might, for example, help understand different behaviour by individuals in 
different types of body.
However, two parts of Dunleavy’s framework are incorporated. Firstly, 
the insight of distinguishing between public bodies on the basis of those that 
cover the costs of their activity by trading and those that get most of their money 
from grants. On this basis, the bureau-tools typology makes a distinction between 
organisations that are set up as ‘trading’ organisations and those which are not. 
The Dunleavy framework facilitates a second distinction based on the use of 
budget by an agency, between those where core budget dominates total budget 
and those where most of the budget is passed on to other bodies. Putting the two 
distinctions outlined above together produces the four categories in Table 1.2. 
The categories are mutually exclusive, such that an agency classified as being of 
one of the four types cannot be classified as a member of another type. Individual 
agencies are classified as either trading or non-trading. The budget type 
distinction is based on the predominance of budget, with either core or passed on 
budget constituting over half of an agency’s budget.
Table 1.2: Bureau-tools Typology: Criteria and Types
Non-trading Trading
Core budget dominant 1 .Delivery 2. Trading
Passed on budget 
dominant
3. Contract/ transfer 4. Trading/
contract/
transfer
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Section Three: Agencification and New Public Management
Agencification is the process of agency creation involving the setting up 
of an organisation resembling the agency model where previously the activity 
was handled by a different form of organisation. Agencification is a type of 
administrative reform. Caiden defines administrative reform as 'the induced 
systemic improvement of public sector operational performance' (Caiden 
1991:1). This research adopts a similar definition, but pays more attention to the 
possibilities of failure in reforms and does not assume that all consequences of 
reform are the result of a conscious attempt to improve performance. There is a 
role for unintended consequences and disagreement between actors about the 
best way forward. The focus is narrower than general reform, exploring 
agencification as the substitution of a quasi-regulatory relationship between 
organisations instead of existing forms, whatever those existing forms might be. 
Agencification is a process which can be conceived of in stages, including 
identification of possible activities for agency status, delineation of the agency 
and setting up of its performance regime, followed by operation of the agency 
and review of its continuing status as an agency. The consideration of alternative 
forms at the time of setting up the agency and periodic review can result in a 
different form being substituted including privatisation or even abolition. For this 
reason there is an element of competition and the position of the agency is not set 
in concrete.
Agencification is a special type of administrative reform, what is 
sometimes called 'machinery of government' reform or 'the allocation and 
reallocation of functions between departments' (Pollitt 1984:1). A research a 
project on the history of the organisation of central government departments 
further defined this conception to include changes in the internal structure of 
departments, the allocation to bodies other than ministerial departments and the 
creation of agencies and privatisation (McLean and Clifford 1996:3).
The clear analytical definition agencification is needed to evaluate the 
official accounts of the reform. Officials involved in the reform described the
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processes involved in setting up agencies as varied (Goldsworthy 1991:21-25). 
But, at the same time, the conviction was expressed that the reform was a major 
and fundamental change sweeping central government (Prime Minister, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
1994:12-13). The process of agencification involved different things depending 
on the origin of the activity prior to the designation of a unit as an agency. 
Identifying different forms of agencification enables an analysis of whether the 
creation of an agency marked a substantial change or merely a superficial ‘re- 
badging’ exercise. The main forms of agencification used in this study are 
defined as-
1) Pure agencification, with the establishment of a largely separate 
organisation with agency regulatory measures for a unit which previously 
had substantial integration into another body.
2) Mitigated agencification with the establishment of a largely separate 
organisation with agency regulatory measures for a unit which previously 
had partial separation or some form of corporate identity as unit prior to this 
process.
3) Nominal agencification, with the establishment of a largely separate 
organisation with agency regulatory measures for a unit which had these 
characteristics but was not labelled an ‘agency’ .
4) New function agencification, with the establishment of a largely separate 
organisation with agency regulatory measures for a new body to perform a 
new function.
Agencification is part of the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) reforms 
which swept the public sectors, including the central states, of many developed 
industrialised countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Hood, 1991, 1994). The agency 
model and agencification process are central to NPM. Hood (1991) noted seven 
doctrines which form NPM. These were hands on professional management in 
the public sector, explicit standards and measures performance, greater emphasis 
on output rather than input controls, shift to disaggregation of units in the public 
sector, shift to greater competition in the public sector, stress on private sector 
styles of management practice and stress on greater discipline and parsimony in
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resource use (Hood 1991: p4-5). A similar NPM perspective was offered by 
Hoggett (1991). He suggested that the 'new management in the public sector' 
consisted of 'emphasis to flexibility -more flexible production strategies and 
manpower strategies' (Hoggett 1991:243) and a replacement of the 'notion of 
vertically integrated production (ie integrated around the centralised hierarchies 
of the classical industrial bureaucracy) with much more decentralised 
(organisationally and spatially) methods of organising production' (Hoggett 
1991:243).
The initial definition of NPM was developed by Patrick Dunleavy and 
Christopher Hood to link NPM changes with ‘grid-group’ cultural theory. They 
argue that NPM ‘involves a shift in the two basic design co-ordinates of public 
sector organisation, moving it “down grid" and "down group” . This shift 
consists of ‘reworking budgets to be transparent in accounting terms with costs 
which attribute to output not input viewing organisations as a network of 
contracts linking incentives to performance, dis-aggregating separable functions 
into quasi contractual or quasi market forms, opening up provider roles to 
competition between agencies or between public agencies and firms and other 
bodies also de-concentrating provider roles to the minimum feasible sized 
agency’ (Dunleavy and Hood 1994: 9)..
Dunleavy also developed a separate, though closely related, 
characterisation of NPM as a generic label for a group of policy and 
administrative solutions emphasising ‘competition’, ‘disaggregation’ and 
‘incentivisation’ (Dunleavy 1994: 38-42). Competition involves efforts to 
remove monopoly suppliers, to establish multiple competing sources of supply 
where at least to show the contestability of blocks of work and thus to create a 
potential for future competition. Disaggregation emphasises the carving up of the 
public sector organisations, creating far more de-concentrated or decentralised 
patterns than in the day of functionally organised, integrated public service 
bureaucracies. Incentivisation introduces motivational devices at an individual 
level or revenue maximisation incentives at an organisation level to supplement 
or replace previous public service ethics focus on professional or organisational 
motivations.
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Agencification fits squarely within these definitions of NPM. 
Agencification involves the disaggregation of activities to create corporate units 
within the central state headed by a chief executive. It involves establishing 
performance measures and targets for the agency, especially relating to the 
agency’s ‘outputs’. In this sense agencification marks a move ‘down grid’ and 
‘down group’ in terms of cultural theory, but not to the extent that provision is 
handed over to the private sector. However, the idea that the chief executive is 
chosen as the best person for the job implies a broader search for job candidates 
than in traditional recruitment. In Dunleavy’s terminology, agencification is a 
prime case of disaggregation, involving the setting up of corporate units, and 
changes in the form of incentivisation to place more emphasis on performance 
regimes, for example in assessing and rewarding the chief executive.
A further NPM perspective is Peter Aucoin’s characterisation of 
administrative reform. Whilst he did not use the term NPM, he emphasised the 
tensions in the reforms between centralisation and decentralisation, co-ordination 
and deregulation, and control and delegation. He noted that these changes 
seemed to be occurring simultaneously (Aucoin: 1990: 115-137). Agencification 
fits Aucoin’s thesis because they are about decentralisation of ad hoc controls 
and tougher central performance targets for agencies. However because the 
directions of centralisation and decentralisation relate to different types of 
controls, there is less tension in the agency model than in Aucoin’s 
characterisation in conceptual terms.
A characterisation of developments with strong similarities to NPM is the 
‘hollowing out the state’ perspective, suggested by Rhodes (1994), which 
consists of four inter-related trends evident in many public sectors during the 
1980s and 1990s. Firstly, privatisation which limits the scope and forms of public 
intervention. Secondly, the loss of functions by central and local government 
departments to alternative service delivery systems such as agencies. Thirdly, the 
loss of functions by British government to European Union institutions. Fourthly, 
limiting the discretion of public servants through the new public management, 
with its emphasis on managerial accountability, and clear up political control
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through a sharper distinction between politics and administration. (Rhodes 1994: 
138-139). Agencification involves the creation of non traditional service delivery 
bodies and is in this sense part of the ‘hollowing out’ process, although it 
constitutes one relatively small part and the trend is conceived of as a much 
broader phenomenon.
Other commentators have claimed that modem states are becoming 
'hollow' through their use of private firms under contract and other indirect 
means of providing services. Salamon has noted the 'rise of third-party 
government' (Salamon 1989), where federal agencies in the US rely increasingly 
on private companies, sub-central governments, voluntary associations or other 
intermediaries to deliver their policies to citizens. Salamon focuses on the 
experience in the US but the change is apparent in most developed countries:
'What is involved in this transformation is not simply an expansion in the 
scope or range of government action. Even more important has been a 
massive proliferation in its basic forms - in the instruments or tools the 
public sector uses to carry out its activities. These tools now include 
much more than direct service delivery by government bureaucrats. A 
veritable technological revolution has taken place in the operation of the 
public sector in this country, characterized by a widespread expansion of 
the basic instruments used to carry out the public's business.' (Salamon 
1989:3-4)
Similarly Kettl has identified the rise of 'government by proxy1 involving 
governments use of non-government owned organisations under contracts, 
grants, tax incentives, loans and regulation, as well as direct service delivery. 
(Kettl 1988: 3-4). The growth of quasi-govemmental agencies (QGAs), agencies 
which are semi-detached from direct control by elected politicians, and of 'quasi- 
non-govemmental organizations' (QUANGOs), private or voluntary sector 
bodies which implement government policies, also reflects the shift away from 
government as a direct provider of services (Flinders and Smith 1999). However 
privatisation is not part of agencification, which does not involve a transfer of 
ownership, and is a separate reform process. Furthermore, agencies are not
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‘government by proxy’ because they are still under the control of central state 
politicians. But the agency form is an intermediate form between traditional 
departments and more separate bodies because it combines increased ‘corporate’ 
focus with continued control. So agencification can be considered the ‘inner 
face’ of the ‘hollow state’ and part of the proliferation of tools that the 
government uses to carry out its activities described by Salamon in the above 
quote.
Detailed empirical research on the operation of ‘New Public 
Management’, the ‘hollow state’ and ‘government by proxy’ model is scarce. 
Instead, most of the literature is at a high level of generality and has been 
developed to provide an overall conceptual map in which to situate individual 
reforms. In the context of agencies, the empirical work that has been conducted 
has been fragmented and for the most part not linked to these overall theoretical 
considerations. The work has involved examining bits of personnel systems or 
single agencies, a feature which has been noted by several authors (Pollitt 1995, 
Talbot 1998). Rhodes argues that public administration ‘must prove once again 
that it has something to contribute to understanding the institutions of 
government in their multiplying, manifold guises’ (Rhodes 1997:178). The 
agency model is one such guise and detailed empirical work on its use in the UK 
central state can illuminate the operation of this important part of the New Public 
Management.
Conclusion
The agency model, typology of agencies and model of agencification 
offer a benchmark for evaluating the UK agency initiative as part of the New 
Public Management. Most work on ‘NPM’ or the ‘hollow state’ has been done at 
a high level of generality looking for overall trends, often across several 
countries. Much less theoretically informed work has been undertaken on 
developing detailed empirical studies to map trends. The models developed in 
this chapter will be used to explore several questions about the reform in the UK 
Firstly, what evidence is there of agencification in the UK? Did the creation of 
bodies called ‘agencies’ by the Government constitute a significant reform in
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terms of the model of agencification or did official accounts refer mainly to 
‘nominal’ changes? What types of agencies were created? How did agency 
working in practice compare to the model?
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Chapter 2: Agencies and Agencification in UK Central State
‘The Next Steps initiative is the most ambitious attempt at Civil Service 
reform in the twentieth century’ (Treasury and Civil Service Committee 
1990:v)
‘..that Next Steps might constitute a substantively new and stable formula 
for public management into the next century seems to be the least 
probable medium term fate for the programme’ (Hood and Jones 
evidence to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1990:82)
The conceptual framework of the agency model and agencification 
defined in Chapter One can be used to explore the practice of reform in the UK 
central state. The framework is used to trace the general pattern and to focus on 
the case of the largest agency, the Benefits Agency in the Department of Social 
Security. The approach enables a consideration of whether the reform, described 
in the above quote by the Treasury and Civil Service Committee as ‘ambitious’, 
brought substantial changes or whether they were superficial, as Hood and Jones 
thought more likely when they gave evidence to the Committee in 1990. Section 
One looks at the growth in the number of agencies, the origins of agencies and 
whether the changes consisted a substantial or nominal change. Section Two 
maps the types of agencies that were created during the period using the bureau- 
tools typology. Section Three compares the practice of agencification with 
related reforms in the central state.
Section One: The Creation of Agencies in the UK Central State
There were regular official updates on progress with the initiative which 
commented on its success, in terms of the number of agencies set up. Whilst the 
report was not publicly announced until February 1988, work identifying the first 
candidates for agency status began in Summer 1987 (Goldsworthy 1991:9). In 
1991 the government reiterated its aim that 'all the executive activities of 
government will, as far as practicable, be operating along these lines by the end
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of 1993' (Prime Minister 1991:36). However the pattern of creation of agencies 
has not been mapped against the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter One 
in either official or academic publications. According to the results of a census of 
agencies conducted as part of this research, 155 agencies were created in the 
period 1988 to 1998. The number of agencies created each year, the growth in 
the total number of agencies and their relative importance in the central state is 
shown in Table 2.1. The census results for the full set of agencies are contained 
in Appendix 1.
The first agency was the Vehicle Inspectorate, which was set up in 
August 1988, followed by Companies House in October 1988 and HMSO in 
December 1988. The number of agencies created each year peaked at 25 in 1990 
and 24 in 1991, before falling back to between 14 and 17 each year. There was a 
second, higher, peak in 1996, with 30 new bodies. But this figure was, for the 
greater part, the result of 16 new agencies in the Ministry of Defence. These 
agencies were relatively small, most having fewer then 1,000 staff, and included 
some agency relaunches of units designated as agencies in previous years. The 
number of new agencies trailed off after the end of 1996 with only 2 created in 
1997 and 4 in 1998. Whilst the reform was petering out in this period, 18 
sections of work were under consideration for turning into agencies at the end of 
1998, although about two thirds of these had fewer than 1,000 staff (Cabinet 
Office 1998:62).
The total number of agencies initially reflected the creation of new 
bodies. By 1989 there were just 10 agencies with 9,000 staff, but these figures 
grew rapidly to 76 agencies and 210,000 staff by 1992. By 1996, after the main 
burst of agencification, there were 133 agencies employing 313,000 staff, 63 per 
cent of all civil servants. After a subsequent period of lower agency creation, the 
total at the end of 1998 stood at 138 agencies with 299,000 civil servants or 65 
per cent of the total. From 1993 some agencies changed their status, for example 
by merger, abolition or privatisation as discussed in Chapter Eight, and the total 
figure at the end of the period was lower than the number of agencies created. 
There was also a growth in staff located in departments designated as operating 
on agency lines which are included in official accounts of the ‘Next Steps’
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reform. These include Customs and Excise from 1991, Inland Revenue from 
1992, the Crown Prosecution Service and Serious Fraud Office from 1997. The 
reform in these departments was an internal management reform within the 
organisation, for example to create 24 executive units in Customs and Excise, 
rather than a full application of the agency model between organisations, and do 
not count as use of the agency model in this analysis.
Table 2.1 Growth in Agencies 1988 to 1998: Number of Agencies and Civil 
Servants Working in Agencies
Year Agencies
Created
Total Number 
of Agencies
Civil Servants 
in Agencies
All Civil 
Servants
Agency
Civil
Servants as 
Percentage 
of All Civil 
Servants
1988 3 3 6,000 580,000 >1
1989 7 10 9,000 569,000 1
1990 25 35 114,000 562,000 20
1991 24 59 200,000 554,000 36
1992 17 76 210,000 565,000 37
1993 16 92 250,000 554,000 45
1994 14 102 268,000 540,000 50
1995 14 109 305,000 517,000 59
1996 30 133 313,000 495,000 63
1997 2 134 305,000 475,000 64
1998 4 138 299,000 463,000 65
Source: Appendix 1 Census of Agencies
The distribution of agencies varied across departments. Five departments 
had ten or more agencies. These were the Ministry of Defence, which created 45 
agencies between 1990 and 1998, the Northern Ireland departments as a group with 
24 agencies created between 1990 and 1998, the Department of Transport with 10 
agencies created between 1988 and 1998 (by which time the department was
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absorbed by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions), the 
Department of Trade and Industry, with 10 agencies set up between 1988 and 1991 
and the Cabinet Office which set up 10 agencies, ranging in start dates from 1988 to 
1996. These department were followed by the Scottish Office with 9 agencies 
established between 1990 and 1995, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
with 8 between 1990 and 1995, the Treasury with 7 between 1990 and 1998, the 
DSS, which created 6 agencies from 1989 to 1994, the Department of the 
Environment with 5 between 1989 and 1992 (the Department was later absorbed in 
the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions), the Home Office 
with 4 set up between 1991 and 1993, the Lord Chancellor’s Department which 
established 4 between 1990 and 1995 and the Department of Health with 4 from 
1991 to 1994. Some other departments had a single agency each (Appendix 2).
The pattern of agency creation over time was broadly similar in different 
departments with the highest levels of agency creation occurring between 1990 and 
1996. However, three departments were exceptions to the general pattern of timing 
of agency creation. There were two ‘innovators’, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, with just over half its 10 agencies set up between 1988 and 1991 and the 
Department of the Environment, which created all its 5 agencies from 1989 to 1992. 
There were no obvious laggards, although the Ministry of Defence, which 
eventually created the most agencies, was relatively slow to start. Beginning with 2 
in 1990 and 6 in each of 1991 and 1992 new agencies fell back to 2 in 1993 before 
rising, on average, to 6 a year between 1994 and 1998. Similarly, in the Northern 
Ireland group of departments, 16 of its 24 agencies were created in the period 1995 
to 1998, which was relatively late (Appendix 2)
The overall effect of agency creation varied between departments. By the 
end of the period, all the major departments with central state politicians in the 
Cabinet had created at least one agency (Cabinet Office 1997a:Chapter III). 
However, a few major departments had only one agency, including the 
Department for Education, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Welsh 
Office and Department of Employment. In contrast, the Ministry of Defence had 
45 agencies. However, in terms of the proportion of staff who ended up in 
agencies, the picture was different, and is summarised in Table 2.2. On these
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figures, the reform was most significant in the Department of Social Security 
with 97 per cent of staff in 6 agencies. The Lord Chancellor’s Department had 80 
per cent of staff in agencies, the Home Office and the Department of 
Employment, before the latter Department’s merger with Education in 1995, both 
had 80 per cent of staff in agencies (Cabinet Office 1991; 1992). The majority of 
departments were in the middle range, for example in the Cabinet Office agency 
staff formed around 40 per cent of the total, and in Ministry of Defence, despite 
their large number, agencies employed only 26 per cent of all staff. The FCO and 
Welsh Office’s single agencies had less than 1 and 20 per cent of total staff 
respectively.
Table 2.2 :Staff in Principal Departments and Agencies in Year After Last
Agency Creation, with Percentage of Staff in Agencies
All Civil Servants Civil Servants in 
Agencies
Staff in 
Agencies as 
Percentage of 
All Staff
Ministry of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Food
11,500 4,000 35%
Cabinet Office/Office of 
Public Service
2,500 1,000 40%
Ministry of Defence 1 122,000 32,000 26%
Department for Education 2,500 500 20%
Employment Group 50,000 40,000 80%
Department for the 
Environment Transport and 
the Regions
19,000 14,000 74%
Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office
6,000 30 <1%
Overseas Development 
Administration
1,500 500 33%
Home Office 50,000 40,000 80%
Lord Chancellor’s Department 12,000 10,500 90%
Northern Ireland 16,000 8,000 50%
Scottish Office 13,000 6,000 46%
Social Security 89,000 86,500 97%
Trade and Industry 10,000 5,000 50%
Treasury 15,000 2,000 13%
Wales 2,500 500 20%
Source: Civil Service Statistics (Cabinet Office 1991,1992,1995b) 1 gure for
includes all staff, not ju st civil servants
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However, the cases of agency creation outlined above were not all the 
same because agencies had different origins. Hogwood argued that agencificaiton 
was a very complex process, noting that departments were not monolithic 
structures before Next Steps (Hogwood 1997). Although agencification was not a 
uniform process, it was not irreducibly complex, the pattern of change can be 
identified. Applying the framework of types of agencification developed in 
Chapter One reveals the pattern presented in Appendix 3. In summary, for the 
155 cases of agency creation, the most numerous type was the second type, 
mitigated agencification, where the organisation existed as a partially separate 
unit prior to the process. There were 108 agencies, or 69 per cent, derived from 
this process. This type was followed at the same level by the third type, nominal 
agencification, with 22 agencies or 14 per cent, and the first type pure 
agencification with 22 agencies or 14 per cent. The fourth type, new function 
agencification, was the least common form with only 3 agencies or 2 per cent. 
Agencification was pure or mitigated in around 83 percent of cases and as such 
‘Next Steps’ was an important rather than a nominal reform. There was no 
obvious pattern in the distribution of types of agency creation over time, except 
that there were no cases of ‘pure’ agency creation in the first two years of the 
reform. Instead, in 1988 and 1989 the reform involved units that already had 
clear definition or were already separate bodies. There was no obvious pattern of 
difference between departments, most departments with several agencies had 
several different types of agencification.
However, agencification is not only a relationship between ‘before’ and 
‘after’ states, but also as a process of identifying candidates and setting up the 
bodies. In terms of the process, the general approach was for departments to 
identify candidates for agency status and implement the creation of agencies 
using central guidance provided by the Cabinet Office and the Treasury. There 
was a central Next Steps Project Team with a senior Project Manager unit set up 
in the Cabinet Office to oversee progress on the reform. The Project Manager 
asked Departments to draw up lists of potential agency candidates. However, it 
was left to departments themselves to identify candidates and set up agencies. 
Departments were expected to undertake a process of questioning whether the 
activities should be done at all, then weighing up the alternative delivery
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structures including contracting out the service for private provision by a firm, 
keeping the work in the department or creating an agency (Goldsworthy 
1991:22-24). This process later became known as the ‘prior options’ test 
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1995). The choice of agency status was 
kept under consideration with reviews of agency status firstly every three years 
and, from 1994, every five years. The reviews were conducted by the 
departments (Cabinet Office 1994).
Focusing on the case of the Benefits Agency illustrates the process of 
agencification in this case. Because the case was an example of pure 
agencification it sheds most light on similar cases, but has some relevance for all 
agencies because of the common processes used in the reform. The DSS sought 
to implement the ‘Next Steps’ reform, stating that ‘It is government policy that 
the executive functions of Departments should be carried out by agencies 
operating within a policy and resources framework and using the resources set by 
the Secretary of State’ (DSS 1993:3). The creation of the Benefits Agency 
involved dividing up the department. Following the overall rationale of the ‘Next 
Steps’ programme, the Department focused its attention on its own activities 
rather than considering whether activities could be combined across departmental 
boundaries. The result of the reform was a split between a Department 
Headquarters (DSS HQ) and 6 agencies, including the Benefits Agency, that 
handled different activities.
The creation of the Benefits Agency was closely related to the 
establishment of the other agencies in the Department. The DSS employed a mix 
of agencification types, makes it broadly representative of the ‘Next Steps’ 
reform in the overall central state, although the DSS placed more emphasis than 
most departments on ‘pure’ agencification. The origins of agencies in the DSS, 
the type of agencification and type of agency are summarised in Table 2.3. The 
Department carried out major reviews of its activities to look at its work in the 
light of the Next Steps report. Senior officials commented that at the time 
departments were under pressure from the Cabinet Office to be looking at the 
potential for agencies to handle their work (115 Senior Official, Benefits 
Agency). The Agency Study Report, sometimes called the Hickey Report after
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the official who led the team, was an internal document reporting the findings of 
an examination of proposals for separating the activities of paying benefits and 
collecting social security contributions from the rest of the department. The team 
considered different ways of dividing up the department and concluded that the 
delivery of payments and contributions was one business. There was some 
discussion of privatisation of the function to a private firm under contract at the 
time of the initial establishment of the agency but this was not taken very far (114 
Senior Official, Department of Social Security). However, there were longer 
debates about how the separated bodies should be distinguished from each other.
The Permanent Secretary produced papers suggesting that contributions 
were a separable activity from paying out benefits. In the end, his version of the 
split was carried out and two separate agencies were established, the Benefits 
Agency and the Contributions Agency (Greer 1994:35-36). The Benefits 
Agency, set up in April 1991, brought together several bits of the Department to 
form the agency responsible for running a network of local offices and central 
centres for paying out benefits and is categorised as pure agencification (DSS 
1993:26-29). The Contributions Agency was established at the same time and 
brought together several parts of the Department and is pure agencification, to 
run the National Insurance system for contributions (DSS 1993:32-33).
Although much of the Benefits Agency came from the regional 
administration rather than the policy core of the DSS, substantial changes were 
involved in separating out the Social Security Operations group and moving 
functions like personnel to the new body (113 Senior Official, Department of 
Social Security). The Benefits Agency handled the bulk of the Department’s 
work in the period. In 1998, the DSS was responsible for the delivery of a 
programme worth about £100,000m, or around 30 per cent of all public 
expenditure (Secretary of State for Social Security and Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury 1999:3). Within this total, the HQ had about 1,700 staff and a budget of 
£182m. About 96 per cent of staff were in agencies with almost 80 per cent in the 
Benefits Agency which employed 67,000 staff, paid benefits amounting to 
£81,500m, spent £2,43 lm  on its own administration costs (BA 1999a:46 and 56). 
There was agencifciation from the Benefits Agency itself through the creation of
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the War Pensions Agency (WPA), a case of ‘pure’ agency creation. The Agency 
was carved out of a central unit and staff located in local offices dealing with war 
pensions within the Benefits Agency. The WPA ran as the War Pensions Unit 
within the Benefits Agency until April 1993, prior to being established as a full 
agency (DSS 1993:36).
The Benefits Agency reveals how general processes of agencification 
operated in the setting up of new agency systems. In contrast, mitigated 
agencification was a less radical change, two examples of this form of change 
were undertaken in the DSS. The Resettlement Agency was the first agency 
candidate to be announced by the DSS, in early 1988. The agency managed 
hostels for homeless people and at the same time was responsible for moving 
central government out of this activity. Because the agency already had some 
separate identify within the department the creation process was an example of 
mitigated agencification. The second example was the Information Technology 
Services Agency. A report by an official, Eric Caines, examined information 
technology and recommended that an agency be set up to handle this work. The 
Information Technology Services Agency took on organisational units which 
were already part of the Information Technology Directorate within the 
organisation. The Agency ran IT systems and had a role in contracting out IT 
functions (DSS 1993:30-31).
The creation of the Benefits Agency contrasts with new function 
agencification. In the DSS, an example of this form was the Child Support 
Agency (CSA), a new body responsible for carrying out the assessment of 
liability, collection of payments and enforcement of child maintenance payments 
from liable relatives, a function instigated by new legislation. This Agency was 
formed from a shadow Child Support Unit, created in April 1992 with 
responsibility for existing work on child maintenance transferred from the 
Benefits Agency, and a substantial new set of new tasks arising from changes in 
legislation in the area. Senior DSS staff took the decision to locate these 
functions in a shadow unit which was established as a precursor to the agency 
rather than being integral parts of the Department or the Benefits Agency (DSS 
1993:35-36).
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The process of creating the Benefits Agency contrasts with nominal 
agencification, involving no substantial change. The DSS did not have any 
agencies of this type, but the case of HMSO illustrates this form of change. The 
organisation was already a separate government department prior to the reform. 
It had trading fund status since 1980 under which it became self financing and 
had a target set by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of gaining a five per cent 
return on assets. The opportunity for agency status was seen by senior 
management within HMSO as providing more freedoms but not involving major 
organisational change (Dopson 1993:17-23). There was no reallocation of 
activity associated with the creation of the agency or radical change to the system 
of setting targets for the organisation. Instead the conferral of agency status was 
largely a relabelling exercise.
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Table 2 3  Benefits Agency and Other Agencies in the Department of Social 
Security, Date of Establishment, former Location of the Activity and Type of 
Agencification
Agency Date
Established
Location of Agency Activity 
Before Establishment as a 
Next Steps Agency
Type of 
Agencifcation
Resettlement
Agency
May 1989 Units under control of 
Department of Social 
Security
Mitigated
Information 
Technology 
Services Agency
April 1990 Information Technology 
Services Directorate within 
the Department of Social 
Security
Mitigated
Contributions
Agency
April 1991 Branches of the Department 
of Social Security
Pure
Benefits Agency April 1991 Regional Directorate and 
Regional Offices in the 
Social Security Operations 
Group within the Department 
of Social Security
Pure
Child Support 
Agency
April 1993 New function New function
War Pensions 
Agency
April 1994 War pensions and general 
benefits sections, Social 
Security Operations Group 
within the Department of 
Social Security and the 
Benefits Agency from April 
1991
Pure
Source: Appendix 3; DSS 1993
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Section Two: Types of Agency
There were attempts to identify types of agencies and classify bodies set 
up as part of Next Steps, but the research using these classifications is not 
suitable for the purposes of applying the bureau-tools typology developed in 
Chapter One. One classification of agencies was used by the 'Fraser' report 
(Efficiency Unit 1991: 22-25) which identified the following groups of agencies-
1. Mainstream agencies, which are fundamental to the mainstream policy 
and operations of their departments, such as the Benefits Agency in the 
Department of Social Security.
2. Regulatory and other statutory agencies, which carry out delegated 
statutory functions, usually the implementation of rules, for example the 
Vehicle Inspectorate.
3. Specialist service agencies, providing services to departments or other 
agencies, such sis the Information Technology Services Agency.
4. Peripheral agencies, which are not linked to the main aims of the 
department but which report to its minister, for example HMSO 
(Efficiency Unit 1991: 22-25).
However, this classification was not based on the differences which were 
identified in the framework set up in Chapter One. Similarly, research using 
Greer’s (1994) more theoretically informed typology is of limited use. Greer 
distinguished between those agencies which obtained their budget from operating 
in markets from those which were dependent on Treasury finance. Second, she 
distinguished agencies which were monopoly providers from those which were 
non-monopoly providers. Greer applied the typology to the agencies in the 
Department of Social Security (DSS); the results are shown in Table 2.4.
59
Table 2.4 Greer’s Typology Applied to DSS Agencies
Treasury
Dependent
Revenue
Raising
Monopoly Benefits Agency 
War Pensions Agency
Child Support Agency 
Contributions Agency
Non-monopoly Resettlement Agency Information Technology 
Services Agency
Source: Greer (1994:40)
However, the types were not applied consistently. The Child Support 
Agency and Contributions Agency were described as 'revenue raising' in the text 
because of their role in tax and child maintenance collection (Greer 1994: 41) 
despite being classified as 'Treasury dependent, monopoly' in the typology (Greer 
1994: 40). The confusion was exacerbated when both agencies were reclassified 
as 'revenue raising, monopoly' agencies without acknowledging their previous, 
different, classification (Greer 1995:193). The 'monopoly/non-monopoly' 
distinction is also unclear. If 'non-monopoly' is the existence of current 
competition then the Resettlement Agency should have been a monopoly agency 
because there were no other bodies vying to carry out its tasks. If potential for 
competition was the criterion then not only the Resettlement Agency but several 
of the agencies classified as 'monopoly' should have been classified as potentially 
non-monopoly, for example banks and building societies could compete for some 
services provided by the Benefits Agency.
Applying the bureau-tools typology in a fresh study produces the 
summarised in Table 2.5. The methods used in this analysis and a list of all 155 
agencies classified by type, with the date of establishment, is included as 
Appendix 1. The delivery type was the most numerous with 119 agencies or 77
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per cent, followed by the contract/transfer type with 20 agencies or 13 per cent, 
trading with 15 agencies or 9 per cent and trading/contract/transfer with 1 
agency. In terms of staff numbers the contract/transfer type is the most 
significant with around 40 per cent of staff, because of the contribution of the 
biggest agency, the Benefits Agency and the third largest agency, the 
Employment Service, followed by the delivery type with near 40 per cent of 
staff, followed by the trading types having the remaining 20 per cent of staff 
between them.
Table 2.5: Agencies Classified by Bureau-tools Types
Type Number Percentage Examples
Delivery 119 77 HM Prison Service, The 
Insolvency Service
Contract/transfer 20 13 Benefits Agency
Trading 15 9 HMSO, Meteorological Office
Trading/contract/transfer 1 >1 The Buying Agency
Source: Appendix 1 Census of Agencies
Table 2.6: Types of Agencification (with Percentages) by Agency Type
Bureau type Number of 
agencies in 
type
Pure Mitigated Nominal New
Function
Delivery 119 16(15) 87 (73) 15(12) i d )
Contract/transfer 20 6(30) 10 (50) 2(10) 2(10)
Trading 15 0(0) 10(70) 5(30) 0(0)
Trading/contract/
transfer
1 0(0) 1(0) 0(0) 0(0)
Total 155 22 (14) 108 (70) 22 (14) 3(2)
Source: Appendices 1 and 3
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There were differences in the origins of the different types of agencies, 
and consequently in the form of agency creation that was entailed by Next Steps, 
as summarised in Table 2.6. The delivery and contract/transfer types had a 
broadly similar pattern of agency creation to the overall picture summarised in 
the section on agencification. The trading/contract/transfer type does not indicate 
a pattern beyond the single agency was an example of mitigated agencification, 
the most frequently occurring form of agencification overall. However, the 
trading type came only from cases of mitigated agencification and nominal 
agencification. Nominal agencification was found to be the form for 30 per cent 
of trading agencies the highest percentage figures for any of the types.
Section Three: Reforms Similar to Agencification
There were a number of related reforms going on in the UK central state 
with similarities to agencification in the same period. But the ‘Next Steps’ 
agency reform was sufficiently distinctive to constitute a separate strand of 
reform. The other reforms did not have enough features of the agency model and 
agencification to constitute further examples of use of the model. However, 
agencification drew on elements of the earlier Financial Management Initiative 
(FMI) in that agencies had clear targets for their performance and clearly defined 
objectives, which were key aspects of FMI. The 1988 report which generated the 
reform proposal was originally a study into the progress made in the FMI and 
other reforms (Goldsworthy 1991:5-6). However, the FMI did not propose 
organisational separation to the same degree and had largely run its course by 
1988. A second related reform was the removal of central pay and grading 
systems. This reform is closely related to the general thrust of agency creation 
because it involved giving more autonomy to individual units. However, the 
delegations were also given to departments rather than picking off blocks of 
work to form distinct ‘agencies’ with a principle of less ad hoc intervention by 
senior staff in the department.
Other reforms in the central state had fewer similarities to agencification. 
The setting up of the Senior Civil Service in 1996 consisted of enhancing 
common career practices across senior grades, including senior agency staff. In
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this sense it conflicted with the idea of letting agencies develop their own 
approaches. However, because it was mainly focused on departments where the 
bulk of senior staff were located, it is separable from the agency creation process 
discussed here. Similarly the delayering of senior posts in the mid and late 1990s, 
involving cutting grades, was an internal process of management reorganisation 
within departments and agencies rather than a change in use of the agency model.
There were further public sector reforms that affected the central state 
and which had some similar features to agencification. A major reform 
throughout the period was privatisation, in a number of different forms. Firstly, 
there was privatisation where ownership was transferred from the public sector to 
a private firm or charity. The 1988 Report suggested that agencies could be part 
of the public service or ’may be more effective outside government' (Efficiency 
Unit 1988:9), continuing 'Ultimately some agencies could be in a position where 
they are no longer inside the Civil Service in the sense they are today.' 
(Efficiency Unit 1988:10). However, whilst privatisation of agencies has 
occurred, it is not analytically part of the definition of agencification offered in 
Chapter One and was not part of the practice of setting up Next Steps agencies. 
The Cabinet Secretary Sir Robin Butler wrote 'The Next Steps initiative is simply 
about reorganising executive functions within government' (Butler 1994:266). 
Whilst privatisation was considered prior to establishing an agency, the official 
statements introducing the reform quickly de-emphasised the potential 
privatisation option, commenting that 'agencies will generally be within the civil 
service, and their staff will continue to be civil servants’ (Hansard 1987-88: Col 
1157). Whilst agencies were privatised and privatisation was an option it was 
not directly part of the agency reform.
Another form of privatisation involved the use of private firms under 
contract to provide public services. This type of change was evident in the 
Competing for Quality, or market testing reform, which arose about three years 
after the Next Steps process got under way (Prime Minister 1991, Treasury 
1991). The market testing procedure involved a review process similar to the 
prior options process before agency creation. The following questions were 
asked of an activity. Firstly, does the activity need to be done at all? Secondly, if
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the activity has to be performed does the government have to be responsible for 
it? Thirdly, if the government needs to retain responsibility does it have to carry 
out the task itself? Finally when the job has to be carried out by government is 
the organisation of the correct structure (Prime Minister 1994). In this sense 
'market testing' was not fully distinct from the creation of agencies because the 
agency form was one of the possible organisational structure. However, the use 
of private firms under contract to provide public services is not an instance of the 
agency model in the terms used here, which focuses on publicly owned bodies. 
Another form of privatisation was the Private Finance Initiative. This initiative 
consisted of increasing the use of private investment to provide public services 
paid for by taxpayers or some other arrangement, such as charging (Treasury 
1992b). However, whilst a PFI arrangement was an alternative to the use of an 
agency, it was a distinctly different form of arrangement to the agency model of 
service delivery, usually involving a contract with a privately owned 
organisation.
However, there was use of ‘arms length’ relationships between 
departments and other public organisations with similarities to the agency model. 
These include the use of so called ‘quangos’, the central state’s relationship with 
the local state and nationalised industries. The term ‘quango’ has been applied to 
many types of organisation and has a complicated history. Many have suggested 
that quangoisation, the increased use of this form, has been an important feature 
of the latter half of the 20th century both in the UK and other developed countries 
(Flinders and Smith 1999). In the UK central state, quangos were normally taken 
to centre on Non Departmental Public Bodies, a term derived from Sir Leo 
Pliatzky's 'Report on Non-Departmental Public Bodies of January 1980 (Pliatzky 
1980). An NDPB was defined as 'a body which has a role in the processes of 
national government, but is not a government department or part of one, and 
which accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm's length from 
Ministers' (Cabinet Office/Office of Public Service 1995: v). These bodies were 
different from the agency model in two important respects. They were not 
formally part of departments and usually had a statutory framework establishing 
them.
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The agency model has closer links and a stronger role for the department 
in controlling the agency through formal performance targets than NDPB 
arrangements. NDPBs were structured with more autonomy from departmental 
direction, although departments did try to influence these bodies from time to 
time. NDPBs are beyond the scope of the present analysis. However, 
confusingly, the now defunct Funding Agency for Schools was called an 
‘agency’ but was an executive body of the Department for Education and not part 
of the Next Steps agency reform. The Funding Agency for Schools did not match 
the criteria of the agency model and is not included in this study. The 
nationalised industries that existed in the period, similarly to NDPBs, were not 
examples of the agency model because these organisations had greater autonomy 
from departments than agencies. Table 2.7 summarises the main reports 
produced by government that relate to the ‘Next Steps’ agency reform in the 
period.
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Table 2.7 Principal Reports and Legislation Relating to the ‘Next Steps’ 
Agency Reform in Central Government 1988-1998________________________
Date Report Description
1988 Improving 
Management in 
Government: the 
Next Steps
Suggested establishing executive agencies operating in 
a policy and resources framework set by departments
1989 The Financing 
and
Accountability of 
Next Steps 
Agencies
Set out the financial framework in which agencies 
operated and the relationship with the public 
expenditure control system
1990 The Government 
Trading Act
Extended the eligibility for trading fund status to a 
wider set of public bodies including some agencies
1991 Making the Most 
of Next Steps 
(Fraser Report)
Recommended that departments grant agencies more 
freedoms and adjust their work to reflect agency 
working and suggested improved mechanisms for 
communication between departments and agencies
1991 The Citizen’s 
Charter
Standards for public services and better performance 
reporting for public bodies, including agencies. The 
Charter standards were similar to agency performance 
targets, and were the same in some cases.
1991 Competing for 
Quality
Suggested ‘market testing’ parts of central government 
work including activities handled by agencies
1994 The Civil 
Service:
Continuity and 
Change
Consolidation of agency system and efforts to ensure 
the continued survival of a cadre of senior civil 
servants
1995 Next Steps: 
Moving On 
(Trosa Report)
Reviewed progress since the Fraser Report and 
suggested further ways of improving 
department/agency communication and improvements 
to performance regimes for agencies
1996 Development and 
Training for Civil 
Servants: A 
Framework for 
Action
Improvements to training systems, including passing 
on more responsibility to departments and agencies
1996 Government
Direct
Prospectus for the electronic delivery of government 
services including services handled by agencies
Source: Cabinet Office (199 3:80-83); Minister for the Cabinet Office (2000:297-
301).
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Conclusion
Findings from the analysis of developments in the UK central state 
suggest that the agency model became increasingly significant between 1988 and 
1998, with over 155 agencies created in the period. By 1998, 65 per cent of civil 
servants worked in agencies. However, the creation of agencies was not a 
uniform phenomenon and a pattern was apparent. The agency reform was very 
significant, in terms of staff, for some departments, especially the Department of 
Employment (which merged with Education during the period), Department for 
the Environment Transport and the Regions (which arose from a merger of 
Environment and Transport during the period), Home Office, Lord Chancellor’s 
Department and Department of Social Security. In contrast it was less significant 
in others, for example the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The creation of an agency involved different types of agencification. 
Mitigated agencification, in which the organisation existed as a separate unit 
prior to agency creation, was the most numerous type, with 69 per cent of 
agencies arising this way, followed by pure agencification with 14 per cent. 
Nominal agencification similarly accounted for 14 per cent of agency creation 
with new functions forming the remaining 2 per cent. These results suggest, 
overall, that Next Steps was a major reform, as suggested by official accounts. 
However, the analytical approach produces a more differentiated interpretation of 
the reform than in official accounts. Whilst pure agencification was evident, the 
importance of mitigated agencification reflected the considerable fragmentation 
within departments before the agency reform and there were some cases of 
nominal change.
The bureau tools typology demonstrates the variety of agencies produced 
by the reform. The Delivery type was the most numerous with 119 agencies or 
77 per cent, followed by the Contract/transfer with 20 agencies or 13 per cent, 
Trading with 15 agencies or 9 per cent, and Trading/contract/transfer with 1 
agency. In terms of staff numbers, the Contract/transfer type was the most 
significant with around 40 per cent of staff, in part because of the contribution of 
the biggest agency, the Benefits Agency. Most types reflected the general pattern
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of agency origins, however 30 per cent of trading agencies were the result of 
nominal agencification.
The creation of agencies had similarities with other reforms in the UK 
public sector during the same period. The most closely related reform was the drive 
to delegate pay and grading to departments and agencies, which fitted with the 
thrust of the agency initiative to create corporate units. The drive to set standards as 
part of the Citizen’s Charter was similar to the use of performance targets, but the 
agency performance systems were embedded in regulatory systems for departments 
to control agencies. The agency reform was more distinct from other changes 
occurring during the period, including different forms of privatisation.
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Chapter 3: The Practice of Agency Working
'Over the last six years the Next Steps initiative has fundamentally altered 
the way in which the Civil Service is managed' (Prime Minister, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
1994:13).
The above quote from the government White Paper Continuity and 
Change suggests that agencies had been set up and were operating in a way 
largely consistent with the original recommendations of the 1988 Report. But 
neither the government nor academics evaluated the operation of these bodies 
systematically. The claim in the White Paper was an assertion rather than a 
conclusion based on clear evidence. This chapter examines the overall practice of 
agencies by drawing on the fragmented academic and official studies to build a 
more systematic analysis on a few key dimensions. The approach is 
supplemented by exploring the case of the Benefits Agency, drawing on more 
detailed studies and interviews. Each section of the chapter examines the 
operation of an element of the agency model. Section One looks at organisational 
separation between the agency and department and the operation of freedom 
from ad hoc intervention and flexibilities. Section Two examines regulation by 
the department, especially the use of performance targets. Section Three 
examines agencies’ relationships with bodies other than departments as distinct 
units within the central state.
Section One: Organisational Separation, Freedom from Ad Hoc
Intervention and Flexibilities
The first element of the agency model consists of organisational 
separation of the agency to create a corporate unit focused on achieving the aims 
of the organisation and freedom from ad hoc intervention by the department. 
Whilst internal management procedures are not prescribed in the agency model, 
the model implies a structure which is responsive to the chief executive and his 
or her management team and accountable through them to ministers. The model
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gives the agency flexibility in the use of resources to run the business in a way 
which best focuses on the task at hand.
Superficially, the separation of the agency from the department was 
achieved by creating a separate body called an ‘agency’ headed by a chief 
executive with overall remit for running a section of work as set out in a 
Framework Document. This Document 'publicly set out the respective roles of 
ministers..and those of agencies..they make transparent the resulting 
accountabilities within government and to Parliament' (Treasury 1989:17). 
Framework documents were not legal documents but contained durable elements 
which set out the Chief Executive's responsibility to Ministers, the Agency's aims 
and objectives, the services provided, the financial arrangements, including 
financial objectives and pay and personnel arrangements (Goldsworthy 1991:26). 
Although agencies formally remained parts of departments in many cases they 
were encouraged to create their own corporate identity and had more autonomy 
in the use of their resources.
The Government noted that after a phase of setting up agencies, the 
implications for the departmental side of the relationship were being realised by 
the mid 1990s. 'At the same time [as agency models developed], the development 
of a more structured relationship between those at the centres of departments and 
those in agencies has increasingly focused attention on the nature of headquarters 
tasks and how they can best be discharged, whether in policy making or the 
strategic management of agencies' (Prime Minister et al 1994:13). The resulting 
collection of agencies and departments was described as a 'federal structure of 
more autonomous units' (Office of the Minister for the Civil Service 1989:5).
However, the practice of agencies did not always reflect such a clear 
division of tasks. A 1991 report by Sir Angus Fraser and the Efficiency Unit 
analysed agencies in six departments taken to be broadly representative of most 
agencies, in terms of handling a similar variety of activities to agencies in total. 
They used the ad hoc classificatory scheme discussed in Chapter Two. However, 
the report listed examples of agencies it examined which coincided with the three 
main types identified by the bureau-tools typology in Chapter Two. The
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examples included Historic Royal Palaces (delivery) the Vehicle Inspectorate 
(trading) and Benefits Agency (contract/transfer). The team found a lack of 
clarity in the relationship between several agencies and their departments, for 
example in setting out the roles and responsibilities in the Framework Document. 
But they noted that this problem was less apparent where the agency had 
considerable autonomy in its activities and a direct relationship with customers 
(Efficiency Unit 1991:2-4;23-25). This finding fitted the trading types identified 
in Chapter Two.
Some of these problems reduced over time. A later report, published in 
1994 to follow up issues raised by Fraser, found that the relationships were 
generally more clearly worked out than in the earlier period, although tensions 
between agency priorities and departmental initiatives not included in agency 
targets remained (Trosa 1994:11-13). Only 20 per cent of the agencies she visited 
described their relationship with the department as a ‘good’ working relationship 
with clear allocation of responsibilities, and these cases were most clearly where 
there was some form of trading or clearly separable task (Trosa 1994:28). After 
1994, the core parts of departments made adjustments as part of Senior 
Management Reviews. There was delayering of senior grades resulting in staff 
reductions of 27 per cent overall, and more of a focus on tasks to be done rather 
than grades. These changes were partly to improve policy advice but also to 
match management structure to the needs of the work being done by departments 
to reduce ‘double guessing’ of agency actions by departments (Cabinet Office 
1995a: 17).
The difficulty of separating agencies’ tasks from those of departments 
was reflected in the issue of whether to hold the agency or the department and its 
ministers to account for performance. This issue received considerable academic 
and parliamentary attention. Academic studies define accountability as some 
form of giving information to other parties about activities, justifying actions on 
the basis of mandates for their conduct and praising and blaming the agency for 
the action, possibly with rewards or punishments in this process. Research 
examined the practice of allocating accountability for actions to agency chief 
executives and ministers (Dudley 1993, Barker 1998, Hogwood, Judge and
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McVicar 1998, Polidano 1999). Ministers did not always refrain from ad hoc 
intervention in agencies, leading to allegations that they were responsible for 
actions within the agency despite the formal separation of the body. This 
problem was explored in the case of the prison service, where the Chief 
Executive claimed that he had been subject to day to day interference from 
ministers despite the supposed operational discretion of the body (Barker 1998; 
Polidano 1999). The ministers did not limit themselves to ‘policy’ issues of 
setting the framework for the agency. Intervention included summoning the 
Chief Executive to the Home Office to discuss operational matters on a daily 
basis and the Agency being put under pressure to suspend the governor of a 
prison after an escape (Polidano 1999:202-203).
Other studies came to a similar conclusion. Hogwood, Judge and 
McVicar (1998) examined mechanisms of accountability to ministers, Parliament 
and other groups. They found continued intervention in agencies where ministers 
perceived political salience to be high. Harlow (1999) found problems of 
separating policy and operational matters in allocating blame for failures in the 
Child Support Agency. The Public Service Committee picked up on and reported 
these problems of ministers’ ad hoc interventions in operational matters (Public 
Service Committee 1996). Dudley (1993) similarly found that the separation of 
departments handling policy from agencies dealing with implementation was 
indistinct and that ministers intervened in agencies. However, high profile 
incidents attracting media and parliamentary interest were rare. The Prison 
Service and Child Support Agency cases were unusual (Polidano 1999:207).
The difficulties of task separation and freedom from ad hoc intervention 
were evident in the case of the Benefits Agency. But the problems were not as 
severe as in prisons and child support. The organisational separation between the 
Headquarters and the Benefits Agency is shown in Figure 3.1 at the end of this 
chapter. The purpose of the agency was stated as ‘the administration of social 
security benefits and other services’ (Benefits Agency 1991:4). This aim was 
restated in subsequent annual reports as a mission to ‘support the Government in 
establishing a modem welfare state...by helping to create and deliver an active 
and modem social security service. The service will encourage independence and
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pay the right money to the right person at the right tine, all the time’ (BA 
1999a:5). At the end of 1998, the BA administered 24 social security benefits, 
provided information and advice about benefits, handled claims, appeals and 
reviews, and made payments and recoveries for benefits (BA 1999a:31). The 
Department of Social Security Headquarters, contained the Secretary of State for 
Social Security, other ministers, the Permanent Secretary, the senior official in 
charge of the department overall. The Headquarters was responsible for overall 
social security policy and implementation. The DSS stated that Headquarters 
‘supports Ministers on policy and legislation and provides corporate management
of the Department as well as covering the allocation and accounting for
resources, targets and performance measurement’ (DSS 1999a: 1).
However, the separation of policy issues from operational work in which 
ministers did not intervene was not complete. The Framework Document 
emphasised that the Secretary of State, Permanent Secretary and DSS HQ did not 
ordinarily intervene in the day to day running of the agency (BA 1991:7). The 
1995 Framework Document restated the principle that the Chief Executive of the 
agency has responsible for day to day management was repeated (BA 1995b:3). 
However Framework Document gave ministers the right to intervene, even if 
they did not generally intend to use it, stating that the Agency was ‘acting on 
behalf of, and in accordance with any directions, where appropriate, of the 
Secretary of State for Social Security’ (Benefits Agency 1991:4). The Agency 
was required to ‘maintain the capacity to respond quickly to Ministerial 
direction’ (Benefits Agency 1991:5). But this potential for intervention did not 
produce clashes on the same scale as in prisons or child support (113 Senior 
Official, Benefits Agency; 115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
The incompleteness of the separation between policy and operations was 
acknowledged. The Framework Document stated that the Agency should 
‘contribute to the Department’s development and evaluation activities; provide 
information on the operational implications of current and alternative programme 
characteristics and provide, to an appropriate level of quality, such data as 
Ministers and the Permanent Secretary may require to support the monitoring, 
evaluation and development of policy and the monitoring and forecasting of
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benefits expenditure’ (BA 1991:5). The same document suggested that the 
Department consult the agency before making policy changes and that the chief 
executive could propose changes, but the that the Department took the lead on 
policy matters (BA 1991:7, BA 1995:3-4). These statements did not create a 
clear divide, in practice staff on both sides complained that the division of 
responsibilities was not always clear. The Framework Document suggested that 
the Agency was largely in a subordinate role in developing new policies such as 
strategic frameworks for delivering benefit or the design of new benefits. But 
senior staff in the Headquarters claimed that the Agency quickly developed its 
own policy capacity which duplicated the responsibilities of the Headquarters 
(114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security). In contrast, senior staff in 
the Benefits Agency said that the policy edicts from the Headquarters were 
underdeveloped and did not constitute a plan that could be implemented by the 
Agency. Instead the Agency often received instructions amounting to general 
principles accompanied by details of legislation. These instructions could not be 
used directly to inform delivery arrangements. The ‘policy’ section in the 
Benefits Agency translated the intentions of the policy makers into strategic 
management ‘business plans’ which could be implemented in the Agency (115 
Senior Official, Benefits Agency). Whichever of these interpretations was true, 
there was ‘strategic’ work occurring on both sides of the Department/Agency 
divide, although it formed a much smaller proportion of the Agency’s work than 
in the Headquarter’s tasks.
The agency model suggests that agencies have flexibility in the use of their 
resources, in funding and budgetary arrangements, pay and grading, recruitment 
and working practices. Studies of agencies in the early 1990s found that agency 
chief executives were not always getting the freedoms they needed, departments 
were in some cases attempting to micro-manage agencies, for example keeping 
controls over pay systems (Efficiency Unit 1991:6-l 1). However, the pattern varied 
between agencies and between different types of flexibility. Firstly, examining 
funding, the bureau-tools typology defined a difference between trading and non 
trading types of the agency model. In the trading type, the agency is given more 
freedom for commercial operation with net budget control and freedoms to expand. 
There were several trading fund agencies. In the overall survey, agencies that
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operated as trading funds for any of the period 1988-1998 are listed. However, not 
all operated on this basis for the entire period. There were 6 trading funds in 1991 
(Prime Minister and Minister for the Civil Service and Minister of State, Privy 
Council Office 1991:73), rising to 12 by 1994 (Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster 1994:iii). At the end of the period there were 13 agencies operating in this 
way (Cabinet Office 1998:53-56). The introduction of this way of working was 
delayed as financial information systems were set up but they generally worked as 
they were intended once established (Efficiency Unit 1991:13).
For non-trading agencies, the degree of financial flexibility varied. Some 
were financed by a ‘gross’ budget passed on from the department and required to 
pay any surpluses into general receipts, for example CADW. Some were supply 
financed but operated on a net running cost regime where they covered the costs of 
providing certain specified services by charging, for example the Vehicle 
Certification Agency. The freedom to have net control rather than gross was 
widespread. A survey of 26 agencies in 1991, including the above examples, found 
that 62 per cent had net running cost rather than gross control. There were further 
freedoms in use of budget, 85 per cent had complete or partial freedom to vire 
money between parts of their budget; and only 25 per cent not allowed some form 
of carry forward of unspent budget from one year to the next (Pendlebury, Jones 
and Karbharti 1992:42-44). Further freedoms were granted in procuring goods and 
services. A survey of 26 agencies in 1991 found that 85 per cent had partial 
freedom over procurement, although restrictions often applied to larger items over 
£0.25m of expenditure (Pendlebury, Jones and Karbharti 1992:45).
In terms of employment systems some flexibilities were granted, although 
agency staff remained civil servants on transferring to agencies, unless they were 
already some other type of personnel, such as military staff. The departments 
often retained controls over employment conditions, pay and recruitment, these 
were sometimes specified in the Framework Document. However, the Treasury 
and Cabinet Office granted discretions and delegated authority for recruitment to 
agencies. This authority was revocable and the agencies were dependent on their 
department and central agencies’ support. A study of 34 agencies in 1991 found 
that 82 per cent had partial freedom over recruitment. In the agency model,
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flexible recruitment extends to the chief executive who is supposed to be the best 
person for the job regardless of whether he or she has a background in the Civil 
Service. But the choice of chief executives was, in practice, heavily influenced 
by departmental and central procedures. A study of 90 per cent of the chief 
executives appointments over the period 1988-1996 found that competition was 
restricted. Only 65 per cent of appointments went to full competition and allowed 
candidates from any background to apply. In terms of appointments, 54 per cent 
came from the civil service, 18 per cent from elsewhere in the public sector, 15 
per cent from the armed forces and 13 per cent from the private sector. The 
tendency to recruit from the civil service was even more acute in the first two 
years of the reform. However, once chosen, pay was set according to the 
individual requirements of each appointment within certain bands set centrally. 
(Horton and Jones 1996). There is substantial variation in the pay of chief 
executives and the ‘ranks’ they corresponded to in the civil service, from grade 
1A (Second Permanent Secretary) to Grade 6 equivalent (Hogwood 1994:81).
Agency specific systems of pay took several years to develop. Almost 
three years after the initiative began, HMSO was the first agency to get a 
separate pay system. Some agencies did not want to develop separate systems, 
such as the Vehicle Inspectorate which delayed the introduction of a scheme 
(Clifford 2000:18-20). However, the fact that the agency was given some form of 
choice, even to remain in system wide arrangements, indicated a delegation. 
Agency specific pay systems began to catch on after 1994, most larger agencies 
took over the running of their own pay systems although there were restrictions 
on freedoms for senior officials pay (Cabinet Office 1994). At the end of the 
period, a Cabinet Office review commented favourably on the flexible systems 
developed by agencies to meet their different needs (Cabinet Office 1998). The 
pay bargaining systems, which had been centralised before the 1980s, also began 
to be set on an agency by agency basis, challenging the traditional conception of 
the Civil Service as a single employer (Clifford 2000).
Many agencies were successful in developing their own patterns of 
working distinct from their departments (Efficiency Unit 1991, Trosa 1994). 
However, a Price Waterhouse survey found that about half the agencies had day-
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to-day contact about detailed management issues with their parent department. 
Despite these limitations the same survey found that agency chief executives felt 
that they were able to devote the bulk of their attention to developing their own 
internal management styles rather than cross-departmental management issues 
(Hogwood 1994:86). Each of the annual reviews of agencies conducted by the 
Cabinet Office presented ways in which the organisations had been able to 
develop flexible practices. In the first review Peter Kemp, the Project Manager, 
claimed evidence from 34 agencies in the document supported his view that 
‘People are showing what they can do when they are enabled to give of their best 
rather than just told to do so’ (Prime minister and Minister for the Civil Service 
and Minister of State, Privy Council Office 1990:7).
A range of academic studies provides some support for this statement, 
although highlighting the restrictions on autonomy discussed above. The 
distinctive systems of working practices appeared most developed in trading 
types of agency. Dopson noted how the HMSO developed its own procedures, 
including staff appraisal systems. Although the agency initiative created an 
expectations gap because HMSO’s managers did not get as much freedom as 
they had hoped, they had more freedom to develop their own procedures than in 
the past (Dopson 1993:17-23). Mellon found, in interviews with six agency chief 
executives, that chief executives found it easiest to establish practices that broke 
away from traditional civil service procedures where they could point to attempts 
to improve customer satisfaction rather than implementing procedures set by 
departments (Mellon 1993:25-31). However, flexible working was far from 
confined to trading agencies. The chief executive of the Employment Service 
argued that agency status enabled the organisation to develop a clearer ‘vision’ of 
the business and styles of working focused on these aims which would have been 
more difficult without agency status (Fogden 1993:10-11).
The Benefits Agency reflected the problems with flexibilities found in 
other agencies. In terms of budget systems the agency was partially separate. The 
Agency reported through the Department as part of the Public Expenditure 
System and the Secretary of State for Social Security allocated resources to the 
Agency. The Agency operated under a gross running costs control system, and
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the chief executive submitted a statement of strategies and resource requirements 
to the Department and Treasury (BA 1991:13, BA 1995b:6). The Agency had 
some flexibilities in the timing of spending its money, with a 0.5 per cent year to 
year carry over of running costs and could carry out capital projects up to a limit, 
and switch between sub-headings of running and capital and other costs within 
limits (BA 1991:14, BA 1995b:6-7).
There were freedoms in use of other resources. The Agency had 
recruitment systems which were partially separate from those elsewhere in the 
DSS. These began at the top of the Agency. The Chief Executive, recruited by 
open competition and for a fixed term on the basis of suitability for running the 
Agency, but was appointed by the Department rather than the Agency itself (BA 
1991:15, 1995b:7). The Chief Executive was given responsibility for setting 
management structure, creation and retrenchment of posts and promotion and 
pay arrangements and general personnel issues outside of senior posts. The 
Agency gained responsibility for pay arrangements in April 1994 and developed 
separate systems for pay and recruitment in consultation with the Department 
and the Treasury. But this was carried out in a way consistent with the DSS 
Personnel Guiding Principles and the staff remained civil servants. However, the 
chief executive carried out negotiating rights with employees in pay bargaining 
which gave the body more flexibility (DSS 1995).
The Agency was able to develop its own working patterns. It had a 
different internal structure to the DSS Headquarters. The Headquarters was a set 
of closely located units focused on policy development and corporate 
management centred on Whitehall. The Agency initially had a central core based 
in Leeds with most staff employed in a local network structure of 159 Districts in 
20 Area Directorates with a central core of benefit centres. These were initially 
run through three Territorial Directorates with the whole of the Agency being 
supported by four Central Directorates covering personnel, policy and planning, 
finance and medical services (BA 1993:5). The organisational structure at the 
start of agency working is shown in Figure 3.1. In April 1996, the Agency 
reduced the number of territories from 3 to 2 and rationalised the Area structure 
from 20 to 13 Area Directorates. This change occurred after a review of the
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Agency in 1995 but was primarily instigated by senior Benefits Agency 
management to enable the organisation better to focus on its aims (113 Senior 
Official, Benefits Agency).
Section Two: Regulation by the Department and Performance Targets
The second part of the agency model consists of the department’s 
regulatory system consisting primarily of periodic review and a performance 
target regime. The Government reiterated that it was eager to 'move away from a 
'management by command' to 'management by contract' and saw agencies as a 
way of doing this (Prime Minister 1990:15). The system was originally seen as 
using an annual quasi-contract covering both policy objectives and a resources 
framework. However, in many cases the systems did not match the model.
The regulatory framework was principally set out in the Framework 
Documents. However the link for reporting agency performance and receiving 
instruction from the department took various forms. In some agencies the chief 
executive reported directly to the minister, but in many others the agency 
reported to the Permanent Secretary or lower ranking officials in the department. 
After the Fraser Report in 1991, senior figures were used as points of contact for 
agencies in some departments. Some personal responsibility for performance was 
taken by the chief executive. There were high profile removals, such as the 
sacking of Derek Lewis as head of the Prison Service agency or Ros 
Hepplewhite as head of the Child Support Agency, but these form under one per 
cent of the total number of people who held chief executive posts since between 
1988 and 1998 (Horton and Jones 1996 and Cabinet Office 1998:68-79). A study 
of agencies in 1996 found that only a third had experienced a change in chief 
executive and changes were often associated with an alteration of status rather 
than performance of the chief executive by itself. However, all chief executives 
had their pay linked in some way to performance (Horton and Jones 1996).
Departmental oversight through the agency ‘prior options’ review 
operated to a standardised set of procedures laid out in guidance (Cabinet Office 
1995a), although practice did vary. Each agency had an external review every
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five (originally every three) years, handled by the supervising department with 
guidance from the Next Steps Team in the Efficiency and Effectiveness Group, 
the Citizen’s Charter Team in the Cabinet Office and the relevant expenditure 
sections of the Treasury. In cases where the agency itself was a department, the 
review was conducted by the agency, but external representation from central 
departments was sought to include non agency officials on the review team 
(Cabinet Office 1995a: 1-3). The reviews brought together experience since the 
launch of the agency or the last review, re-appraised the agency using the ‘prior 
options’ process which examined whether the functions could be abolished, 
privatised, let using a contract rationalised or merged. The reviews evaluated the 
performance of the agency in meeting objectives, examined efficiency savings 
and productivity gains and how well services were delivered to ‘customers’ of 
the agency (Cabinet Office 1995a: Annex C). They made recommendations 
including changes to the status of the agency, the framework document or 
performance targeting regime The results of the review were presented to 
Parliament and included in the agency and report and some cases are also 
published separately (Cabinet Office 1995a: 13).
Full reviews and other assessments by departments led to changes of 
status or closure in 30 out of 102 agencies over the period 1995-8 (see Chapter 
5). So the review process appears to have been a real rather than just nominal 
consideration of status -agencies were not ‘immortal’ and resistant to change. If 
an agency review suggested that agency status was to be maintained, it made 
recommendations for future development of the agency and changes to the 
performance regime. The review documents were not ordinarily publicly 
available. However a survey of 30 agency reviews using unpublished official 
documents at the Cabinet Office found that, whilst the form was varied, most 
concentrated on performance targets rather than a broader consideration of 
efficiency and effectiveness. These limitations of the review process were 
recently acknowledged by the Cabinet Office but it was claimed that they 
provided a focus for thinking about the continued use of the agency form 
(minister for the Cabinet Office 1999:23). The Benefits Agency’s reviews by the 
Department for Social Security support this opinion. One review was conducted 
in 1995. Whilst the review did not result in a change in status of the Agency it
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did precipitate an internal restructuring to reduce the number of territorial regions 
from 3 to 2 and rationalise the directorate structure from 20 to 13 directorates 
(BA 1997:7-9). The review was also used as an opportunity for internal debate 
about the future direction of the agency (114,Senior Official, Department for 
Social Security; 115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
A key part of the regulatory system was the use of performance targets 
and measurement of performance against targets. These targets were set by the 
department as a way of controlling the agency in a strategic manner. The 
Treasury issued guidance on setting targets and measuring performance, 
categorising agency performance under the headings of financial performance, 
volume of output, quality of service and efficiency (Treasury 1992a). All 
agencies had a system of performance targets intended to enable departments and 
agencies to make value for money judgements by taking inputs and outputs 
together and considering how operations linked with policy.
However the systems were not operating as the model would require. 
There were large ‘gaps’ in the performance regimes of many agencies, targets 
were often changed and were not challenging enough. The target setting systems 
were often not fully integrated into wider planning systems. In 1991, the Fraser 
report found that target setting was still evolving for many agencies and the 
implementation of regimes was uneven. Sometimes overall goals were expressed 
as a single target. For example the Royal Mint was tasked with making a 
percentage return on assets. But most other agencies’ targets exhibited a wider 
range of targets. An evaluation of targets in the mid 1990s found a mean of 7 
targets for each agency. However there was considerable variety in the number 
of targets, from just one to over 20. In most cases a target did not seem to cover 
all the aims of the organisation (Talbot 1996). A study looking at the Home 
Office and Department of Social Security agencies in the mid 1990s, sought to 
identify performance targets corresponding to the stated aims of the bodies. The 
study found that 47 per cent of agencies’ aims and objectives were not covered 
by performance indicators and a further 31 per cent were only partially covered 
(Talbot 1996).
81
Not all aspects of performance were treated with equal importance. A 
study revealed that in total, for all targets for all agencies, 59 per cent related to 
outputs (for example units of different goods or services produced in a year), 17 
per cent related to efficiency (often a measure of unit cost of output), 12 per cent 
referred to processes (for example achievement of an administrative task) 9 per 
cent related to inputs and less than 1 per cent were about outcomes (for example 
effects of an agency’s activity on a policy aim) (Talbot 1996). In the early 1990s 
a survey of 26 agencies found few had clear targets for performance outside of 
financial performance (Pendlebury, Jones and Karbhari 1992: 47). Another 
study, which looked at a set of about three quarters of agencies that existed in the 
period 1991-994 found similar results, with efficiency targets forming around 10 
per cent of total targets with input and output targets forming the majority of 
targets, 40 per cent of agencies did not have any targets for efficiency (Hyndman 
and Andersonl 998:26-27). These studies suggest that the balance of targets was 
heavily weighted towards outputs rather than outcomes or efficiency.
Not only were targets limited, they changed from year to year, hampering 
a comparison of performance over time. Research looking at 10 agencies of 
different sizes between 1990 and 1996 found that there was a 70 per cent 
turnover of targets over the period (Talbot 1996:49-51). Targets were criticised 
for not being challenging enough. It could be argued that whatever targets were 
set reflected what politicians wanted from the agency, so even if they .appeared 
‘lax’ to an observer they were still a good indicator of performance, in terms of 
achieving what politicians wanted. However, many agencies were able to 
influence the setting of performance targets. The coverage and form of targets 
was usually only set after considerable discussion between the agency and the 
department in most cases because the departments lacked knowledge of what 
was achievable (Efficiency Unit 1991, Trosa 1994:11-14, Massey 1995). The 
problem of lack of independence extended to evaluating performance against the 
target, which was generally measured by the agency itself rather than by an 
external body. The National Audit Office found discrepancies in measurement of 
performance by agencies. For example, the Meteorological Office reported 
efficiency improvements at 75 per cent of the target for 1993-94. However, the
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NAO calculated that the agency had only achieved 40 per cent of the target 
(NAO 1995c:l).
The case of the Benefits Agency demonstrated the problems with 
performance targets. The Department of Social Security held the Agency 
accountable for performance against targets set by the Secretary of State which 
reflected key ministerial priorities, shown in Figure 3.1. The targets were mainly 
quantitative assessment of performance against a numeric target with a few 
milestone targets for achievement of specific policy aims. A steering group 
advised the Secretary of State annually on setting targets and sought advice from 
both the Department and the Agency (NAO 1998:37). The Agency provided the 
Department with performance information each month, which fed into the three 
meetings each year between the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Executive to 
discuss performance (NAO 1998:39-40). There were also Citizen Charter 
standards from the centrally driven initiative discussed in Section One. 
However, these were set in a way which overlapped with existing targets rather 
than constituting a separate set of requirements.
The external targets were supplemented by internal management targets 
filling out the external targets to deal with wider performance of the agency. 
Internal targets were set by the Chief Executive and approved by the Secretary of 
State. The Agency central management monitored performance and took action 
where performance was seen as needing improvement (Benefits Agency 1993:7). 
At each level of the agency the targets were a guide for action, so the external 
system had a considerable influence over the internal management of activities; 
leading to more standardisation of performance measurement regimes within the 
Agency (Greer 1994:74-75). It also led to more formal and independent central 
checking to ensure accuracy in the agency’s own performance systems (113 
Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
However, problems with the implementation of performance 
measurement and targeting systems were noted. Firstly, the Secretary of State’s 
targets did not cover some large parts of the agency’s work, for example the 
accuracy of the administration of Retirement Pensions (NAO 1998a:56). There
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were few measures of whether the benefit went to the right person and the 
systems largely ignored the issues of efficiency and the quality of customer 
service (NAO 1998a:39 The Agency had an indicator of cost of administration 
per pound of benefit expenditure, which covered all spending of the agency on 
benefits. However this measure left aside issues of quality -for example whether 
the right people were getting the benefit, which should have been a consideration 
in a ‘full’ indicator of efficiency. Such a consideration would have been essential 
for considering the effectiveness of the body in this task; the emphasis was on 
measures reflecting crude outputs rather than outcomes. Because targets referred 
to a percentage of claims rather than all claims, any claims beyond the target 
time did not have clear standards for achievement (Carter and Greer 1993). 
Secondly, performance targets were frequently changed. Some targets, for 
example the Secretary of State’s targets for speed of payment were downgraded 
after 1992/93. There were also movements in target coverage, definitions, the 
introduction of new tasks and problems with accuracy of measurement of 
performance against targets (NAO 1998a: 16). Locally collected data on accuracy 
figures, used to assess performance against external targets, were often found to 
be wrong. Local reports were suggesting that accuracy was 94.4 per cent against 
a target of 94 per cent, but when central checks were done the accuracy figure 
was found to be only 89 per cent (BA 1993: 20-21).
There was even some confusion about the fundamental role of the system 
of performance targets in the Agency’s relationship with the Department. This 
issue was reflected in contradictory statements about the regime by Ministers and 
the Chief Executive. Ministers stated that the targets were intended as levels of 
performance the Agency should achieve (Minister for the Cabinet Office 
1998:192). However the second Chief Executive, Peter Mathison, expressed a 
different view in 1998. He said that there was disbelief that some of the Secretary 
of State’s targets were achievable, citing an accuracy target of 87 per cent. He 
commented that ‘We have an overall target [for accuracy] for the Agency and 
when I came in we were so far adrift from it that people had given up [on 
achieving the target].’ (Social Security Committee 1998:Q152). Instead Mathison 
called the target a goal, in the sense of something to move towards rather than 
necessarily to achieve in a given year. Mathison stated that he was trying to get
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the agency to raise performance from below 80 per cent towards 84 per cent and 
eventually to 87 per cent. Ministers’ public tolerance of this position was 
demonstrated by the fact that they did not remove the chief executive and the 
apparent contradiction was allowed to remain (Social Security Committee 
1998:Q188-190).
Section Three: Relationships with Other Bodies
The agency model, as defined in Chapter One does not specify the 
relationship with groups beyond the ‘parent’ department in great detail. 
However, it does suggest that agencies have a corporate identity distinct from 
departments and some associated responsibilities to account for actions to other 
bodies as a distinct unit. The model does not alter the convention of ministerial 
accountability to Parliament, because agencies are controlled by departments, but 
it does suggest that the agency could be held more directly accountable for 
routine ‘operational’ matters. There are difference between types of agencies. All 
agencies are supposed to respond to customers, but the non-trading type agencies 
have ministers as their primary customer whereas trading type agencies, are set 
up to respond in a more commercial way to those who purchase services from 
them. However, all agencies remain part of central government, and as such are 
subject to system wide rules, but the model suggests that they are as free as 
possible from these rules to enable them to focus on the task at hand.
There was limited central monitoring of agencies by Parliamentary 
bodies, in keeping with the focus of the model on reporting to ministers, but 
some separate accounting for operational matters. Chief executives were 
responsible for answering MPs questions relating to operational matters, 
referring them on to ministers if they raised policy matters. For most agencies, 
standard practice was for the minister to see a copy of the answer but not to 
intervene if it dealt with operational matters (Hogwood, Judge and McVicar 
1997:20). However, the general principle of ministerial accountability, where 
ministers give information to Parliament, principally through questioning by 
Members of Parliament, take responsibility for action and, on occasion, resign 
for poor performance, did not operate fully for central government in general.
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According to a survey of resignations, ministerial accountability was a 
convention that, particularly with regard to resignations, did not seem connected 
with implementation failures in the early 1990s (Dowding 1995:161-178). 
However, Parliament expressed particular concern about the division of 
responsibility between agencies and departments. There were problems in a few 
cases, including HM Prison Service and the Child Support Agency as discussed 
in Section One.
In reviewing agencies, Parliament relied on existing governmental and 
academic studies supplemented by requests for information and oral questioning 
of witnesses on a piecemeal basis. Scrutiny was more effective in the committees 
than on the floor of the house, where questions were ad hoc and did not 
systematically probe the performance of agencies (Evans 1994). The Public 
Accounts Committee, acting with NAO advice produced several reports with 
substantial sections devoted to agencies (Public Accounts Committee 1989; 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1990; Public Service Committee 1996). 
Concern about the limitations of performance targets was expressed reported by 
parliamentary committees. The Public Accounts Committee argued for more 
indicators of the quality of service for customers into targets because this group 
was not having its interests represented in targets (PAC 1989). The Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee conducted reviews which suggested that agencies’ 
targets failed to take account of customer satisfaction (TCSC 1990).
Other committees touched on the work of agencies, but reviews were 
rare, generally concentrating on a few extreme cases (Hogwood, Judge and 
McVicar 1997:15). An example was the Social Security Committee’s interest in 
the Child Support Agency, which was the subject of several reports because of 
exceptionally poor performance (for example Social Security Committee 
1993; 1994; 1995). Agency officials answered questions at Select Committee 
hearings on the same basis as departmental officials, subject to the ‘Osmotherly 
Rules’ which state that civil servants answer questions on behalf of ministers and 
ministers make and interpret policy (Dowding 1995:156). The practice of agency 
working did not appear to involve a new and separate form of accountability 
directly between agencies and Parliament, bypassing ministers according to a
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study of select committee questioning of agency officials between 1988 and 1993 
(Natzler and Silk 1994:73). Later research produced a similar finding for the mid 
1990s (Hogwood, Judge and McVicar 1997:14-17).
Parliament’s watchdog for scrutinising the executive, the National Audit 
Office, conduced ‘financial audits’ of expenditure and ‘value for money’ studies 
relating to agencies. Each agency’s accounts was separately checked by the 
NAO, reflecting the emphasis on corporate responsibility in the model. However 
only 3-5 ‘value for money’ studies were carried out specifically relating to 
agencies each year. Reports published in 1995 illustrate the range of studies, 
including a review of services performed by Scottish Heritage (NAO 1995a), a 
study of banking services provided by HM Paymaster General (NAO 1995b) and 
an examination of the Meteorological Office’s performance (NAO 1995c). NAO 
did not undertake an evaluation of the agency model or the reform process in 
general. The partial exception was an early report on progress in the reform 
initiative (NAO 1989). In this report, the National Audit Office reviewed the 
initiative but the report was concentrated early on in the life of the reform and 
concentrated on departments’ performance in getting the Next Steps initiative 
under way (NAO 1989).
The Benefits Agency reflected this general pattern of relationships with 
Parliament. There were not such severe problems as occurred in prisons or child 
support. MPs questions about routine matters were handled by the Chief Executive, 
and, despite a few initial complaints from MPs, there was not great disquiet about 
the system despite the Agency having the third highest volume of questions of any 
agency (Hogwood, Judge and McVicar 1997:12-14). However, the difficulty of 
fully separating tasks between the DSS Headquarters and the Agency was 
reflected in accountability to Parliament, especially to parliamentary committees. 
The Agency was at times asked to present its case jointly with the Department, 
for example in giving evidence to the Public Accounts Committee (Public 
Accounts Committee 2000). The Agency was subject to inquiries by the National 
Audit Office as a distinct unit. The NAO found problems with both financial 
accounting and value for money. The head of the NAO, the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, qualified his opinion on financial accounts of the Agency for
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the tenth successive year in 1997-98, because of errors. In 1997-98 these 
included error or fraud constituting about 7 per cent of total spending of the 
Agency (Public Accounts Committee 2000:Secs.l-3). The NAO produced 2 or 3 
value for money studies each year in which the Benefits Agency was a 
substantial topic. The Agency received more attention than other agencies, in 
part, because of its size. For example, in 1998 reports included Underpayments 
to Public Service Pensioners on Invalidity Benefit (NAO 1998a), Benefits 
Agency: Performance Measurement (NAO 1998b), and Department of Social 
Security: Progress on Measures to Combat Housing Benefit (NAO 1998c). 
However these reviews did not amount to a systematic evaluation of the full 
range of the Agency’s activities.
Agencies developed relationships with broader customer groups and the 
public as distinct units through the production of annual reports and corporate 
and business plans. However, corporate plans were sometimes not publicly 
available for reasons of commercial confidentiality (Prime Minister and Minister 
for the Civil Service, and the Minister of State, Privy Council Office 1990:7-8). 
Taking the case of the Benefits Agency as an example, the organisation produced 
business and corporate plans setting out its strategies for dealing with future 
developments as a way of publicly stating its intentions and aspirations for 
performance to clients and the general public (BA 1991:8, BA 1995:5). Senior 
officials in the Agency suggested that it was keen to try and project a ‘corporate’ 
image as a distinct organisation to people claiming benefit. The Agency 
supplemented annual reports, with other schemes to refurbish offices, give staff 
name badges and produce promotional material to project a new image for the 
Agency (14 Official, Benefits Agency; 113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
The agencies remained part of the central state and were subject to system 
wide rules, mainly those set and enforced by the Cabinet Office and Treasury. 
The Treasury incorporated the agency system within the existing expenditure 
control framework, with agencies passing on their spending requests via 
departments (IA1, Senior Official, Treasury; IA4 Senior Official, Treasury). 
However, at some points central policies on expenditure limited agencies’ 
discretion. There were blanket public sector pay settlements, like the maximum
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1.5 per cent pay rise announced in November 1992, and periodic freezes on 
running costs throughout central government (Hogwood 1994:86). A survey of 
chief executives found annoyance at these pressures from the centre when many 
wanted to pursue their own policies (Price Waterhouse 1993). But, according to 
senior officials responsible for implementing Next Steps, the fact that these 
central initiatives were being interpreted as an unnecessary burden in part 
reflected a change, with Chief Executives questioning relevance to ‘their’ 
organisation rather than accepting because they were responsible for a 
component part of central government (II,Senior Official, Cabinet Office; 12 
Senior Official, Cabinet Office).
Agencies were incorporated into the existing system of accounting for 
expenditure, which placed responsibility on officials designated as ‘accounting 
officers’. The chief executives were appointed accounting officers for their 
agencies either as second accounting officers responsible for a ‘vote’ of funds 
allocated by Parliament responsible for the programme and agency running costs 
or appointed as an additional accounting officer responsible for the running costs 
of the agency (Treasury 1989). This allocation of responsibilities was consistent 
with the model’s emphasis on giving responsibilities to agencies as a unit, 
although cases were the chief executive was responsible for a separate vote as 
well as responsibility for running costs moved further in that direction than cases 
where the chief executive was responsible only for agency running costs. The 
freedoms from general accounting rules were greatest in trading funds with net 
running cost systems and freedom to expand service provision subject to certain 
restrictions (IA 3 Senior Official, Cabinet Office).
But even beyond the trading type, agencies had freedoms, as is illustrated 
by the Benefits Agency. The Treasury expenditure teams mostly worked through 
the DSS for public expenditure rather than dealing directly with the Agency. The 
Treasury and DSS were generally in agreement over the strategic management of 
the Agency and the relationship was made easier by the movement of ministers and 
senior officials between the two departments, especially in the mid 1990s (Deakin 
and Parry 2000:132). In this sense the Agency did not develop a fully distinct 
relationship with the Treasury, which was consistent with the agency model which
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emphasises departmental control over the agency. In terms of accounting for 
expenditure, whilst the Permanent Secretary of the DSS was Accounting Officer for 
the Department as a whole and for administrative spending and payments from the 
National Insurance Fund, the Permanent Secretary appointed the Chief Executive as 
Agency Accounting Officer for this expenditure where it was handled by the 
Agency (BA 1991:10, 1995b:4). The Treasury appointed the Chief Executive 
Additional Accounting Officer in accounting for the Social Security Benefits Vote 
and the Social Fund Vote (BA 1991:10, BA 1995b:5). This second function gave 
the chief executive extra responsibility, which was kept under review by the 
Secretary of State with advice from the Permanent Secretary.
Agencies were required to supply information to the Cabinet Office 
which produced an annual review of agencies from 1990. However, the Cabinet 
Office was not able to develop comparative indicators of efficiency for each 
agency in the review because the information provided was not produced on the 
same basis by different agencies (Minister for the Cabinet Office 1999:32). The 
Cabinet Office undertook limited reviews of some aspects of the practice of the 
agency model, but these focused on perceived best practice in procedures rather 
than evaluating performance. The major reviews in the early 1990s were the 
1991 Efficiency Unit report Making the Most of Next Steps (Efficiency Unit 
1991), a report to the Cabinet Office, conducted by a French civil servant called 
Sylvie Trosa, following up the issues raised by the 1991 report (Trosa 1994) and 
the ‘Massey Report’, produced by an academic for the Cabinet Office, 
concentrating on progress with previous recommendations for improvements and 
how information was fed into the policy making process (Massey 1995). After 
the mid 1990s the focus shifted from reviewing the creation of agencies to 
improving performance. This was exemplified by the report, The Strategic 
Management of Agencies (Next Steps Team 1995), which examined the different 
models for management used by agencies. There were few central initiatives or 
comprehensive reviews of performance and most performance information was 
handled at departmental and agency level.
Although most checking of agency performance was left to departments, 
which was largely consistent with the model, there were several central
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initiatives that limited the ability of agencies and departments to develop their 
own systems. The most significant conflict was in procurement. The Treasury 
introduced the Competing for Quality programme in 1991. This programme 
required departments and agencies to subject activities to competition by 
examining whether tasks could be better handled by a private firm leading to 
better efficiency and effectiveness (Treasury 1991). The 1991 White Paper 
required departments to propose a programme of activities which were to be 
reviewed. Departments discussed with agencies activities that were reviewed. A 
review of the initiative found a tension between this central drive and agencies’ 
autonomy, a particular issue arose for small agencies whose managers felt driven 
to conduct evaluations of activity for very small groups of staff which in the 
process incurred high costs out of all proportion with potential benefits 
(Efficiency Unit 1996: 29 and 31). Even in large agencies like the Benefits 
Agency, managers felt under pressure to be seen to contract out activities to meet 
the central targets rather than undertaking the review process simply to improve 
working within the agency (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
Another central initiative was the Citizen’s Charter programme led by the 
Cabinet Office. It included a requirement for bodies that dealt with the public to 
demonstrate performance against standards of service. The Cabinet Office 
required, after the launch of the Charter in 1991, that Framework Documents and 
plans reflect Charter statements about quality of service (Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster 1994: ii). However this scheme presented less conflict with 
the agency model than Competing for Quality, because the standards were 
largely self set and integrated within existing structures, such as performance 
targets. The Cabinet Office had little day to day contact with agencies (IA9 
Senior Official, Cabinet Office). In the case of the Benefits Agency, the main 
involvement was the Citizen's Charter Unit monitoring of standards of service. 
The Unit was described as an important influence on standard setting by one 
senior Benefits Agency staff member because the standards had to be approved 
by the centre. The need for approval reduced managers’ autonomy in setting 
standards (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
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Conclusion
The findings about how the model worked in practice during the period 
suggest that, as an overall group, there were widespread difficulties in separating 
out tasks and stopping ad hoc intervention by departments. But severe problems, 
reflected in disputes about accountability for performance, were limited to a few 
bodies, notably the Child Support Agency and HM Prison Service. The Benefits 
Agency illustrated the difficulties of separating strategic policy from executive 
operational responsibilities and the retention of ad hoc powers of intervention by 
ministers. However, in this case, there was an uneasy compromise which did not 
attract as much parliamentary and other attention as in the high profile problem 
cases. Flexibilities were given to agencies in budgeting and accounting. The most 
substantial delegations were associated with the trading agencies, although 
surveys reveal a range of flexibilities in other agencies. There was substantial 
delegation of pay and grading to agencies and evidence of diversification in 
working practices between agencies. The Benefits Agency reflected these general 
patterns.
The practice of departmental regulation was partially consistent with the 
agency model for most agencies. The periodic reviews of agency status did 
sometimes result in changes, including abolition and privatisation. These 
outcomes demonstrate that the process was not just a nominal consideration of 
status. However, there were widespread failures to produce performance targets 
that were simultaneously challenging, comprehensive and reliable. There were 
major problems of implementation of this part of the model in the Benefits 
Agency, with performance targets not reflecting all the aims of the organisation 
and substantial inaccuracy in reporting performance against some targets.
The relationship with other bodies operated in a way largely consistent 
with the model. The difficulty of separating out tasks between agencies and 
departments combined with ministers’ continued ad hoc intervention sometimes 
caused difficulties in reporting to Parliament, which was unsure of whether to 
allocate responsibility for failures to ministers or agency staff. These problems
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were only severe in a few high profile cases, principally prisons and child 
support, but the tension was evident in the Benefits Agency. In this case, both the 
Chief Executive and departmental officials regularly appeared before 
parliamentary committees. Agencies were incorporated in the existing system of 
Treasury appointed accounting officers by designating chief executives 
accounting officers for their agencies. In many cases the agencies were granted 
freedoms from central rules, most notably for trading agencies. The Benefits 
Agency had responsibilities for accounting as a distinct unit, with the Chief 
Executive being appointed Agency Accounting Officer and Additional 
Accounting Officer for some parts of the organisation’s budget.
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Figure 3.1:Benefits Agency and DSS Headquarters 
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95
Chapter 4: The Public Interest Model
‘It is difficult to put a figure on the benefits which should become 
available from our recommendations but the potential is obvious. Five per 
cent of Civil Service running costs amounted to £630m in 1986-87, and 
experience elsewhere certainly indicates that when good management has 
the opportunity to perform well, percentage improvements larger than this 
are achieved...But a primary aim of the recommended changes is to 
improve the delivery of services both to the public and to Ministers’ 
(Efficiency Unit 1988:16).
Part Two explores the second main research question by seeking to explain 
why the ‘Next Steps’ reform occurred in the way that it did. The public interest 
model is developed as an explanation of reform based on official justifications for 
the change. Section One sets out the foundations of the public interest model 
through a survey of the justifications offered by government, including those 
contained in the 1988 Efficiency Unit illustrated by the above quote. The survey 
enables the predominant account to be identified, centred on the reasons given in 
the 1988 Report, as the basis for developing the public interest model. Section Two 
develops the public interest model to form an explanation for the use of agencies 
with hypotheses that are amenable to empirical evaluation. Section Three conducts 
the first part of an empirical evaluation of the public interest model by exploring 
whether it appears to account for the pattern of implementation described in Part 
One.
Section One: The Foundations of the Public Interest Model
There are considerable difficulties in attempting to identify the ‘official’
account of the reform. The official explanation of Next Steps is not available in
any one source, there was no single blueprint for the reform. Instead, indications
of the reasons for the reform were presented by government organisations in
official publications, especially the original ‘Next Steps’ report, and statements
of politicians and civil servants involved in the reform. The original ‘Next Steps’ 
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report was very short, only 35 pages in length. However, it originated the reform 
and is taken as constituting the core of official justifications for the reform.
The Report argued that agencies were needed to deliver government 
services as ‘effectively as possible’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:9). The Report 
suggested that benefits in terms of economy would flow from the 
recommendations, stating ‘it is difficult to put a figure on the benefits which 
should become available from our recommendations but the potential is obvious. 
Five per cent of Civil Service running costs amounted to £630m in 1986-87, and 
experience elsewhere certainly indicates that when good management has the 
opportunity to perform well, percentage improvements larger than this are 
achieved’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:16). But the Report said the main aim was to 
‘improve the delivery of services both to the public and Ministers’ (Efficiency 
Unit 1988:16). In particular, it noted potential benefits in terms of effectiveness, 
stating ‘With total programme expenditure of £128b (1985-86), there is an 
immense opportunity to go for substantial improvement in outputs, with better 
delivery of services and reduced delays as an alternative to savings’ (Efficiency 
Unit 1988:16).
The reasons why agencies were supposed to bring about benefits were 
only sketched in the initial Report. It stated that several features of the pre­
agency system were inhibiting performance and a move towards the agency 
model was needed. The Report asserted that the civil service was too big to be 
managed as a single entity. More flexibility was needed to allow managers to 
adjust their systems to suit the needs of the job at hand. Freeing managers in 
agencies from intervention from the department and ministers was supposed to 
enable them to focus on the task at hand. At the same time, the agency model 
was also supposed to free up people in the department to concentrate on their 
core activity of policy advice, where ministers, Parliament, the media and the 
public demanded that more time was spent on these activities. The use of more 
clearly defined aims associated sections of budget in the policy and resources 
framework for each agency was supposed to focus managers’ attention on getting 
the job done efficiently and effectively, reducing costs where this did not
compromise effectiveness (Efficiency Unit 1991: 9-13). The agency form of 
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organisation was supposed to be more suitable for dealing with ‘executive’ 
operational activities rather than ‘policy’ strategic tasks (Efficiency Unit 1991:9). 
Executive activities were seen as suitable for control by the strategic policy and 
resources framework.
Other statements about the reform reflected a similar belief. An unofficial 
history o f the reform was written by Diana Goldsworthy, who was one of the 
original members of the Next Steps Project Team. Whilst the document was not 
called an ‘official history’ it clearly had the approval of senior officials; Sir 
Robin Butler, then Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, 
commissioned the pamphlet and wrote its Forward (Goldswothy 1991:I-ii). 
Goldsworthy reiterated the benefits of the agency form and argued that much 
central government work was executive in nature, commenting that ‘a very high 
proportion of government activities can, in principle, be run on an agency basis’ 
(Goldsworthy 1991:25).
The same position was stated in the Continuity and Change White Paper 
in 1994, which commented that 'The Government does not...envisage extending 
the formal establishment of agencies into areas of the Civil Service primarily 
concerned with policy' (Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1994:13). There were few statements of 
the reasons for the reform by departments, beyond it being government policy 
applied to a particular area of government. In the case of the Benefits Agency, 
the ad vantages were stated as being ‘delegation with clear lines of responsibility 
and accountability, clearly defined targets and challenging performance targets, 
published annual reports, making the business more open to scrutiny, greater 
emphasis on the business and customer service’ (DSS 1993:3). The Benefits 
Agency commented on similar advantages, allowing the organisation to focus on 
the meeds of customers while working within a framework set by ministers 
(Benefits Agency 1991:5).
However, there were disputes about how radically delegation should be
pursmed and the benefits of such a change. The justification for the creation of
automomous agencies was not accepted by all parts of government at the start of 
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the reform period. Treasury was not happy with the plans to give organisations 
more autonomy and in the early stages opposed the reform. There was a long 
delay between the study’s completion in March 1987 and its publication in 
February 1988, in part reflecting the lack of agreement. Nigel Lawson referred to 
the Treasury’s concern that the reform would lead to difficulties in controlling 
the expenditure of agencies because of a lack of market discipline inside the 
public sector (Lawson 1993: 393). However, the Treasury changed its view, 
arguing that the agency model could be applied, and budgets controlled, within 
the existing public expenditure and accounting systems. The Treasury moved its 
position to one more consistent with the Cabinet Office/Efficiency Unit view. 
The Treasury acceptance of the principle of ‘strategic’ management of public 
expenditure was reflected in changes under the Fundamental Expenditure 
Review of its own activities in the mid 1990s (IA3 Senior Official, Treasury). As 
part of this change, the Treasury gave up detailed controls, for example relating 
to approving smaller items of capital expenditure, in exchange for better strategic 
control of expenditure using key performance information (Parry, Hood and 
James 1997).
There were differences of opinion within the Cabinet Office. The first 
Next Steps Project Manager, Peter Kemp, suggested that a radical approach to 
allow agencies as much freedom as possible was needed to enable them to 
innovate and improve performance. In contrast, Sir Robin Butler, the Head of the 
Civil Service, wanted to preserve some of the common conditions of service 
across the Civil Service, in part because of the flexibility in organisational 
arrangements this facilitated (Butler 1991). Eventually Kemp resigned, 
prompting him to attack his former colleagues and the reforms ‘There are 
welcome breakthroughs but they do not add up to a revolution. At the centre, in 
Whitehall, old attitudes and the old guard prevail. The only heads that have 
rolled have been among the revolutionaries themselves’ (Kemp 1993:8 quoted in 
O’Toole and Jordan 1995:9).
There were similar disputes in the case of the Benefits Agency. The DSS 
Headquarters stated that ‘Whilst seeking to take maximum advantage of the 
freedoms offered by central initiatives such as Next Steps, the Department 
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remains a single organisations with inter-linked businesses and a shared set of 
management purpose and aims which underpin the wider aims and objectives of 
the social security programme. The Department allowed agencies to develop 
their own personnel systems but only on the basis that they took account of the 
wider departmental interest (DSS 1993:24). The tension between keeping 
controls and allowing autonomy was reflected in the Benefits Agency arguing 
that the main benefits of agency status came from freedom from controls, 
providing ‘the opportunity to give the Agency a clear sense of identity and 
direction’ (BA 1992:5). However, Kemp’s departure reduced the significance of 
these contradictory positions, but the tension was important throughout the early 
period of the reform from 1988 to 1993. After this time, the view that delegating 
pay and grading structures and greater freedoms was beneficial but only within 
some continuing system wide rules was the dominant position.
The official accounts of the reform were not based on marshalling evidence 
systematically to support the case for reform. Part of the 1988 Report’s title, ‘Next 
Steps’, reflected the document’s origins in a ‘common sense’ practitioner based 
reflection on progress in improving government rather than theory building and 
systematic analysis. The Report, began 'As a result of initiatives taken since 
1979, the management of government business is much improved...But there is 
still a long way to go' (Efficiency Unit 1988:1). The evidence marshalled in 
support of this position did not amount to a systematic analysis of the 
performance of the ‘reformed’ and ‘traditional’ parts of government over the 
period. Interviews were conducted with over 150 ministers and officials and group 
discussions held with many others. There were also field visits to see different parts 
of the system in action, analysis of previous Efficiency Unit scrutinies of work 
practices and meetings with three outside organisations. But the study only lasted 
for 90 days over the period November 1986 to March 1997 (Efficiency Unit 1988: 
33-34) and were presented in an impressionistic way. The recommendations were 
asserted rather than being supported by systematic evidence. There were no tables 
of data or figures to illustrate the superiority of the agency form over current 
arrangements. Much evidence was anecdotal, reporting ‘frustration’ at central 
controls amongst people working in the field and benefits from moving towards
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clearly defined and budgeted management where these had taken place (Efficiency 
Unit 1988:3-4).
The Report suggested that the adoption of agencies had not occurred before 
because there had been a lack of attention to the management of services over a 
prolonged period. The Report argued that new recruits to the Civil Service quickly 
became aware that the route to the top was through policy not management 
(Efficiency Unit 1988:3). Although the 1988 Report was not the first time that 
agencies had been suggested as a model for the organisation of government, the 
Report did not analyse the operation of similar forms in the past. A similar delivery 
structure was identified by the 1968 Fulton Report into the Civil Service and was 
experimented with in the 1970s. The Fulton Report recommended the possible 
‘hiving off of executive functions to accountable management units. It made 
proposals to distinguish between those whose primary responsibility was to plan 
from those who were mainly involved in provision of services and to establish 
clearer means of holding departmental branches and individuals responsible for 
performance (Fulton Committee 1968:51). Similarly, the 1970 Report The 
Reorganisation of Central Government suggested that functions be aggregated into 
a series of large departments with blocks of executive work ‘delegated to 
accountable units of management, thus lessening the load on the departmental top 
management' (Prime Minister and Minister for the Civil Service 1970: 6). There 
were bodies established in the 1970s which were like agencies, for example the 
Employment Service and Property Services Agency (Pollitt 1984). But the 1988 
Report did not examine the operation of these bodies in much detail, beyond 
referencing earlier reports relating to these experiences (Efficiency Unit 1988: 31- 
32).
Whist the 1988 Report was vague in its specification of the benefits of
agencies, it was more concrete in suggesting the way agencification should proceed.
It argued for a strong central management team to set the framework within which
departments should identify and establish agencies (Efficiency Unit 1988:4-5, 9-
13). The Report argued that the full support of the Prime Minister and Head of the
Civil Service along with other ministers was essential for making the reform
happen (Efficiency Unit 1988:12). The Report argued that a frill Permanent 
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Secretary was needed as ‘Project Manager’ to lead the reform and oversee the 
departments (Efficiency Unit 1988:13). This position came close to suggesting that 
there might have been some resistance to the reform from within the service rather 
than just a need for central co-ordination. Goldsworthy noted the importance of 
designating a full Permanent Secretary as a 'Project Manager' to ensure that the 
change took place, sending out a signal that the reform was not just hot air. She 
also recognised the importance of the Prime Minister’s and Head of the Civil 
Service’s authority in pushing for change (Goldsworthy 1991:10-11). The Project 
Team ‘was prepared to challenge their views when necessary’, when the team 
thought more progress could be made (Goldsworthy 1991:21).
The Project Team’s statement that central direction was needed partially 
contradicted suggestions that the Civil Service was wholehartedly behind the 
reform. The Head of the Civil Service noted that the success of the reform was in 
part the result of 'the wholehearted support of the Government and the Civil 
Service itself, as well as other powerful bodies, like other political parties, 
members of Parliament and trade unions.' (Butler 1991 :i-ii). At the same time he 
also noted the importance of the Project Team as a catalyst and the contribution 
of staff. Goldsworthy’s book strikes a similar note at some points, giving the 
Report team credit for crystalising a feeling in the service that structures needed 
to change and recognising 'The role of the silent and often apparently invisible 
majority of civil servants seemed at last to have been recognised and, unlike 
previous reforms, it seemed likely to be driven 'bottom up' rather than imposed 
'top down' (Goldsworthy 1991:8).
The official account also stressed that departments themselves were to
take the lead in creating agencies, using a standard general framework with
considerable flexibilities for application to their specific activities. The official
account at times emphasised the lack of a central rationale, and even the lack of
clear criteria for setting up agencies. Goldsworthy stated that, once it was
decided that a service should remain in government, agency creation was
considered but that ‘There are no absolute rules about this. One factor to be taken
into account is the extent to which the executive function can be separated from
policy-making. The definition of what constitutes “policy” as opposed to 
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“executive” work was a matter of some discussion initially but, as with many 
aspects of Next Steps, it has not proved difficult when dealt with pragmatically, 
case by case’ (Goldsworthy 1991:25). The agency form in particular departments 
was the result of this process. Reasoning in each department was evident in 
justifying the creation of agencies.
The creation of the Benefits Agency was justified as a variation on the 
general central theme rather than a slavish application of central edicts. The 
Department of Social Security reviewed its activities in the light of the Next 
Steps programme in the late 1980s. The reasons for the creation of the Benefits 
Agency were given both in statements justifying the creation of the agency and 
in statements about activities that were kept in the department or put into other 
agencies, and by implication not put in the Benefits Agency. The overall 
justification was that the separation of strategic functions from executive work 
would be beneficial, but within an overall departmental structure which gave the 
business a departmentally oriented corporate identity. People involved in the 
central Project Team commented approvingly on the changes in the Department 
of Social Security because the activities being put into agencies were ‘so integral 
to the parent Department’ (Goldswothy 1991:36).
However, officials who were not directly involved in the creation process
in the DSS later commented that the rationales offered by the Caines and Hickey
reports were based as much on the practicality of changing the existing
organisational structure as starting with a blank sheet of paper (I 13 Senior
Official, Benefits Agency; 115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). There was no
justification of limiting the search process to activities within the department
beyond the pragmatism of the approach. The Resettlement Agency was
announced as the first candidate early on, in February 1988, on the basis that it
was a separable business with routine tasks (Greer 1994:33). At that time, it was
argued that the other parts of the Department needed more time for
consideration. When the reviews were completed, the justification for the broader
changes was primarily set out in terms of the ease of identifying separate
businesses which could be controlled using the agency model. This argument
was used to justify establishing separate agencies for contributions, information 
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technology, general welfare payments, child support and war pensions. The 
remaining departmental procedures were meant to emsure co-operation between 
these bodies when needed and set strategic direction. However, contradictions in 
the official justification were evident at the departmiental level as well as the 
general level. In the DSS, there was a divergence of opinion about the extent to 
which agencies could be separated from each otther. The Hickey Report 
suggested keeping contributions and welfare paynnents together whilst the 
Permanent Secretary, whose opinion was reflected in the final outcome, 
suggested separating them (Greer 1994:34-35).
Section Two: The Public Interest Model
The public interest model developed in thus section tries to form a 
coherent, complete, justification that can be empirically evaluated based on the 
official accounts described in Section One. The explamatory model gives reasons 
why changes came about in terms of aims of the re-formers, including reasons 
why the agency model was supposed to be beneficial, and the action taken by 
reformers to bring the changes into practice. The publiic interest model ‘irons out’ 
the contradictions by taking the preponderance of wiews where these clashed 
developing a theoretically informed framework drawing on the agency and 
agencification models from Chapter One.
The public interest model is structured in two parts. The first part seeks to
explain the way the agencification process was undertaken in the way that it was.
The dominant view from the official accounts, as contained in the 1988
Efficiency Unit Report, was that the Civil Service acknowledged the need for
change but needed a central unit and central leadership to co-ordinate the reform,
with the centres of individual departments identifying candidates and setting up
agencies. The central team advocated a pragmatic approach in this respect
following the basic principle that departments were i;n a better position to judge
the setting up of agencies than the central units. Tlhe model suggests that the
division of responsibilities simply reflected specialisation, side-lining apparent
differences of opinion about the reform, including thie early objections from the
Treasury and disputes between the Project Manager and Head of the Civil 
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Service about the extent of freedoms. Instead, it stresses the unitary nature of the 
central state as an actor pursuing the goals of the reform through use of the 
agency model.
The second part of the model refers to the overall goals of the reform and 
why the agency model was supposed to be beneficial. The official goals are most 
coherently expressed as improving performance in terms of the public interest. 
This justification suggests that the central state sought to pursue this interest by 
using agencies as a delivery structure for public services. The model treats the 
politicians and central civil servants in the central agencies and centres of 
departments as a single actor seeking to promote general welfare. In analysing 
markets, the public interest is conventionally viewed as the interests of 
individuals as promoted by free markets in which there is voluntary exchange of 
goods and services with no market distortions, rather than the interests of 
privileged groups. Reading-across to the public sector, where there is public 
ownership and funding and conventional markets do not operate, the public 
interest must be redefined. It can be translated as the interests of individual 
taxpayers and, broadly defined, users of public services as opposed to the 
sectional interests of narrow interest groups who can exploit a privileged position 
for their own benefit (James 2000). Both the 1988 Efficiency Unit Report and the 
Government’s response to it vowed their intent to improve public service 
delivery for ministers and the public and to promote effectiveness, efficiency, and 
economy. This last goal is potentially contradictory in some circumstances, for 
example if budget rises but output rises faster than inputs then efficiency improves 
but economy worsens. However, it is consistent to the extent falls in inputs are 
associated with stable or rising outputs, and can be considered separately where this 
is not the case
The public interest model further suggests that agencies are especially
suitable for achieving these goals. It explores the choice of the agency model
compared to the other organisational forms for delivering public services that were
identified in Chapter One. A useful framework for considering choice of service
delivery structure from within the public interest perspective is provided by
transaction cost analysis. This analysis is part of the new institutional economics, 
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a body of research that seeks to understand the variety of institutional and 
organisational arrangements adopted to govern economic activity using 
techniques drawn in particular from economics but also from organisation theory 
and law (Williamson 1996:3-20). Standard economic theory suggests that 
specialisation in production leads people to trade for mutual benefit and that 
trade requires co-ordination. In some contexts the price mechanism and markets 
will be all that is required. But transaction cost theory develops from the 
recognition that neo-classical economic theory's ignores costs which arise from 
impediments to reaching and enforcing agreements.
Transaction costs arise because of bounded rationality and opportunism in a
world where uncertainty prevents everything being written down in advance.
Bounded rationality is individuals' limited ability to realise their intentions, people
are hampered by their limited knowledge, foresight, skill and time. Opportunism is
transactors' willingness to attempt to obtain a more favourable distribution of the
gains from trade by reneging on agreements or in some way exploiting trading
partners. Opportunism can involve behaviour within agreements, so called 'moral
hazard' such as shirking or alternatively trying to get favourable terms for the
agreement in the first place. Transaction costs vary in significance according to
dimensions of the transaction. The relative significance of these dimensions
influence the 'efficient', in terms of transaction cost minimising, organisational
form. The relative importance of different features of transaction varies in different
transaction cost models but typical dimensions include asset specificity, problems
of performance measurement, frequency of interaction and complexity of writing
contracts (see Milgrom and Roberts 1992:Ch 2, for a more extensive discussion).
The dimension of asset specificity illustrates the approach for its use in this
research. Asset specificity is the degree to which assets are specifically designed for
or located for a specific user. This feature makes redeployment of assets from their
current use less attractive and encourages conflict between contracting parties. A
simple form of market organisation offers the potential for the party owning the
asset to be exploited after making an investment because the party they contract
with knows the value in the next best use is low and can renege on agreements,
perhaps discouraging beneficial exchanges from occurring at all. In contrast,
vertical integration of production in which production is internalised alters the legal 
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relationship between the transactors. It allows transactors to overcome some of the 
problems of market exchange by placing more duty on employees to act in the 
interests of employers and internal management acts as a 'court-like' body in the 
case of disputes rather than external court system.
Transaction cost theory explains organisational structures as the outcome of 
a process of minimising transaction costs by aligning different organisational forms 
with transactions of different features. There are two main variants of the 
minimisation process, sometimes labelled the 'blind' and 'deliberate' models 
(Buckley and Chapman 1197:127-8). The 'blind' model derives from the population 
ecology of organisations and suggests that organisations are not intelligent and 
purposive, using an analogy of DNA in biological theories of evolution. Instead 
each generation of organisational form replicates itself with a minor random 
variation which will affect its likelihood of surviving in an environment. Only 
organisational forms that survive are able to replicate themselves.. These problems 
include the risk of tautology in explanation by arguing that 'survivors survive', the 
problem of identifying an organisational unit which conveys structure across 
generations of organisation as an equivalent of the gene in evolutionary 
explanations in biology. Finally the mechanism for selection in an evolutionary 
account in the public sector is not clear. In a competitive market it is possible that 
poorly performing firm would be removed by market forces. In the public sector 
there is not a market in the same sense, so some form of political market 
environment which affects the survival of different organisations would need to be 
assumed (see Buckley and Chapman 1997 129-131 for a more extensive discussion 
of these issues). In contrast the deliberative model stresses that individuals in an 
organisation are willing and able to minimise transaction costs. In the account, 
managers weigh up the transaction costs of different organisational forms and 
choose the form that minimises the costs, for example in deciding whether to make 
a component 'in house' or buy it from another firm.
The deliberative form is used here. It consists of modelling the choices
made by officials at the heart of the central state when weighing up different ways
of delivering public services in terms of their implications for minimising
transaction costs and, in so doing, promoting the public interest. The public 
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interest account assumes that actors who might be drawn on to deliver public 
services are not always publicly interested and may act in their self interest. This 
tendency causes government failures where people delivering services exploit 
their monopoly position as providers of a service or where bureaucratic ‘agents’ 
can exploit ‘principals’ because they have an informational advantage about the 
activity they are performing (Wolf 1979; Vining and Weimer 1990). The 
consequences of these failures include goal displacement where the aims of a 
public body are altered by those running it, under or oversupply of public 
services where too much or too little is produced, wasteful production where 
services are produced at a cost in excess of what could be achieved, and 
difficulties in ensuring the quality of public services.
Transaction cost analysis enables different forms of delivery, in this case 
the choice between the status quo departmental form and alternatives including 
the agency model, to be considered within a common framework of comparable 
costs and implications for stopping government failures. The agency model is 
one variation of the use of authority for publicly owned central state bodies, as 
defined in Chapter One. In terms of transaction costs, the use of ad hoc authority 
enables better responses to uncertainty than rules, because delivery can be 
constantly reformulated for new cases as they come along. The ad hoc form is 
also particularly good where product quality is difficult to specify, because it can 
be changed as the situation evolves. However, this form has high monitoring 
costs for senior politicians and officials, who have to spend time and effort 
formulating unique responses to situations. In contrast, rules are lower cost 
because once established they can be used to deal with a number of instances. 
However they are not well suited to dealing with uncertainty and where product 
quality is hard to monitor, because they are, by definition, more rigid than ad hoc 
systems. The authority is directed to inputs or outputs. If outputs can be specified 
for a service then these forms are clearly going to be beneficial than if they 
cannot easily be specified. The same applies for inputs, although these are 
usually taken to be easier to specify for a wider range o f activities, because it is 
easier to specify something like a budget level than an indicator related to the 
goals of an organisation (see Smith 1993:1-19).
108
The agency model, in its pure form, makes only very limited use of ad 
hoc intervention. Instead it relies on output focused rules and freedom from input 
rules. This combination is supposed to allow the agency, especially the chief 
executive, to focus on the task at hand. However, there are variants of the agency 
model and important differences between trading and non-trading types. In 
trading types, with some form of charging, the agency form is enhanced by direct 
‘bottom up’ control by the consumers of services produced by the organisation as 
well as ‘top down’ control through the regulatory system. For this reason, there are 
fewer input controls over the level of budget. In contrast, non-trading agencies have 
input controls. The contract/transfer non contract/transfer distinction produces 
\ different types of control. In contract/transfer agencies, budgets are passed on to 
individuals or other organisations to achieve goals. There are fewer controls on the 
use of this money once it has been passed on, and achieving the task is either left up 
to them or written in some form of contract. In contrast, in non-contract/trading 
bodies, the budget remains within the direct control of the organisation.
The agency differs from other forms of organisation discussed in Chapter 
One. A key difference is with the traditional departmental model that makes 
extensive use of ad hoc controls on both inputs and outputs. Whilst rules may 
also be used in departments, the dominant characterisation of the form is ad hoc 
control. The agency form is expected to be more transaction cost minimising 
than traditional departmental forms for activities where outputs are relatively 
easy to specify, product quality is not difficult to establish and uncertainty is low. 
The agency does not need the high cost monitoring used in the traditional 
department to control these activities.
The model suggests that routine, executive, operational activities should
be located in agencies rather than departments. In contrast, the agency form is
less suitable for complex activities that are constantly changing. These activities
are difficult to control using output rules and require ad hoc control. Such
activities include non-routine, policy and strategic work. However, the trading
type of organisation has some suitability for this form of non-routine work,
because of the ‘bottom-up’ responsiveness to customers which enables a more
flexible response to these sorts of tasks.
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The agency model differs from providing a service using a private firm 
under contract. In the contractual model, the activity is passed on to a privately 
owned body. The public sector loses the ability to reorganise the activity in any 
way that it likes, instead control is through the contract. The contract contrasts 
with the controls that are available within an organisation, which are most 
extensive in a department but also available, with limits on ad hoc intervention, 
in the agency model. Instead, the public sector must rely on the contract with the 
private firm, which is vulnerable to opportunism for a range of activities where 
there is a need for flexible responses and where outcomes are difficult to specify.
The public interest model justifies pure and mitigated agencification, in 
cases where there has been an increase in the desirability of the agency form of 
organisation relative to the departmental form and where the agency form is 
preferable to other alternatives, such as contracts. The change is triggered by a 
rise in the costs of ad hoc control, a fall in the costs of rule based control, or 
policy makers coming to a better understanding in their deliberation of the 
possible delivery structures available to them. The nominal form of 
agencification does not involve a substantial change in organisation and is 
consequently not a significant change in terms of the model, instead it is a re­
labelling exercise.
The public interest explanatory model suggests a number of hypotheses 
about the agency model and agencification processes. These hypotheses are 
amenable to empirical evaluation and are summarised in Table 4.1 below. The aim 
of empirical evaluation is limited by the available evidence, the paucity of which 
has been commented on both by academics and officials (Trosa 1994: Pollitt 1995). 
However, the approach adopted here uses officially produced information analysed 
in unconventional ways, supplemented by interviews and other sources of 
information about performance from non-governmental sources, to evaluate the 
public interest model.
The first hypothesis relates to the process of reform as developed in the first
part of the public interest model. It is evaluated using material collected in Part One 
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about the process of reform and the official justification as outlined in Section One 
of this chapter. The second hypothesis relates to changes in transaction costs and is 
evaluated by considering these costs and evidence of deliberation by actors in the 
central state. The use of agencies for executive work is evaluated using the pattern 
of agency creation mapped in Part One and the type of activities handled by 
agencies. The third hypothesis relates to how the agencies performed and whether 
they were better than alternative forms of organisation. This issue potentially 
involves counterfactuals, such as what might have happened had departmental 
organisation continued or some alternative form been adopted, for which 
information is not directly available. However, examining whether the performance 
of agencies was seen as acceptable by those who set them up gives an indication of 
the adequacy of the agency model. Comparing performance before and after the 
reform allows some consideration of agency performance relative to traditional 
departmental forms. Evaluating the impact of agency structures on performance 
using evidence about their effects yields further information about whether the 
model achieved the aims that were expected of it.
Table 4.1 Hypotheses Drawn from the Public Interest Model
Part of 
Model
Hypotheses
One 
(process 
of reform)
1) Pure and mitigated agencification was conducted by a unitary central 
state seeking to deliberate and minimise transaction costs
Two
(rationale
for
reform)
2)Transaction costs changed in the 1980s or the state’s deliberations were 
brought up to date in this period triggering pure and mitigated 
agencification for ‘executive’ activity rather than ‘policy’ activity and 
transaction costs were unchanged in cases of nominal agencification
3)Agencies performance was in keeping with the expectations of 
transaction cost analysis in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
and performed better than alternative forms of organisation
Source: Section Two of this chapter
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Section Three: Evaluating the Public Interest Model’s Interpretation of the 
Reform Process
The first hypothesis is evaluated using evidence from the reform process 
in Part One and the official justification in Section One of this chapter. The 
official justification lacked coherence because of disputes between the Treasury 
and the Cabinet Office, between the Project Manager and Head of the Civil 
Service within the Cabinet Office and between the Cabinet Office and 
departments, who were involved beyond implementing a centrally worked out 
plan. The central state did not appear to be a unitary actor. There were a number 
of apparent inconsistencies in the official description of the reform, especially by 
the Project Team. They designated all cases of ‘agency creation’ as broadly part 
of the same Next Steps reform, but this does not seem appropriate in terms of the 
practice of reform. The reasons why the 14 per cent of cases of nominal change 
identified in Chapter Two, should have been lumped together with 83 per cent of 
cases where the reform was a significant change are not clear from the public 
interest model. This issue was particularly important in trading type agencies 
where 30 per cent were the result of nominal changes. These problems were side­
lined in constructing the public interest model as a coherent rational for reform, 
but they mean that this aspect of the reform requires an alternative explanation.
The second hypothesis is more difficult to evaluate. According to the 
public interest view, factors that could have stimulated a movement towards the 
agency model included a reduction in the costs of using standards or rule-like 
structures to measure performance and a rise in the cost of using of ad hoc controls. 
Evidence of these changes was cited in official statements. The 1994 White 
Paper Continuity and Change stated that 'Changes in society, technology, in 
international relations, in the world economy all have an effect on what the Civil 
Service is required to do and how it needs to do if (Prime Minister et al 
1994:10). New technology facilitated management information systems that were 
necessary to run the regulatory system and which were not previously available 
(Prime Minister et al 1994: Ch2).
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There seem to have been general changes across the public and private 
sector affecting the suitability of the agency form. The literature on wider NPM 
changes suggests that 'the demise of bureaucratic control strategies was made 
possible by alterations in technique which revolutionised the handling of 
information concerned with the planning, design, co-ordination and supervision 
of production.’ (Hoggett 1991:247). The broad trend towards agency-like
i L
structures in the private sector throughout the latter part of the 20 Century was 
noted by Williamson in his discussion of the move from U to M form firms 
(Williamson 1976).
The U form consists of a general manager supervising specialist 
managers, who may be responsible for different functions in the organisation. 
The M form came to replace the more integrated U form as businesses became 
bigger by adding new product lines and the costs of monitoring by a single 
central management became higher. The advantages of the M form firm are that 
responsibility for operating decisions are assigned to essentially self contained 
operating divisions which operate as quasi-firms. The corporate staff attached to 
the central office advise the operating divisions and also audit or regulate these 
units. The organisational separation allows the central unit to get on with the 
strategic direction of the business rather than the individual affairs of units.
The shift towards the U form of organisation reflected competitive 
pressures, making firms adapt in order to survive in a world of new technological 
opportunities (Hill and Pickering 1986). The changes in the private sector 
provide some support for viewing agency creation as the government recognising 
analogous benefits within the public sector by deliberation rather than 
competitive pressure. In the private sector individual units are set goals which 
reflect their contributions to organisation’s overall aims, usually some form of 
profit maximisation for the unit. In the agency model the goals are more complex 
and revolve around performance targets for services as part of the regulatory 
framework, but the principal is similar.
Whilst general changes towards use of agency-like forms provide some
indirect support for the public interest model, it is difficult to quantify alterations 
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in transaction costs and their impact on the increased suitability of the agency 
form. But a necessary condition for the public interest model’s empirical validity 
is that agencies were used for activities which the model suggests were suited to 
this form. If agencies were used for non-routine policy as well as routine 
executive tasks the justification for its transaction cost minimising properties for 
certain activities would not be valid. Examining the 155 agencies outlined in Part 
One using information about their activities obtained from Cabinet Office 
reviews of their work enables agencies to be classified into those predominantly 
handling routine activities and those predominantly dealing with non-routine 
activities. The full survey, and methods used in the survey process, is presented 
in Appendix 4 and the results for types of agency are summarised in Table 4.2. 
Whilst individual agencies were involved in a mixture of activities, the bodies 
are classified in the group most closely reflecting their activities overall.
Table 4.2 Types of Agency Classified by Routine or Non-routine Activity 
(with Percentages for Type) and Examples
Type Routine Activity Non-routine
Delivery 69 (58 per cent) 
eg HM Prison Service
50 (42 per cent)
eg National Engineering
Laboratory
Trading 10 (67 per cent)
eg QE II Conference
Centre
5 (33 per cent) 
eg Meteorological Office
Contract/transfer 20 (100 per cent) 
eg Benefits Agency
0 (0 per cent)
Trading/contract/transfer 1 (100 per cent)
The Buying Agency
0 (0 per cent)
Total 100 (65 per cent) 55 (35 per cent)
Source: Appendix 4
The findings appear to be partially inconsistent with the second 
hypothesis. Only 68 per cent of agencies handled the expected type of activity. 
100 agencies, or 65 per cent, were involved in routine tasks, with 55, or 35 per
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cent, involved in non-routine activity. Involvement in non-routine activities was 
most significant in the delivery type, followed by the trading type, but was not 
found in the contract/transfer or trading/contract/transfer types. According to the 
model, the trading agency form is suitable for both routine and non-routine tasks 
because of its ‘bottom up’ flexible responsiveness to customers, so the 5 trading 
agencies in the non-routine category were broadly consistent with the model’s 
expectations. The non-routine delivery type bodies were predominantly small 
research and/or consultancy organisations, for example the National Engineering 
Laboratory and the Natural Resources Institute. However, the apparent ‘misuse’ 
of the agency model requires explanation.
However, the activities that were put in agencies are only half of the 
picture. As important were the activities that were not put in agencies but instead 
remained in departments. Using the same method as for agencies, but using 
information from departmental reports, the sections of agencies’ parent 
departments are classified by bureau-tools type and activity in Appendix 5. Of 
the 138 sections, the majority fitted the non-routine activity delivery type with 93 
sections, or 67 per cent, handling non-routine activities. 32 sections, or 23 per 
cent, were non-routine delivery and non-routine contract/transfer types and 12 
sections, or 9 per cent, were handled non-routine activities and were of the 
contract/transfer type. Only one, the Immigration and Nationality Department 
clearly fitted the routine delivery type, although that is not to say that routine 
activities were not found in most if not all of the other sections, just that this 
activity did not predominate in these sections. In overall terms, sections of 
departments as a group are more involved in non-routine activities than agencies. 
This finding seems to partly explain the variation in the use of the agency form 
across departments found in Chapter Two. Departments with a large amount of 
suitable activities, such as the Department of Social Security, had a higher 
proportion of their work transferred to agencies than those with less suitable 
activities, for example the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
In the case of the Benefits Agency in the DSS, a contract/transfer type
was created handling predominantly the routine activities of paying out benefits
to claimants. As was shown in Chapter Three, the Agency did have some non- 
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routine activity related to operationalising policy statements provided by the 
Department but this did not take up a large part of the agencies’ staff and 
resources. The rump of the Department left behind by the agency creation 
process was the DSS Headquarters. The Headquarters section’s activities were 
focused on non-routine policy development, supporting ministers, corporate 
strategic management of the department and legal work (DSS 1993:24). In these 
ways, the case of the Benefits Agency and its department reflected the dominant 
pattern of agencies handling predominantly routine activities.
A second indicator of the degree to which an activity was routine is 
provided by the political saliency of the activity. This indicator allows the 
finding based on the basis of examining work tasks to be double checked. 
Political saliency is defined in terms of ministers’ interest in day to day issues, 
with high saliency indicating the non-routine nature of activities and potential 
desire to intervene in an ad hoc way. A measure of political saliency is provided 
by the number of Written Parliamentary Questions asked by Members of 
Parliament relating to different bodies. The political salience of activities handled 
by agencies in aggregate terms appears to have been much lower than for the rest 
of government. Taking 1995 as a census year, a time when the bulk of agencies 
had been established, there were a total of 3,374 questions for all agencies. This 
contrasted with a total figure of 41,620 for non-agencified parts of government in 
a combined total of 44,994 questions for all central government. Questions 
relating to activities handled by agencies were just 7 per cent of the total, despite 
agencies employing almost 60 per cent of all civil servants (Public Information 
Office, Department of the Library, House of Commons 1997:2; Table 2.1, 
Chapter Two).
The results for individual agencies reflect low saliency relative to other
sections of government. The survey of agencies is in Appendix 6 is based on the
98 agencies for which data was available, out of 102 that existed at the start of
1995, because 4 agencies were either privatised or in some way reorganised in
that year. The mean number of questions for agencies was 34, with a lower
median of 16 questions. The agency with the most questions was HM Prison
Service, with 613 questions, followed by Social Security Child Support Agency 
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with 231, Social Security Benefits Agency with 217, Employment Service with 
188, Highways Agency with 187 and Insolvency Service with 109. There were 
32 agencies with fewer than this number but more than 15, with the remaining 60 
agencies having between 0 and 15 questions.
However, these figures reflect the size of the agencies rather than saliency 
of the activity. Adjusting the measure based on Written Questions to take 
account of the size of the agency removes this distortion. In aggregate, the 
expenditure on running costs of all agencies was £ 10,991m with 0.3 questions 
per £m in 1995/96. This contrasts with non-agencified parts of government with 
running costs of £3,761m and 11 questions per £m. For central government 
overall, including both agencified and non-agencified parts, the figure was 3 
questions per £m on expenditure of £14,752m (see Table 5.1, Chapter 5). These 
figures suggest that non-agencified parts were almost 37 times more salient. For 
individual agencies, the mean figure was 1.3 questions per £m of running costs 
with a lower median of 0.9 questions per £m. No agency had more than 8 
questions per £m of running cost. The top three were the Veterinary Medicines 
Directorate with 8 questions per £m, National Weights and Measures Laboratory 
with 7.7 per £m and Wilton Park with 6.5 per £m. 54 agencies had less than 1 per 
£m. The Benefits Agency was ranked 93rd with a figure of 0.8 questions per £m 
(Appendix 6). Even the most salient agency had a level which was only three 
quarters of the figure of 11 questions per £m for the activities in the non- 
agencified part of government.
Conclusion
The public interest model develops the predominant official justification in
a form that is amenable to empirical evaluation. The public interest model suggests
that the agency form is beneficial for handling executive rather than policy activity
and gives reasons why there was a change towards increased use of the agency
form in the 1980s and 1990s. However, evaluating the model’s first two hypotheses
suggests only limited empirical support. In terms of the first hypothesis, the
contradictions and gaps in the official account are inconsistent with the model and
require further explanation. The central state did not appear to be acting as a 
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unified body pursuing the public interest raising the questions: why did parts of 
central government seem to have such different views of the reform? Why were 
cases of nominal agencification lumped together with more substantial changes in 
descriptions of the reform by the Project Team?
The second hypothesis receives more empirical support. The survey of 
activities shows that most agencies predominantly handled activities that were 
routine. In contrast, nearly all sections of departments predominantly handled 
non-routine activity. The case of the Benefits Agency shows that the agency was 
a contract/transfer agency primarily handling routine executive activity in 
contrast to sections of the DSS Headquarters which handled non-routine policy 
activity. There were several trading agencies handling non-routine activities. But 
this finding is consistent with the use of bottom up, customer focused, market 
controls for these bodies. The public interest model suggests that these additional 
controls allow a more flexible method of influencing non-routine activities for 
this type of agency. Beyond these cases, there were some agencies handling non­
routine activities, these were mostly small research or consultancy organisations. 
Taking political saliency as an indicator of routine activities produces even better 
support for the hypothesis. The activities handled by non-agencified parts of 
government produced 11 questions per £m of running costs. In contrast, the 
overall figure for total agency running costs was 0.3 questions per £m. For 
individual agencies, the mean figure was 1.3 questions per £m of running costs 
with a lower median of 0.9 questions per £m. No agency had more than 8 
questions per £m of running cost.
The findings relating to the first two hypotheses of the public interest 
model suggest that it receives some support. However, further explanation of the 
inconsistencies, especially the conflicting accounts of the reform by official 
sources, is required. The public interest model has a third hypothesis, that the 
agency model should perform well in terms of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness and perform better than alternative forms of organisation. The third 
hypothesis is evaluated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Evaluating the Public Interest Model’s Interpretation of the
Performance of Agencies
‘We have been very careful to set targets and the objectives for the Chief 
Executives of the Agencies not just in terms of cost but in quality of 
service. I think that those goals of quality of service are being very widely 
achieved...One is seeing the results of that in the speed and accuracy of 
calculations of social security benefits’. Sir Robin Butler, Head of the 
Civil Service, giving evidence to the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee (Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1993:53).
‘Without an objective measure of the [Next Steps] changes, however, 
doubt about the effectiveness of the reform will inevitably remain.’ 
(Trosa 1994:68).
The third hypothesis of the public interest model suggests that agencies 
should exhibit good performance in the delivery of public services and perform 
better than alternative forms of organisation. However, the above quote from 
Trosa’s report on agencies (Trosa 1994) illustrates that little research on the 
performance of agencies has been conducted either by government or academics 
(Pollitt 1995, Talbot 1998). Examining the performance of all agencies on a few 
key indicators and exploring the case of the Benefits Agency helps evaluate the 
third hypothesis. Section One examines the economy of agencies. Section Two 
looks at their efficiency and effectiveness, evaluating whether the claims of Sir 
Robin Butler in the quote at the front of this chapter were justified. Section Three 
analyses evidence about the ways in which the agency model affected the 
performance of the Benefits Agency.
Section One: Economy
The public interest model suggests that agencies promote economy. This
section looks at changes associated with use of agencies in terms of the levels of
resource inputs for the bodies and central government as a whole. The authors of
the Efficiency Unit report expected savings of at least 5 per cent of running costs, 
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the direct administrative costs of agencies. Changes in real terms central 
government running costs and total spending, this latter total including running 
costs, are summarised in Table 5.1. There was a real terms rise in administrative 
expenditure of £l,183m, or 9 per cent, between 1988-89 and 1997-98, and, in 
this respect, the agency model was associated with a deterioration in economy. 
However, after the main burst of agency creation ended in 1996, as described in 
Table 2.1 in Chapter Two, there was a fall of £706m or 4.8 per cent from 1995- 
96 to 1997-98. But the level at the end of the period was still higher than at the 
start of the reform.
Table 5.1: Economy of UK Central Government 1988-98: Administrative 
Costs and Total Costs Constant 1996-97 Prices (£m)
1988-
89
1989-
90
1990-
91
1991-
92
1992-
93
1993-
94
1994-
95
1995-
96
1996-
97
1997-
98
Admin
Costs
12,863 12,817 13,295 14,250 14,378 15,117 15,069 14,752 14,319 14,046
Total
Costs
164,
700
168,
000
171,
600
179,
400
189,
500
196,
300
199,
300
200,
800
198,
700
195,
800
Source: Chancellor of the Exc lequer 1994: 41-42, 1998:57 and 64 (ac justed to
1996-97 prices). Administration costs are for civil departments, MoD figures are 
excluded because they included armed forces personnel costs and were subject to 
several definitional changes during the period.
In terms of staff inputs, the agency model was associated with 
improvements in economy. In crude aggregate terms, the total number of civil 
servants fell from 580,000 to 463,000 from 1988 to 1998, a fall of 117,000 or 20 
per cent over the ten years, as shown in Table 2.1 in Chapter Two. However, 
there were similar proportionate falls in staffing in the same length of time prior 
to the reform. The 1988 Efficiency Unit Report commented that civil service 
staffing was reduced by 15 per cent between 1979 and 1984 and by 20 per cent 
between 1979 and 1987 (Efficiency Unit 1988:23). But it was perhaps more of 
an achievement to get continued reductions in the 1990s compared to the 1980s 
because in the 1990s the reductions were from a lower base, all time civil service 
numbers having peaked in 1976 at 763,000 (Cabinet Office 2000:7). However,
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these changes refer only to staffing, overall expenditure presents a different 
picture of changes in economy.
In aggregate spending terms, looking at not only running costs but also 
expenditure on programmes, the economy of central government did not improve 
after the start of the agency reform as shown in Table 5.1. In the ten years after 
the reform, expenditure in real terms rose from £164,700m to £195,800m, a rise 
of £31,100m or 18.8 per cent. In the first six years after the reform began, 
between 1988-89 and 1994-95, the level of central government total expenditure 
within the control total, a measure covering nearly all central spending, rose in 
real terms from £164,700m to £199,300m. This change was a rise of £34,600m 
or 21 per cent (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1998:57). In the six years prior to 
the start of the reform, real terms total central government expenditure rose by 
9,800m or 6 per cent in six years (1982-83 to 1987-88) (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 1998:57), so the agency model was associated with even larger rises 
than before agency creation.
However after this initial period of growth in the number of agencies, as 
for administrative costs, there were improvements in economy with a fall of 
£5000m or 2.5 per cent between 1995-96 and 1997-98. Contrasting the ten years 
after the initiation of the reform with the same length of time before the reform 
began indicates the differences between the periods. In the ten years 1978/79 to 
1988-89, central government spending under the planning total, which is broadly 
similar to the definitions used in later total cost figures shown in Table 5.1, rose 
in real terms by 13 per cent (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1987:34). This increase 
is lower than the increase after the agency reform, but indicates that there was 
substantial growth in overall spending by central government both before and 
after the start of the reform.
However, the overall figures outlined above include all parts of central
government, not just agencies. Although agencies were an increasingly important
part of central government over the period an examination of their performance
is necessary to evaluate their contribution to these overall changes. The agency
reform process incurred costs in evaluating potential agency candidates, 
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designating agencies and setting them up. It is difficult to put an exact figure on 
this expenditure because the activities were not accounted for separately from 
other staff duties and many people were involved in the process in different 
capacities. However the costs in establishing the Benefits Agency in the DSS 
was ‘considerable’ according to interviewees, running to several million pounds 
(114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security; 115 Senior Official, Benefits 
Agency). A better assessment can be made of costs of running the agency 
system. These costs include running the regulatory system including performance 
measurement systems and producing annual reports. No indication of these costs 
was sought by the Cabinet Office or Treasury (II Senior Official, Cabinet Office; 
12 Senior Official, Cabinet Office). However, NAO estimated that the costs of 
performance systems for the Benefits Agency. The cost of the systems, in excess 
of the arrangements that would be needed for purely internal processes, was 
calculated as approximately £7m each year for the Agency, or 0.3 per cent of its 
total administrative spending (NAO 1998b:20). If this agency’s costs are taken to 
indicate proportionate costs of running systems for other agencies then, based on 
total administrative spending of these bodies, the total cost of these systems in all 
138 agencies was around £40m per year in 1998 (Appendix 7). However this 
figure is probably an underestimate of the full cost because the Benefits Agency 
exhibited enormous economies of scale, having a large administration budget by 
comparison with other agencies. If the costs were, on average for each agency, 
about one tenth of the costs of the BA system, which seems a reasonable 
assumption given the fixed costs of setting up and running systems, then the total 
costs of running the performance systems was almost £100m per year. However, 
this figure was only 0.7 per cent of total central government administrative costs, 
as shown in Table 5.1.
The changes in agencies themselves illustrate the contribution of the group
to the figures for total central government economy that are shown in Table 5.1.
The figures presented here are based on an analysis of 72 agencies that were
broadly stable in their organisation over the three years from financial year 1995/6
to 1997/8. The choice of 1995 as a start date marks the point where two thirds of the
agencies had been created which constituted the mature phase of agency reform.
The choice of a three year period is long enough to make statements about a trend 
122
rather than a single unusual year because the two way comparison between the start 
and end year can be checked against the middle year of the period to see if they are 
wildly different. At the same time, it is not too long a period to prevent the 
identification of a substantial set of agencies to track over time. Of the 102 agencies 
that existed in at the start of 1995, 30 were reorganised, privatised or abolished in 
the period to 1998, leaving 72 bodies for examination. An earlier start date would 
reduce the number of identifiable stable agencies below this figure.
In aggregate real terms spending, the 72 agencies cost £9,127m in 1995- 
96 and £9,079m in 1997-98, a fall of £417.8m, or 4.6 per cent, over the period. In 
these crude aggregate terms, the agency initiative did improve the economy of 
these activities by nearly as much as the 5 per cent suggested in the 1988 
Efficiency Unit Report. All the different types of agency exhibited falls in 
aggregate administrative expenditure between 1995/96 and 1997/98. However 
the falls were larger for the contract/transfer type, which fell by 5.1 per cent, and 
the delivery type, which fell by 4.3 per cent, than for the trading type which fell 
by just 1 per cent (Appendix 7). However, all types of agency were associated 
with lower improvements in economy than central government as a whole in the 
period. Overall total central government running costs, a figure which includes 
the agencies’ costs and those of departments and other central government 
bodies, fell from, £33,554m to £31,558m, a fall of £l,996m or 5.9 per cent over 
the same period, as shown in Table 5.1.
The picture was more complex in terms of changes at the level of 
individual agencies in the same period. The spread of changes is shown in the 
boxplot in Appendix 7. The mean score for all agencies was a small running cost 
rise of 1.7 per cent. This increase reflected modest rises in several, mostly small, 
agencies and a few large increases, the largest being the Forensic Science Service 
which increased its budget by 75.5 per cent, mainly because of increases in work 
commissioned by police forces (Cabinet Office 1999:176). However, the median 
change in budget was a fall of 4.4 per cent, shown by the bold line in the box plot 
in Appendix 7. The largest fall was in the Insolvency Service which fell by 25 
per cent. Overall, 57 per cent of agencies exhibited budget falls and, in this sense,
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use of the agency model was associated with improvements in economy in the 
majority of cases.
There was variation in change in economy between individual agencies of 
different types, as summarised in Appendix 8. The mean changes were a fall of 
2.5 per cent for the contract/transfer type, a fall of 2 per cent in delivery type, but 
a rise of 4.8 per cent for the trading type and 12 per cent for the 
trading/contract/transfer. In terms of median scores, the delivery type had the 
biggest fall of 6.7 per cent, followed by a fall of 4.1 per cent for the 
contract/transfer type and a rise of 8.2 per cent for the trading type and 12 per 
cent for the trading/contract transfer type. There was a substantial difference 
between the economy of those agencies that were trading and those that were not. 
The mean score of non-trading delivery and contract/transfer types was a fall of 
2.3 per cent and a median score of a fall of 5.3 per cent. In contrast, the trading 
types showed a mean increase of 4.8 per cent and a median increase of 8.2 per 
cent.
Examining the relationship between trading and non-trading types and 
rise or fall in budget shows a weak association between trading and budget level 
rises, with a greater proportion of trading types exhibiting budget rises than non­
trading agencies, as shown in Table 5.2. Statistical analysis of the independence 
of the variables using the chi square test only weakly confirms a lack of 
independence between differences in trading status and the direction of budget 
change. At a confidence level of 0.242 the Chi-square result of 1.37 with 1 
degree of freedom is only just within the critical region. However, this finding 
for individual trading agencies and the lower budget fall for the trading type in 
aggregate terms, points to lower economy for this type than for other types.
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Table 5.2 Non-trading and Trading Agency Types and Direction of Budget 
Change 1995/6 to 1997/8: Number of Agencies (with Percentage of Type)
Budget Fall Budget Rise Total
Non-trading 36 (60 per cent) 24 (40 per cent) 60 (100 per cent)
Trading 5 (42 per cent) 7 (58 per cent) 12 (100 per cent)
Total 41 (57 per cent) 31 (43 per cent) 72 (100 per cent)
Source: Appendix 9
The case of the Benefits Agency was an example of a contract/transfer 
agency. Real terms administrative costs fell over the period 1995/96 to 1997/98 
by £114.5m or 4.4 per cent. However, the picture for the entire life of the agency 
has been more mixed. Administrative costs in real terms (1996/97 prices) rose 
from £2,126m in 1991/92, in the first year of agency working, to peak at 
£2,787m in 1996/97 before falling back to £2480m in 1998/99, an increase of 17 
per cent over the whole period. Staffing showed a similar pattern, rising from 
68000 in 1991/92 to peak at 77435 in 1996/97 before falling back to 71376 in 
1998/99, a rise of 5 per cent over the whole period. The 1996/7 and subsequent 
years’ figures included several thousand staff who were transferred from the 
Employment Service to the BA to handle work associated with the JSA. But even 
after adjusting for the effects of this transfer, crude budget and staff numbers 
increased, the main exception being expenditure on capital which fell year on 
year from 6-9 per cent of running costs in the early 1990s to between 0.5 and 1 
per cent in the late 1990s (BA 1993; 1994; 1995a; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999). The 
Benefits Agency did not improve economy over the life of the Agency to 1998, 
although the period of expanding running costs in the first half of the 1990s was 
mostly cancelled out by the period of retrenchment from 1996/97. The total 
expenditure of the Agency was dominated by the transfer budget containing 
expenditure on the programme of social security welfare payments. These 
payments dwarfed the expenditure on running costs which formed only around 3 
per cent of total spending over the period. Total spending in real terms 1996/97 
prices rose over the seven years from £70,699m in 1991/92 to £81,200m in 
1997/98, a rise of £10,600m or 15 per cent. On this broader indicator of
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economy, the Agency did not perform well, although the rate of growth slowed 
down in the mid 1990s and was reversed at the end of the period.
Section Two: Efficiency and Effectiveness
The public interest model suggests that agencies, when used 
appropriately, should operate in an efficient and effective way in their use of 
resources to achieve the stated aims of the organisation. The aims of agencies 
were spelled out in Framework Documents, Annual Reports of agencies and 
departments, Business Plans and Corporate Plans. Effectiveness refers to how far 
the agencies own aims were met and the effect of agencies on the achievement of 
other public organisations’ goals. A distinction is often made between outputs 
and outcomes, with outcomes being the final and wider effects of activities in 
society and generally more difficult to measure (Smith 1996:1-19). Efficiency is 
the ratio of inputs to outputs and outcomes and is a relationship between 
economy and effectiveness. There is a chronic lack of governmental or academic 
information about efficiency and effectiveness (Trosa 1994;Pollitt 1995; Talbot 
1998). The approach adopted here uses the available evidence to build a 
composite picture of the performance of agencies from different perspectives on 
a few key dimensions. This picture is then supplemented by exploring the case of 
the Benefits Agency in a more ‘holistic’ way in greater depth using evidence 
from a wider range of sources including interview material.
Some broad guidance on effectiveness in terms of whether spending was
furthering the aims of the organisation and efficiency in terms of whether inputs
were contributing to outputs is provided by the National Audit Office’s work in
financial regularity audit. The Comptroller and Auditor General, the head of the
National Audit Office, audited the revenue and expenditure of central
government including all agencies and checked whether monies provided by
Parliament were used only for the purposes intended and with due regard for
propriety in expenditure. The audits checked whether the financial statements of
agencies were free from material misstatement, whether caused by fraud, error or
some other irregularity. Where these problems were seen as significant or
‘material’ the account was qualified by the auditor, or, if the problem was less 
126
severe, the auditor produced a report referring to the problem on the account. The 
audit reports and accounts were given to Parliament. The results for the audit of 
all executive agencies’ accounts compared to all UK central government 
accounts from 1993-99 are given in Table 5.3 below.
Table 5.3 Agency Accounts Audited, Accounts with Problems, Divided into 
Agency Accounts Qualified or Report Attached, and Central Government 
Accounts Audited and Accounts with Problems 1993-94 to 1998-99
1993-
99
1993-
94
1994-
95
1995-
96
1996-
97
1997-
98
1998-
99
Agency
Accounts
Audited
78 66 72 78 76 81 96
Agency
Accounts
With
Problems
(Split into
Accounts
Qualified
or Report
Attached)
Agency
Accounts
with
Problems 
as Percent 
of All 
Agencies)
6 per 
cent
9 per 
cent
10 per 
cent
6 per 
cent
3 per 
cent
10 per 
cent
2 per 
cent
Central
Govt.
Accounts
Audited
491 446 514 516 465 473 530
Central
Govt.
Accounts
with
Problems, 
Problems 
as Percent 
of All 
Accounts
36
(7 per 
cent)
40
(9 per 
cent)
37
(7 per 
cent)
34
(7 per 
cent)
46
(9 per 
cent)
33
(7 per 
cent)
26
(5 per 
cent)
Source: Compiled from NAO 996c, 1997,1998d, 1999b,2000b
Before 1993, NAO did not produce aggregate figures for the audit of 
agencies, but the figures in Table 5.3 relate to the majority of the period under 
investigation and for the period when the greatest number of agencies were 
operating. Each year one or two agency accounts were qualified, with a further 
number having reports attached to the audit. On average, 6 per cent of agency
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accounts were either qualified or had a report attached to them. These levels are 
slightly lower than the 7 per cent average for all central government accounts. On 
this measure of performance, agencies appear broadly similar with other parts of 
central government. However, because this information focuses on financial 
control it provides only a partial perspective.
A supplementary perspective on the performance of agencies is offered 
by the ‘benchmark’ scores for agencies collected for the ‘Business Excellence 
Model’ (BEM) run by the Civil Service College (Minister for the Cabinet Office 
1999: 9). The BEM was developed as a framework for assessing the performance 
of organisations across a range of activities in an attempt to improve 
performance. It was developed by the European Foundation for Quality 
management and 200 companies across Europe and was widely used in both the 
public and private sectors. There were nine criteria for assessment, a mixture of 
an evaluation of procedures and outcomes. The model measures procedural 
performance against leadership, policy and strategy, people management, 
resources and processes. There were outcome focused measures of people 
satisfaction, customer satisfaction, impact on society and business results. The 
BEM process produced a scored profile for organisations against each of the 
criteria.
A pilot BEM scheme in 1996 involved 30 agencies, about a third of the
total. These agencies broadly reflected the different types of agencies identified
in earlier chapters. They included the Public Record Office (delivery), Driving
Standards Agency (trading), Benefits Agency (contract/transfer) and the Buying
Agency (trading contract/transfer). However data on these bodies was held by the
Civil Service College on a confidential basis. Individual agencies were sensitive
about the use of the scores and they were not publicly available (Samuels 1997).
But aggregate scores for agencies as a group were available. If private sector
performance is seen as a benchmark of satisfactory performance then the BEM
scores point to mixed results. Agencies lagged behind, especially leadership,
impact on society and people satisfaction which scored just over half the private
sector score (Samuels 1997:4). However, agencies scored higher than the private
sector on customer satisfaction.
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Agencies had a wide variety of ‘customers’, in terms of people benefiting 
directly or indirectly from agencies’ activities as stated in annual reports and 
other documents including the annual Next Steps reviews. Taking the 1998 
review as an example, customer groups discussed include private clients 
including firms, charities other organisations and individuals, taxpayers, elected 
representatives, other government bodies and ministers (Minister for the Cabinet 
Office 1999). Paying customers were a particularly important group for trading 
agencies but the primary customer group for all agencies, according to the model 
outlined in Chapter One, was departmental ministers. Ministerial satisfaction 
with agencies can be assessed by surveying the performance of agencies against 
ministerial targets for the same set of 72 agencies analysed in Section One, for 
the period 1995-96 to 1997-98. The limitations of performance measures, as 
reported in Chapter Three, requires that this analysis is supplemented by 
analysing the responsible ministers’ comments in the Next Steps annual reviews 
of performance to pick up on levels of satisfaction not reported in targets.
The agencies are classified in three bands according to levels of
satisfaction; the results are summarised in Table 5.4. Firstly, satisfactory or
above, indicating achievement of most or all targets and anything but severe
adverse ministerial comment. Secondly, some cause for concern, reflecting
achievement of about half of targets and anything but severe adverse ministerial
comment. Thirdly serious cause for concern, based on severe non-achievement of
targets and/or severe adverse ministerial comment. It was not possible clearly to
separate ministerial comment beyond the dichotomy between severe adverse
comment and any other comment. A large majority of agencies were in the first
category. But 6 agencies, or 12 per cent, exhibited cause for concern or serious
cause for concern, with 3 agencies or 4 per cent, in the latter category. Unlike the
case of economy discussed above, cross-tabulation of these findings with agency
type does not reveal a pattern linking variation in performance with type of
agency or use of the agency for different types of activity. According to the third
hypothesis of the public interest model agency performance should have been
worse for inappropriate use of the model on ‘policy’ work, especially for
agencies that were not trading bodies and did not have a market oriented system 
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of control to supplement the regulatory control systems. However, there did not 
appear to be such a relationship in terms of performance. Some of the worst 
performers were bodies which handled relatively routine activity. For example 
the Child Support Agency’s performance is shown in Table 5.4, and its role in 
handling routine activity is shown in Appendix 4.
Table 5.4 Agencies and Levels of Ministerial Satisfaction: Number of 
Agencies, with Per Cent, and Examples
Number 
(with per cent)
Examples
Satisfactory or 
Above
63 (88 per 
cent)
Information Technology Services Agency
Cause for Concern 6 (8 per cent) HM Prison Service,
Training and Employment Agency, 
Valuation Office,
Public Trust Office,
Intervention Board,
Northern Ireland Child Support Agency
Serious Cause for 
Concern
3 (4 per cent) Child Support Agency, Fire Service 
College, Student Awards Agency for 
Scotland
Total 72 (100 per 
cent)
Source: Analysis of cata from annual reviews of agencies as cited in Appendix 1
Taking an example from each category illustrates the issues of 
performance in each category. Firstly, the satisfactory or above category is 
illustrated by the Information Technology Services Agency (ITSA), in the 
Department of Social Security. In terms of effectiveness, there was an overall 
percentage performance and quality measure relating to delivering a level of 
service to customers within budget, on time and according to contract. The target 
was raised and met in each of the years from 1995/96 to 1997/98. There was a 
percentage efficiency improvement target and target relating to staying in
130
approved budget in each of the years which were also met. There were also some 
milestone targets, mainly relating to the delivery of IT programmes, which 
differed from year to year and were met by the agency (ITSA 1996; 1997; 1998). 
Over the three years, running costs fell by 17 per cent in real terms, which, when 
combined with achievement of targets, suggests efficiency improvements. Whilst 
the low number of targets and their limited scope means they give only a 
fragmentary view of performance, statements by ministers in the Annual 
Reviews were supportive. In 1997, the Secretary of Sate for Social Security 
commented that the agency was ‘demonstrating year on year performance 
improvements in efficiency and quality of service delivered to its customers’ 
(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1997:193).
Secondly, HM Prison Service Agency was in the ‘some cause for 
concern’ category. In the period 1995/96 to 1997/98 the Agency achieved about 
half of its targets, the figures for each year were in 1995/96 4 of 8 targets, 
1996/97 6 of 11 targets and 1997/98 8 of 10 targets (Minister for the Cabinet 
Office 2000:180). In terms of crude efficiency, cost per prisoner place was 
broadly constant at between £23,940 and £24,271 over the period, below the 
target level of £24,615 (Prison Service 1998:7). Despite these shortcomings, the 
comments by ministers in the annual review were not very critical (Minister of 
the Cabinet Office 1998), and the Chief Executive, Richard Tilt, was able to 
comment in the 1996/97 Report that ‘I am very pleased to be able to report that 
we achieved the majority of our targets. Those targets we missed we missed 
narrowly’ (Prison Service 1997:4).
Thirdly, the serious cause concern category included the Child Support
Agency. The Agency had a mixed record in the achievement of targets. Although
it achieved almost three quarters over the period these were distributed unevenly
so that only 5 out of 10 were met in 1995/6, rising to 6 out of 8 in 1996/7 and 8
out of 8 in 1997/8. The targets by themselves did reveal the full extent of
ministerial dissatisfaction with performance. The agency budget rose by 21 per
cent of the three year period and along with public criticisms this lead to
criticism from the Secretary of State, commenting in 1998 that ‘many challenges
still face the Agency’ (Minister of the Cabinet Office 1998:192).
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However, ministerial satisfaction gives only a partial indication of 
efficiency and effectiveness as broader evidence about the three agencies reveals. 
A National Audit Office value for money study looking at economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness in ITSA found substantial uncertainty about performance. This 
uncertainty arose in part because of major changes to the business. ITSA 
outsourced to private firms many functions relating to day to day provision of 
computing services to enable them to concentrate on the tasks of providing the 
department with a strategy for information technology; acting as an agent for 
DSS customers trying to negotiate with private sector suppliers; and supplying 
other products and services, ranging from software development through to the 
support of customers’ systems (NAO 1996b: 1-3). Evaluating the rationale and 
the effects of this major outsourcing project was largely beyond the scope of the 
performance measures. NAO found that the Agency did look likely to get 
significant cost savings from the project and had followed appropriate 
procedures, although the long term savings and efficiency improvements were 
less clear (NAO 1996b: 1-2). Whilst this finding does not demonstrate poor 
performance it suggests that an analysis over a longer period than three years is 
needed to evaluate the agency more fully.
The reservations expressed by ministers about the performance of HM 
Prison Service were partly reflected in broader evidence. In 1995, there was a 
major dispute between the Chief Executive, Derek Lewis and the Secretary of 
State, Michael Howard over responsibility for prisoner escapes (Barker 1998). 
This incident made the Agency the subject of serious cause for concern at that 
time and raised questions about effectiveness. However, overall performance 
over the entire period was better. The Home Affairs Committee, whilst pointing 
out problems in performance, sought to redress the negative publicity about the 
Agency flowing from the Lewis affair, praising the level of service delivery in a 
report. These findings were quoted by the Agency as independent evidence that 
the service was getting better, for example in reducing escapes, improving drug 
testing and achieving better discipline (Prison Service 1997:15).
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The severe problems of the Child Support Agency were reflected in 
broader evidence. The Agency was subject to critical reports including five 
reports by the Social Security Committee, two special reports by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, two reports from the National 
Audit Office and a report from the Public Accounts Committee (Harlow 
1999:164). There were a wide range of concerns about unfair treatment of 
clients, poor quality service and low levels of efficiency. For example, the Public 
Accounts Committee was concerned that in the running cost of the agency in the 
mid 1990s of £224m exceeded the money collected £206m in payments by the 
body, and the low rate of clearing claims, with just over half cleared within 26 
weeks (Harlow 1999:169). These problems of poor performance went well 
beyond those revealed in performance indicators and statements of performance 
given by ministers.
A longer time frame and broader evidence is used in the case study of the 
Benefits Agency. The Agency’s mission was to ‘support the Government in 
establishing a modem welfare state...by helping to create and deliver an active 
and modem social security service. The service will encourage independence and 
pay the right money to the right person at the right tine, all the time’ (BA 
1999:5). Effectiveness is judged in terms of these aims for the range of benefits 
the Agency was involved in delivering and the effectiveness of other 
organisations that relied on the Agency to help them with their operations. The 
Agency was in the satisfactory or above category in terms of ministerial 
satisfaction as summarised in Table 5.4. Since its foundation in 1991 the BA 
achieved over 70 per cent of the Secretary of States targets in 8 of the 9 years 
(NAO 1998b: 1). The performance each year is summarised in Table 5.5 below. 
The Agency had internal management targets to supplement Secretary of State’s 
targets and achieved over 80 per cent of these targets in 8 out of 9 years. For 
example, the agency achieved 94 of the 109 targets set in 1997-8 (NAO 
1998b: 1). Ministers were generally upbeat about the Agency, praising 
achievements. For example, in 1998 the then Secretary of State, Harriet Harmon, 
praised the Agency’s ‘efforts to maintain continuing high standards of customer 
service’ (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1998:192).
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Table 5.5 Benefits Agency: Secretary of State’s Targets: Targets 
Achieved/Targets Set for Financial Years 1991/92 to 1998/99
Targets Achieved/ Set by Year
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99
16/20 18/23 19/26 16/22 19/22 16/22 8/15 5/7
Source: Benefits Agency (1992,1993,1994,1995a,1996,1997,1998,1999a)
As was shown in Chapter Three, not all of the Agency’s activities were 
covered by performance targets. However, performance under the Citizen’s 
Charter supplements the analysis of the Agency’s achievements. The Charter 
Standards were incorporated in a revamp of the Agency’s own customer charter 
in 1993 (BA 1994:7). Overall, performance was mixed. In the mid 1990s 
performance in the social fund ranged from 68.3 per cent of the target for funeral 
payments within 12 days to 97.9 of the target for crisis loans same day. In 
Income Support only 56 per cent were made within the 5 days standard (BA 
1999a). Many levels of performance were around 80 per cent of the target 
standards. Although the Charter standards did not cover all areas of the Agency’s 
activities these failures point to mixed performance with substantial failure to 
meet standards in some areas (NAO 1998b:44).
The broader effectiveness of the Agency was reflected in the National 
Audit Office’s value for money studies about the agency’s work. One major 
failure of efficiency and effectiveness was the failure to inform the public of 
reduced pension rights for widows and widowers under the State Earning Related 
Pension Scheme. The Department and the Agency failed to pass on changes 
made to the pension in the 1986 Social Security Act to those affected in leaflets 
and other information. The failure began before the Agency was created but the 
size of the problem was not discovered until the late 1990s and the problem grew 
throughout the period. In early 2000 it was estimated that the cost of 
compensating those affected and putting things right would be at least £2,500m, 
and probably considerably more (NAO 2000:6).
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There was evidence of considerable ineffectiveness in the use of the 
transfer component of the Agency’s budget, which formed around 97 per cent of 
the total budget. External reviews pointed to high levels of fraud and error in 
these payments. The Comptroller and Auditor General qualified his opinion on 
the account for the tenth successive year in 1997-98, because of fraud and errors 
in benefit delivery. In 1997-98 these problems accounted for expenditure of 
£1530m on Income Support and income based Jobseeker’s Allowance, £184m on 
child benefit, fraudulent encashment of orderbooks and girochecks amounting to 
£19m. In total these problems constituted 7 per cent of total spending on the 
account (Public Accounts Committee 2000:Secs.l-3). There was further 
ineffectiveness in the lack of take up of benefit. The aim of the Agency was 
stated as paying the right benefit to the right people at the right time. However, in 
1996 the DSS estimated that only 76 to 82 per cent of those entitled to receive 
Income Support obtained the benefit, the figure for Family Credit was even 
lower at 70 per cent (NAO 1998c:25). The Chief Executive, Peter Mathison, 
acknowledged that the agency did not have an active national programme to 
boost the take-up of benefit (Social Security Committee 1998:157 and 158). This 
situation led to a substantial number of people who should have been receiving 
benefit not getting the welfare services to which they were entitled. However, 
some interviewees commented that ministers in the early and mid 1990s did not 
prioritise take up as a key aim of the organisation (113 Senior Official, Benefits 
Agency). The lack of take up in part reflected a reprioritisation of Agency’s aims 
from those stated in the Framework Document rather than simply ineffective 
delivery.
The efficiency of the Agency is revealed by comparing the outputs of the
agency relative to the inputs. The Agency experienced an overall increase in its
own resources over the period but at the same time the workload of the agency
rose substantially. Total expenditure, including transfers, fluctuated with
economic cycles, reflecting that total economy was in large part linked to
‘demand’ from those claiming benefit according to the eligibility criteria of
social security legislation. The agency had an internal measure of efficiency
based on the change in the Agency’s work output per unit of staff. On this
system, the agency improved efficiency by 12 per cent between the start of its 
135
life in 1991-92 and 1995-6. However the index did not cover much of the work 
done in the central benefit directorates and was withdrawn by the Agency (NAO 
1998b:32). However a crude index of agency spending per unit of workload can 
be constructed based on Social Fund Crisis loans. This workload figure was 
continuously available throughout the period, most other benefits changed, and 
reflected changes in wider workloads related to economic cycles. The index of 
real term budget per case fell throughout the 1990s, except in 1998, and ended up 
in the late 1990s about 20 per cent lower than in the early 1990s. The increase in 
resources consumed by the agency did not keep pace with the workload 
increases, demonstrating improved efficiency.
There were few studies of efficiency in the Agency. However, there was 
some evidence of better use of resources which supports interview findings that 
Agency officials felt the Agency was making better use of staff and equipment 
(14 Official, Benefits Agency; 113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). For 
example, the agency achieved significant cost savings by market testing 
switchboard operator systems, negotiating with telephone service providers, 
controlling private use of telephones by staff and checking bills using improved 
inventories (NAO 1996:5-6). Whilst telephones were just one area of the 
Agency’s activities there is no reason to think that this experience was untypical 
of improvements in other areas. Despite this evidence of better use of resources 
the substantial areas of ineffective working, including inaccuracy of payments, 
means that there was substantial inefficiency in attempting to achieve many of 
the key aims of the organisation.
Ineffectiveness and inefficiency was not confined to the Agency’s own
activities but was also evident in the working of other organisations which relied
on the Benefits Agency’s assistance to conduct their business. The Benefits
Agency administered two benefits, Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance
which had implications for a third benefit, Housing Benefit, mainly administered
by local authorities. This was a sizeable programme costing about £11,100m per
year in 1996-97 or 12 per cent of the total £90,000m spend on social security
(NAO 1999). The Agency passed information to local authorities about claimants
to assist them in the administration of Housing Benefit. Because about 66 per 
136
cent of people claiming Housing Benefit were also on Income Support or 
Jobseeker’s Allowance there was substantial joint working (NAO 1997:18). If a 
claimant was awarded Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance by the Agency 
then the local authority had to assume that they had no income or capital, which 
affected the award of Housing Benefit (Benefit Fraud Inspectorate 1999d: Sec 
8.1). The Agency’s problems with fraud and error on these benefits had a further 
externality effect in terms of fraud and error on Housing Benefit. In the mid 
1990s, about 74 per cent of fraudulent claims on Housing Benefit were also 
fraudulent claims for Income Support (NAO 1997:21). Overall, about 7 per cent 
of the Housing Benefit budget was paid out in fraud and error at this time (NAO 
1997:1).
Section Three: The Effect of the Agency Model on Performance
To evaluate the third hypothesis of the public interest model it is 
necessary not only to consider performance of the agencies but also the impact of 
the agency model on this performance. Tracing these effects is difficult because 
the consequences of the model are difficult to separate from other factors such as 
the environment in which the agencies were working. However the case study of 
the Benefits Agency allows some indication of these effects. It is not possible to 
explore the counter factual of how the activities would have been handled if the 
old organisational structure had been maintained or alternatives adopted. But 
comparing the performance of activities before and after the creation of the 
agency helps assess the effects of agency working relative to the traditional 
structure. Secondly, the effects of different aspects of the model on the behaviour 
of people in the Agency and Department, with their consequences for 
performance, can be assessed.
Comparing the cost of activities before and after the creation of the
Agency is difficult because it is hard to identify separate budget figures for the
relevant parts of the old Department of Social Security. However, in the three
years before the creation of the Agency, the total DSS running costs, which were
predominantly the costs of the organisation that became the Agency, rose from
£2500m to £2684m in real terms. This change was an increase of £184m or 7.4 
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per cent (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1994:41, adjusted to 1996/97 prices). In 
the same period after the Agency was set up, the organisation’s running costs 
rose from £2124.6m to £2728.8m, a rise of 604.2m or 28 per cent. By 1998, the 
Agency was spending £355m more than in 1991, a rise of 16.7 per cent over the 
period, although the costs fell back in the period from 1996/97, so the Agency 
performed relatively badly compared to the previous structure (BA 1999). A 
similar picture was evident in terms of total spending on the programme. In the 
pre-agency period the analogous spending figure was total social security 
spending. In the seven years before agency creation, the level rose in real terms 
1996/97 prices £9,000m from £61,600m in 1984/85 to £70,600m in 1991/92, a 
rise of 14.6 per cent (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1998:57). On this measure, 
economy was broadly similar to the post-agency rise of 15 per cent over the 
seven years of the Agency’s working.
Comparing effectiveness of the Agency with the pre-agency organisation 
is difficult because the benefits delivered in the 1980s differed from those in the 
1990s. However, there were some indicators of performance used by the DSS 
which were analogous to indicators in the 1990s. Effectiveness can be compared 
by looking at levels of fraud and error, or inaccuracy, of a major benefit, 
Supplementary Benefit and its replacement (after April 1988) Income Support. 
The findings are summarised in Table 5.6. In the 1980s there was significant 
error in payments. In the five year period 1984-5 to 1988-9, error rates for 
Income Support and Supplementary Benefit ranged between 9.6 and 11.6 with an 
average of 10.2.
The Agency was associated with deterioration in performance. In the 
1990s, Income Support inaccuracy was double the level of the 1980s, ranging 
between 18.3 and 21.9 with an average of 20.1 per cent. Although the NAO 
estimated that the 1980s figures for errors underestimated the true level by 30-40 
per cent and BA tightened up assessment procedures in the 1990s, performance 
did appear to have deteriorated. The deterioration in Family Credit was similar, 
but this benefit was not measured before 1988-9. In 1996 the DSS and the BA 
estimated that fraud and error on income support amounted to £1770m each year, 
equivalent to 11 per cent of total expenditure on the benefit (NAO 1998b:23). 
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The performance in terms of take up of benefit also illustrates a lack of 
improvement under agency working. In the 1980s 89 per cent of those entitled to 
receive Supplementary Benefit received it (NAO 1988:19). In 1996 the DSS 
estimated that only 76 to 82 per cent of those entitled to receive Income Support 
obtained the benefit (NAO 1998b:25). Even taking into account improvements in 
measurement and changes in benefits, the take up rate was not improved under 
the agency regime.
Table 5.6 Percentage of Incorrect Payments Before and After Agency 
Creation
Benefit 1984-5 to
1988-9
average
1988-9 1995-6 to
1997-8
average
1997-8
1980s:IS/Suppleme 
ntary Benefit 
1990s: Income 
Support
10.2 9.1 20.1 19.3
1980s: Family 
Credit
1990s: Family 
Credit
8.6 18.3 17.3
Source: Carter, Klein and Day 1992: 93 and BA 1995a; 1996; 1997; 1998.
Comparing the satisfaction of customers before and after the creation of 
the agency gives a further indication of relative performance. There was some 
evidence of better customer satisfaction compared to the pre-agency period. 
Senior officials argued that there was an improvement in the standards of service 
that claimants received and improvements to decoration of offices and the ‘feel’ 
of the service in the early days of agency working (110 Official, Benefits 
Agency; 113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). A comparison of the ‘quality’ of 
customer service before and after agency creation illustrates this change. The 
pre-agency system suffered from poor quality service to claimants. An NAO
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report on the quality of services to the public at local benefit offices was 
published in 1988. The Report highlighted serious dissatisfaction. A customer 
survey found that 25 per cent of claimants found the service poor with 75 per 
cent rating the standard fair or good (NAO 1988:1). By the mid 1990s the 
situation had improved. A BA survey of customer satisfaction ran in the period 
1991/92 to 1996/97 and was published in each annual report. It found that 
between 83 to 86 per cent of customers regarded the service as satisfactory or 
better (BA 1999a). However, this measure of customer service gave a far from 
comprehensive assessment. Efforts to use surveys were abandoned in 1995-6 
because of concerns about whether they really represented the experiences of 
customer groups (NAO 1998b: 18-19).
The external systems of complaint handling provides another perspective 
on customer satisfaction. An indicator is the incidence of major failings by the 
organisation leading to complaints to the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration (PCA). This perspective complements the findings about general 
customer satisfaction from the surveys. Both the pre-Agency system and the 
Agency were subject to the jurisdiction of the PCA. Before the creation of the 
Agency, there were 220 complaints and 75 investigations in 1988 (PCA 1989:26) 
and 223 complaints and 88 investigations in 1989 (PCA 1990:28) against the 
whole of the DSS, although the overwhelming majority these referred to work 
later transferred to the Agency. By the end of the 1990s there was a rise to 468 
complaints in 1997/8 (PCA 1998: Figure 5) and 469 complaints in 1998/99 with 
75 and 64 investigations in those years respectively (PCA 1999:Figure 5). The 
fall in investigations did not suggest a reduction in complaints worthy of 
investigation because these PCA introduced a system of settling cases informally 
by the Agency without investigation. These cases were running at 47 and 50 in 
1997/8 and 1998/99 respectively. The complaints were about similar problems 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, including delays and inaccurate payments 
(PCA: 1989; 1990; 1998; 1999).
These results suggest that the Agency may have worsened rather than
improved the occurrence of major failings on individual cases. In the late 1980s
the Commissioner commented that ‘For many years complaints about the 
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administration of social security have loomed large in the Office’s investigative 
workload’ (PCA 1990:3). Almost a decade later the Ombudsman commented 
that ‘complaints [against the Benefits Agency] accounted for the greatest number 
of complaints which the Ombudsman received against any single body (PCA 
1999:3.4). Given the size of the Agency, the continued salience of complaints is 
unsurprising. The increase in complaints must be considered in the context of 
rising expectations of services and much better publicity about complaints 
processes in the later period (115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). However, 
even after making some adjustment for these factors the Agency was associated 
with continued failings on individual cases.
Comparing the pre-agency and agency working periods shows that the 
Agency was not a panacea. Long standing performance problems remained, and 
in some instances worsened, although there were improvements in some areas of 
customer satisfaction. However, in order to assess the third hypothesis of the 
public interest model more fully, the effects of the agency model on performance 
need to be assessed. As is described in Chapter Three, both the main features of 
the model were present in the Benefits Agency although they did not operate 
completely according to their principles. However, the agency model appears to 
have had a considerable effect on those working in the organisation and on the 
delivery of services. The first set of effects were related to organisational 
separation with freedom from ad hoc intervention and flexibilities, the second set 
related to the performance regime including the use of performance targets.
In terms of organisational separation, the Benefits Agency mostly
handled executive tasks, separate from the Department mainly handling policy
work. The Agency was able to develop its own corporate systems to focus on the
job at hand. For example, a NAO examination of the management of telephones
found that the Agency had been able to develop its own strategy for developing
the use of the network which was leading to improvements (NAO 1996). After
an initial period, the DSS HQ adjusted its activities to reduce staff as part of the
senior management reviews taking place across the central state. The reviews
were announced in a White Paper Taking Forward Continuity and Change
(Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chancellor of the Duchy 
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of Lancaster 1995: 9-14) and carried out in 1995 and 1996. The reduction in staff 
was, in part, a consequence of the removal of duplication of functions by 
departments and agencies and a change to more strategic control of agencies (114 
Senior Official, Department of Social Security).
However, the difficulties of separating policy and implementation 
contributed to performance problems. Some senior officials argued that Agency 
working elevated the status of people working in service delivery. Michael 
Bichard was the first head of the Benefits Agency. He argued that the big 
agencies, including the Benefits Agency, had been able to forge a partnership 
with their policy colleagues. The Framework Documents of the Agency gave it 
the right to be involved in policy and staff were more involved in giving 
feedback to the policy sections in the Department than previously. The BA had a 
seat on the Departmental Policy Board and was usually represented by the head 
of the Benefit Management Branch. Bichard suggested that the policy sections 
had, before the Agency, developed policy too remotely from operations and this 
resulted in a benefits system that was vulnerable to error and abuse. He suggested 
that frontline staff often had a better idea of the problems with the system than 
policy people (Bichard 1999:7-8).
However, Bichard went on to qualify his praise, stating that the views of 
people delivering services were still not taken sufficiently into account by those 
in policy making organisations (Bichard 1999:7-8). Even if the problems of 
feeding information from the delivery side to the policy side existed before the 
Agency, agency working did not appear to have improved the situation. Instead, 
it instituted an organisational divide between the two, leading to poor co­
ordination between the BA and the HQ in the early 1990s (113 Senior Official, 
Benefits Agency; 114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security). The Chief 
Executive, Peter Mathison, in response to criticism from the Social Security 
Committee about the level of performance, said ‘We have identified where there 
are weaknesses in the system which may essentially be down to some detail of 
the policy design and we have identified some also where there are weaknesses 
around some of the rules and regulations’ (Public Accounts Committee 1999:
Q165).
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Other staff in the Agency complained that the benefits were designed by 
the Department without sufficient reference to how they had to be administered 
(113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency; 115 Senior Official Benefits Agency). 
This view was repeated by staff in non-policy development sections of the 
Department of Social Security. An interviewee commented that the Agency had 
not been able to overcome the long standing problem of ‘Grade 5s in the Adelphi 
[the location of most DSS HQ policy development staff] spending their careers 
developing huge and complex rulebooks without much thought for the people 
who have to implement them’ (111 Senior Official, Department of Social 
Security).
There were few changes to policy made in response to comments from 
the Agency, illustrating the communication problem. Neither the Agency nor 
Department could cite many cases where changes had been made. One case was 
alterations to legislation about mortgage compensation which allowed for 
payment of arrears. BA staff reported that levels of arrears were difficult to 
assess, leading to inaccuracies. They convinced DSS staff that legislation needed 
to be changed to make the payment system easier to administer. Within 12 
months accuracy had improved by 1 per cent, saving £13m. But BA noted that 
this case was unusual (BA 1999b).
The State Earnings Related Pension debacle further illustrated the failings
of separating implementation and policy. People claiming pensions were not
advised of changes to eligibility. Whilst the mistake was originally made in 1986,
before the Agency’s creation, the organisational structure imposed by the
Agency seemed to have worsened the problem. The handling of state pensions
required co-ordinating Benefits Agency staff in Leeds, Newcastle and in local
offices responsible for various parts of delivery and staff in the departmental
headquarters in London responsible for supporting ministers in the development,
maintenance and evaluation of pensions policy. The absence of end to end
responsibility and good communication was a major factor in the failure
according to NAO (2000:10). Once the Department was made aware of the error
in 1995 the information was not passed to the Benefits Agency and incorporated 
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in the information they gave to clients. Benefits Agency leaflets and staff 
continued to give wrong information until 1999. However, it should be noted that 
not all the poor communication was the result of the agency/department split, 
there was poor communication within the Agency itself (NAO 2000:26). In the 
end, Age Concern, a charity representing users of the services, rather than the 
Agency or DSS staff, brought the full implications of the error to the attention of 
ministers (NAO 2000:28).
The creation of the Agency as a separate corporate unit to focus on its 
own tasks made working with other organisations more difficult. One of the 
largest areas of joint-working involved the Agency co-operating with the 
Employment Service, to deliver Jobseeker’s Allowance from 1996. This benefit 
was delivered from Jobcentres run by the Employment Service who paid the 
benefit as an agent of the Benefits Agency. Much of the administrative work 
behind payments remained with the Benefits Agency. In some senses the 
initiative was a success, in that most of the targets relating to Jobseekers’ 
Allowance were met. However, comments by Patricia Hewitt, a member of the 
Social Security Committee, illustrated problems that arose for customer quality. 
She commented that Jobcentres sent out letters to clients based on information 
provided by the Benefits Agency but could not respond to queries, instead having 
to refer clients to the Benefits Agency for details which caused delay and 
inconvenience (Social Security Committee 1998:Q163). There was a lack of 
sharing of information resulting in the same information being requested twice, 
draining resources and inconveniencing claimants (BFI 1999b; Appendix B).
One reason for the problems was the differences between conditions of
service in the two agencies. Staff in the Benefits Agency worked behind screens
to protect them from clients whereas the Employment Service had a more open
work environment. Under the so called ‘Bichard Agreement’, named after the
first head of the Benefits Agency, staff in the Benefits Agency were given the
right not to be transferred to different working conditions when undertaking
Jobseeker’s Allowance related work. This restriction limited flexibility in the use
of staff, contributing to lack of effective communication (Social Security
Committee 1998:176). One senior official commented ‘Both agencies would 
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have preferred Jobseeker’s Allowance to go to one or another, rather than having 
to share it’ (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). This illustrated the ‘logic’ of 
the agency model which was for separate organisational operations and separate 
accounting for performance for each agency. However, more collaborative 
structures developed throughout the latter half of the 1990s to try and overcome 
these problems. They included joint meetings to address problems at several 
management levels, including the local level. The Benefits Agency Chief 
Executive, Peter Mathison and the Chief Executive of the Employment Service, 
Leigh Lewis, met with other members of their boards in a joint board on a 
quarterly basis and prepared action plans. There was a Joint Operations Team 
with members from both bodies to facilitate joint working (Social Security 
Committee 1998:Q163). The project was given as an example of how to facilitate 
inter agency working in a Cabinet Office report on joint working (PIU 
2000:8.13-8.15). The overall success of Jobseeker’s Allowance occurred despite 
the logic of the agency model, relying instead on the development of local 
agreements and co-ordinating structures that were departures from the pure 
model as outlined in Chapter One.
The second part of the agency model is the regulatory mechanisms,
including performance targets. As described in Chapter Three, the Department
kept some input controls over the Agency and was largely successful in keeping
the organisation to the running cost budget allocated to it. The Agency’s budget
was set by the Secretary of State and operated within a gross running cost system
of control. If the Agency felt that changes in workload affected its ability to carry
out its tasks it had to seek approval to change its business plan and funding
levels. The budgetary control mechanisms were not successful in improving
economy as discussed in Section One of this chapter. However, the level of
payments to claimants was largely determined by demand for services because of
changes in economic conditions. The administrative budget similarly was
affected by changes in workloads. For these reasons, the budgetary control
mechanism can be seen as reasonably effective, especially the reductions in
running cost budget which was achieved towards the end of the period through
agreement between ministers and departmental officials and senior Agency staff.
Agency staff commented on the toughness of the regime they faced in evidence 
145
to the Social Security Select Committee. The chief executive described the 
request for a 25 per cent reduction in costs in a four year period as feeling like 
‘somebody had three cups and a pea under one of them’ (Social Security 
Committee 1998: Q142).
However, whilst administrative costs could be controlled, subject to the 
need to cover workload, the regulatory regime had less desirable effects on 
efficiency and effectiveness. The performance target system appeared to have 
had undesirable effects. Under the system, the internal management targets of the 
Agency were tied in to external reporting regimes, a proportion of the pay for 
people in the organisation including the Chief Executive was linked to achieving 
targets (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). For example, in 1997-98 the 
Agency’s management team monitored performance against all the 124 Secretary 
of State’s and related internal management targets. On occasion this led to some 
misrepresentation of performance. The survey of customer satisfaction was in 
part dropped because of worries about whether it reflected performance or was 
an exercise in trying to produce a survey that met the target. The Chief 
Executive, in evidence to the Social Security Committee commented that ‘I felt 
that maybe the national survey was designed to try to get a figure of 86 per cent 
[the target]’ (Social Security Committee 1998: Q174).
The performance target system led managers to pay insufficient attention 
to the performance of activities that were not the main focus of targets. A major 
problem was the focus on clearance times hampering efforts to achieve accuracy, 
contributing to the poor performance in the latter area described in the previous 
section. An official commented ‘We used to be under pressure to get all claims 
done within the clearance time [target] more than anything else’ (14 Official, 
Benefits Agency). Concern with budgetary targets led to less emphasis on redress 
when an error was made. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration 
noted that even when the Agency had been clearly at fault, it took pressure from 
him to persuade the Agency to give redress (IA10 Senior Official, Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration; PCA 1999:Sec 3.4).
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The focus on targets for benefits hindered attempts to redesign systems 
within the Agency. Area managers were sometimes responsible for the 
achievement of 40 different targets (NAO 1998:38). The targets were separately 
related to different benefits, so that each benefit was still treated largely as a 
separate activity within the organisation. However, clients were often eligible for 
several benefits. The problem was noted by junior staff working in the local 
offices who commented ‘Each of the systems we have is based on a different 
benefit rather than allowing us to deal with an individual claimant who might be 
looking at several relevant benefits’ (14 Official, Benefits Agency). This pattern 
of working led to inefficiency and a poorer quality of service for claimants than 
if more flexible client focused systems were adopted, but these would not have 
been compatible with the external target system for the Agency.
The difficulties of setting and using performance targets to control the
Agency led to concern from ministers and civil servants in the Department. The
Department became concerned about the extent to which the Agency was acting
autonomously and the Department’s inability to act as an ‘intelligent customer’
(114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security). The Agency was
developing its own systems which the Department came to view as giving it a
separate capacity and putting its own ‘spin’ on performance (113 Senior Official,
Benefits Agency). Departmental civil servants and ministers felt that the target
regime could not really be used to drive up performance, there was a lack of faith
in the regime (111 Senior Official, Department of Social Security). However, the
blame for poor performance was assigned to the Department as well as to the
Agency by outside bodies especially the parliamentary Public Accounts
Committee (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). The Department was
especially concerned about the high level of fraud and error on benefits
expenditure (115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). The Department tried to use
other aspects of the agency model, including the appointment of the Chief
Executive, to exercise control. The first Chief Executive, Michael Bichard, was
seen as trying to make the Agency too independent. Consequently when his
successor was chosen, one of the criteria was to choose someone who would be
‘managerial’ and follow the spirit of the framework and targets set down by the
Department (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
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Whilst it is not possible to evaluate the performance of the agency system 
compared to other forms, ministers and officials did make an implicit comparison 
of the Agency and the alternative of a private firm handling service delivery. In 
the mid-1990s officials and politicians in the Department of Social Security and 
the Treasury considered using contracts with private firms. The firms would have 
probably taken over the staff and equipment of the Agency in the first instance 
and delivered services in exchange for a fee. However, this possibility was 
rejected partly because it was felt that the contracts would be too difficult to 
specify and the organisation would be even more difficult to control than the 
agency (115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
The problems of controlling the Agency became more acute after 1997 
when Labour ministers were elected. Their agenda involved a change in 
emphasis towards encouraging employability and a social security system more 
‘responsive to, and providing a more direct service for the public’ (Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster 1997:192). This agenda involved focusing more on the 
needs of the clients in the system rather than just trying to reduce the costs of 
running the system. This agenda was even more difficult to achieve using the 
system that did not have end to end responsibility for the design and 
implementation of policy, because the policy being implemented was more 
ambitious. The regulatory system was also inappropriate for a client focus, 
because the targets were oriented towards performance in terms of separate 
benefits (114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security; 115 Senior Official, 
Department of Social Security).
The use of performance targets exacerbated the problems of joint working
with other bodies by strengthening incentives for the Agency to focus on its own
activities regardless of the effect on others’ work. This effect was evident in the
delivery of Housing Benefit. Whilst local authorities were inefficient in their own
administration of benefits, the Agency made a substantial contribution to the
difficulties (BFI 1999d). The Benefits Agency’s own targets did not include its
effects on local authorities’ work. Whilst the BA had service level agreements
with local authorities since 1992 setting out the Agency’s aims in co-operating 
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with these organisations, an NAO study found that a majority of local authorities 
felt that these agreements were not working (NAO 1997). The Benefit Fraud 
Inspectorate found that in 57 per cent of their inspections, liaison needed to be 
improved between the Benefits Agency and local authorities. The required 
improvements included better exchange of information, more cross agency 
working and better feedback on fraud cases (BFI 1999d: Sec 1).
These general problems were exemplified by the findings of a Benefit 
Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) investigation of the BA London South Area Directorate 
(AD3). BFI found that the BA often did not forward form NHB1 promptly, 
which was required by local authorities if a claimant made a claim for Housing 
Benefit through the Agency or a Job Centre. This delay hampered local 
authorities’ ability to pay the benefit within 14 days, which was a statutory target 
for local authorities (BFI 1999a: Sec 8.11). The BA was often slow in responding 
to requests for adjudication about whether Income Support had been withdrawn 
in cases where it was associated with Housing Benefit, information which the 
local authorities needed before they could recover overpaid benefit (NAO 1997 
57-61). The low priority that co-operation was afforded by staff in the Agency 
was reflected in the organisation’s lack of proper monitoring of service level 
agreements, so the body failed to pick up and deal with these sort of 
shortcomings (BFI 1999a: Appendix B).
The Agency’s incentive to achieve its own fraud targets placed the body
in competition with local authorities in trying to stamp out fraud and placed
emphasis on trying to raise levels of fraud detection rather than stamping it out.
In some instances the Agency did not pass on cases of fraud it discovered to the
local authorities because it wanted to keep the savings to help achieve its own
fraud targets (NAO 1997: 62-3). The schemes used the principle of ‘finders-
keepers’ for bodies detecting fraud, which discouraged information sharing. The
BA’s ‘Spotlight’ anti-fraud initiatives did not involved local authorities as much
as they could have, in part because of a concern to pursue its own targets (NAO
1997:71). In some cases there was an atmosphere of mutual suspicion between
the Agency and local authorities, although the relationship varied around the
country (NAO 1997:66).
149
The performance target system led to co-ordination problems with other 
agencies. The Agency was supposed to co-operate with the Employment Service 
in delivering Jobseeker’s Allowance but it was always under pressure to use 
resources to promote the achievement of its own targets. Problems caused by 
targets were reflected in working with the Contributions Agency. This Agency 
was responsible for protecting the rights of contributors and interests of 
taxpayers through efficient payment and recording of National Insurance 
contributions. The Contributions Agency used National Insurance Numbers to 
identify contributors. Most of these numbers were created by the Contributions 
Agency but about 30 per cent were created by the Benefits Agency and then 
passed on using a special form, CA5400. The two agencies had a National 
Service Statement in place to cover areas where their work coincided. However, 
there were no high level Benefits Agency targets for this service. There was no 
target time for passing the forms from the BA to the Contributions Agency. The 
Benefits Agency undertook poor quality interviews as part of the application 
process and used inexperience of its staff. These problems resulted in 34,000 
CA5400s, about 15 per cent of the total, being returned by the Contributions 
Agency each year. The return of forms was inefficient for the Benefits Agency 
because it had to undertake the application process again, but even more of a 
problem for the Contributions Agency, because the allocation of numbers was a 
key part of its business. Because of the problems, 54% per cent of forms took 
more than 16 days, resulting in out of date information being used to create 
National Insurance accounts, damaging the collection of contributions (BFI 
1999c:Secs 3.11-3).
Conclusion
The performance of agencies lends partial support to the third hypothesis
of the public interest model. In terms of economy, staffing civil service staff fell
by 20 per cent between the start of the reform in 1988/89 and 1997/98. However,
agencies were not associated with an improvement in overall central government
expenditure. Central government administrative expenditure rose in real terms by
9 per cent and total central government expenditure rose by 18.9 per cent over 
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the period. The changes in expenditure were more positive for the agency model 
in the mature phase of agency creation after 1996. After about two thirds of 
central government administrative resources had been put into agencies, total 
administrative expenditure fell by 4.8 per cent and total expenditure fell by 2.5 
per cent in real terms. The survey of 72 agencies reveals a fall in real terms total 
administrative costs of 4.6 per cent for this group between 1995/96 and 1997/98. 
In terms of individual agencies, the median change in real terms administrative 
budget was a fall of 4.4 per cent between 1995/96 and 1997/98. So whilst the 
model was not associated with improvements in economy overall, except in 
staffing, there was an association between the model and improvements in 
economy in the mature phase of the agency reform, most clearly in falls in 
administrative costs.
There were differences in economy between agency types. In terms of 
overall real terms administrative costs for each type, the contract/transfer type 
fell by 5.1 per cent and the delivery type by 4.3 per cent. In contrast, the trading 
type fell by just 1 per cent and trading/contract/transfer type rose by 12 per cent. 
In terms of the median score for individual agencies of different types, the most 
striking difference was the median fall of 5.3 per cent for non-trading types 
compared to the increase of 8.2 per cent for trading types. The increase in 
administrative expenditure of trading types perhaps reflected a response to 
consumer demand and is consistent with the expectations of the public interest 
model. In contrast, ministers generally expressed the wish to reduce expenditure 
for other types of agency, and in this sense, the changes are partially consistent 
with the expectations of the model.
In the case of the Benefits Agency, real terms administrative expenditure
fell by 4.4 per cent between 1995/96 and 1997/98 but was still 17 per cent higher
in 1997/98 than in the first year of the Agency in 1991/92. Staff figures were 5
per cent higher at the end of the period than at the start o f the Agency’s life. Over
the life of the Agency, real terms total spending rose 15 per cent, although it was
falling at the end of the period. In terms of economy, this Agency did not appear
to perform well, although, as for agencies in general, economy was better
towards the end of the period. The Agency provides little support for the public 
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interest model, except in the fall in administrative spending in the mature phase 
of the agency reform.
More limited conclusions about the third hypothesis can be made in terms 
of efficiency and effectiveness. On average over the period 1993 to 1999, only 6 
per cent of agencies had problems with their accounts identified by NAO. On the 
measure of ministerial satisfaction, 88 per cent of the 72 agencies surveyed were 
in the satisfactory or above category. These findings suggest that agencies were 
broadly successful, offering some support for the third hypothesis. But the case 
of the Benefits Agency illustrates wider performance issues surrounding 
efficiency and effectiveness. Whilst the Agency was able to improve customer 
service, there were serious shortcomings in effectiveness, particularly inaccuracy 
in the delivery of benefits amounting to, on average, 7 per cent of the transfer 
budget. Effectiveness appeared to worsen compared to the period before the 
creation of the Agency, with higher inaccuracy of payments.. The Agency was 
associated with better use of some resources. According to a crude measure of 
efficiency based on workload, the Agency improved efficiency in the 1990s. But 
problems with effectiveness meant that the efficiency of the body was 
compromised in key areas of service delivery. There was further indirect 
ineffectiveness by bodies depending on joint working with the Agency, 
especially local authorities in the administration of Housing Benefit, where 7 per 
cent of expenditure was paid out inaccurately
There is evidence that the agency forms contributed to performance 
problems in the Benefits Agency, contrary to the third hypothesis of the public 
interest model. The survey of performance before and after the Agency was set 
up survey showed that poor performance was a long standing problem, predating 
the establishment of the Agency. But there were problems of communication 
between the sections of the Department of Social Security Headquarters 
responsible for policy and those in the Agency responsible for implementation. 
Some policy was designed without sufficient thought for implementation and 
communications problems contributed to the pensions failure. The organisational 
separation exacerbated difficulties in joint working with other bodies through 
different working conditions. However, this did not greatly compromise the 
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delivery of some joint services, such as Jobseeker’s Allowance, in part, because 
of the use of joint boards and local arrangements contrary to the main thrust of 
the agency model.
The regulatory system had a mixed effect on performance. The budget 
system of input controls over the agency, after initial increases, brought down 
administrative spending. The performance target systems affected internal target 
regimes and management practices. The desire to meet the Agency’s own targets 
was more important than working cooperatively with other bodies. Problems 
were evident in working with local authorities in Housing Benefit. Within the 
Agency, concern with meeting targets for speed of clearance led accuracy to be 
neglected, with detrimental effects on performance in this area. At exactly the 
time that Sir Robin Butler was praising the effect of the model on speed and 
accuracy in the quote at the start of this chapter, benefit payments inaccuracy was 
spiralling out of control. The control problem became more significant for 
ministers in the incoming Labour Government of 1997, who found it more 
difficult to pursue their agenda using the agency model, leading to increasing 
dissatisfaction with the model.
The conclusions about the effect of the agency model relate to the
Benefits Agency and are not directly applicable to the full set of agencies.
However, the conclusions might be expected to have indirect relevance to other
contract/transfer agencies. In particular, the finding that whilst administrative
expenditure was reduced at the end of the period it was more difficult to reduce
transfer expenditure throughout the period, might have general relevance for
agencies of this type. The findings may have some particular relevance to non-
trading agencies. The Benefits Agency shows the way that ministers were able to
control administrative costs in non-trading agencies by keeping traditional
budgeting and expenditure control systems. More generally, the Benefits Agency
shared the main features of the agency model with other agencies so there are
good reasons to think that the findings may have some general relevance. The
Benefits Agency showed the way features of the model created inefficiency and
ineffectiveness. Although the Agency was in the satisfactory or above category
in terms of ministerial satisfaction for the period 1995/96 to 1997/98 concern was 
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mounting towards the end of the period. For this reason, the Agency is unlikely 
to be typical of most agencies where the model’s effect on efficiency and 
effectiveness seems to have been more positive.
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Chapter 6: The Institutional Rational Choice Approach
‘On the bureau-shaping model the [Next Steps] hiving-off proposals 
provide senior bureaucrats with a unique opportunity to engage in wholesale 
resphaping of their bureaus to attain their ideal form of small, elite, staff 
agencies (Dunleavy 1991:226).
The institutional rational choice approach offers a way of explaining 
inconsistencies between the public interest model’s hypotheses and evidence about 
the agency reform and the performance of agencies. Section One explores how an 
alternative account can be derived using insights from institutional rational choice. 
Section Two uses insights from general rational choice models of bureaucracy to 
help develop the alternative account. Section Three suggests that Patrick 
Dunleavy’s bureau-shaping model (Dunleavy 1985; 1991) is a valuable source for 
developing the alternative account but that it is not suitable for this task in its 
current form.
Section One: The Potential of Institutional Rational Choice
The public interest model’s first hypothesis is not consistent with the 
contradictions in the official accounts. The contradictions centred on different 
parts of central government seeming to have had different views of what the reform 
was and should have been. The models second hypothesis was partially consistent 
with the evidence, but did not fit cases where the agency model was used to handle 
policy and non-routine activities. The third hypothesis was partially consistent with 
the performance of agencies, but performance deviated from that which was 
expected. There was inappropriate use of the agency form, beyond that which is 
compatible with the public interest model. In this sense, the officials and 
politicians concerned with the reform were mistaken about the likely affects of 
adopting the model. An account is needed of why the mistakes happened in the 
way that it did and why the agency form was seen as such a desirable model by 
politicians and civil servants.
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The alternative account developed here seeks to be more consistent with 
the evidence using insights from institutional rational choice. Rational choice, 
broadly defined, is the application of the tools of economic ideas to politics 
(Mueller 1989). The tools used include specifying micro foundations for macro 
phenomena and viewing aggregate outcomes as the result of the actions of 
individuals. Individuals are viewed as making decisions to further their interests 
based upon their assessment of the world around them. Sometimes this is simplified 
to be egoistic maximising behaviour, but this is compatible with a wide range of 
behaviour. Actors pursue both individual and collective strategies to improve their 
welfare. Individual strategies are those that require no co-ordination with others to 
bring about and where the benefits accrue to the individual collective strategies are 
the opposite, requiring co-ordination to bring about or shared benefits. Between 
these extremes are mixed strategies. In a broad sense rational choice is an empty 
theory, merely suggesting some form of instrumental action justifiable in terms of 
the aims or wishes of the actors involved. However, individual actors are necessary 
but not sufficient for explaining outcomes. Institutional features are important to 
understanding the situation in which individuals make choices which enable and 
constrain choices (Dowding 1994).
The meaning of ‘institution’, how they arise and how they affect 
individuals’ behaviour is a much debated issue (see Powell and DiMagio 1991, 
Rothstein 1996). The strong theoretical position of institutional theory is that 
institutions have their own dynamic which sets up processes. This ‘institutional’ 
perspective contends that ‘institutions provide a temporary order in political life and 
that the content and implementation of comprehensive administrative reform 
programs are influenced by the institutional and historical context within which 
reforms take place’ (Olsen, 1991 p 126). In this view, organisations are not 
necessarily fully independent of intentions but they exert considerable influence 
over actors who seek to change them and consequently dictate their own form, 
reforms are path dependent. In an extreme case reform may even be the result of 
unintended ‘garbage can’ processes where solutions emerge regardless of the 
intentions of actors (March and Olsen, 1984; 1989).
156
In contrast, the term institution is used here to mean structures with some 
stability over time which constrain and enabling certain kinds of action by 
individuals. Rational choice has often been seen in contrast to approaches 
incorporating forms of institutionalism, in terms of the study of institutions 
including their origin and role in affecting human behaviour. However rational 
choice is compatible with institutional approaches by incorporating institutions as 
the rules used by individuals for determining who and what are included in decision 
situations, how information is structured, what actions can be taken and how 
individual actions are aggregated. Individuals carry out actions within institutions 
which shape and facilitate their behaviour and there is no necessary incompatibility 
(Dowding 1994).
The rational choice approach has strong similarities with the public interest 
model. The similarities include purposeful, goal directed action by actors using all 
the information available to them to pursue their goals in choice of organisational 
structure. The transaction cost minimising process is undertaken, but instead of 
assuming that the central state shares a common ‘public interest’, it pays more 
attention to the institutional structure of the state. In the public interest model, the 
structure was assumed to be ‘unitary’ in attempting to minimise transaction costs, 
with a task oriented split between the central team developing strategic guidance on 
Next Steps and those in the departments setting up organisations. However, in the 
institutional rational choice approach, the structure of the central state is a 
historically ‘given’ entity, in the sense civil servants and politicians are located in 
an institution that is the product of many previous individuals’ actions and intended 
and unintended consequence.
In broad terms, the state is as a set of government institutions of relatively
recent historical origin occurring in liberal democratic countries (Dunleavy and
O’Leary 1987 p i ) .  Government involves exercising state power, the power to make
binding rules applicable to all individuals in a given area and to enforce them, using
coercion if necessary. The 'liberal democratic' state is restricted, usually by laws, in
the way it can treat individuals and citizens of the state can exercise some control
over the state by electing representatives who govern state activity. The central
state in the UK is defined as those organisations directly controlled by members 
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of the central government, who are ministers accountable to the central 
legislature. This definition excludes local government organisation which has 
partially separate political accountability structures. Ministers are individually 
and collectively responsible ministers who are accountable for the operation of 
central government (Dowding 1995: 153-178). These patterns set the overall 
‘institutional’ relationship between the structures set up to deliver public services 
and formal political accountability structures in the state. Bureaucrats and 
politicians are located in units within the central state. Actors in these units develop 
with their own interests and view of the public interest. The approach examines at 
how they interact both within the state and with the broader public who are 
taxpayers and service users.
Whilst the public interest model assumes that transaction cost minimisation 
automatically operates in the interest of the broader public, the alternative approach 
suggests that these processes are mediated by the interests of actors operating in 
different parts of the state, and by interaction between these different parts. 
Individual politicians and civil servants are different people with different, 
complex, personalities. Instead of modelling individual complexity, the technique 
adopted here captures the main features of an individual occupying a particular role 
in the structure of the central state. The approach simplifies a potentially very 
complex picture into one which captures the main processes, allowing factors such 
as individual personalities to be invoked to fill out the explanation where the broad 
model does not seem to capture what was going on. There are many rational 
choice models of bureaucracy which are possible candidates for the alternative 
account developed here and their potential is explored in the next two sections.
Section Two: Rational Choice Models of Bureaucracy
There are many rational choice models of bureaucracy (for surveys see
Bendor 1990 and Weimer and Vining 1996). However, this section focuses on
models which, whilst were not developed specifically for examining reorganisation,
can be used to develop insights into the agency reform. Niskanen’s budget/output
maximising model examines the effects of bureaucratic behaviour on the efficiency
of public service production and has only indirect relevance to reorganisations. The 
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model is one of the best known rational model of bureaucracy and the general 
model and appears in several texts on rational choice (Meuller 1991, Jackson 1982, 
Dowding 1995). Dowding makes a distinction between the behavioural part of the 
model and the equilibrium model. In the behavioural model bureaucrats seek to 
maximise budgets because-
' Among the several variable that may enter the bureaucrat's utility function 
are the following: salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, 
power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes and ease of 
managing the bureau. All of these variables except the last two, I contend, 
are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau during 
the bureaucrat's tenure in office' (Niskanen 1971 p.38).
The equilibrium model consists of the behaviourial model combined with 
specification of the structure of the relationship between the bureau and its sponsor. 
Niskanen posited that this structure consists of a bilateral monopoly between a 
legislature or legislative committee funding a bureau for goods and services. The 
sponsor is assumed to be the sole buyer of the good or service on behalf of the 
public. Similarly the bureau is taken to be the only supplier of goods or services. In 
a market exchange the outcome of a bilateral monopoly is indeterminate, it is not 
necessarily the case that one or the other side will be able to exploit their position 
for their own benefit. In contrast in the Niskanen model bureaucrats have the better 
side of an information asymmetry and have a degree of agenda control, enabling 
them to take advantage of their position.
In the Niskanen model the sponsor gives a budget to the bureau based on 
the perceived public benefit from output of the bureau. Public benefits are assumed 
to increase with quantity, but at a decreasing rate, shown by the downward sloping 
line B1 in Figure 6.1 at the end of this chapter. The bureau is assumed to have a 
cost range for producing the output which increases at an increasing rate with rises 
in quantity, shown by the upward sloping line C in Figure 6.1. However the cost 
schedule is assumed to be known to the bureau only rather than the sponsor, 
creating a problem of monitoring for the sponsor who sees only the total output of 
the bureau and its total budget. This feature of the sponsor’s position means that the 
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sponsor cannot tell whether the output is efficient, that is whether at the margin the 
benefits of increasing output of the bureau exceed the costs of producing that extra 
output.
The bureau can maximise its budget subject to the constraint that the budget 
covers the costs of production. This situation enables the bureau to expand 
production beyond the efficient (in terms of marginal benefit for the public 
equalling marginal cost) at QO to Q*, where all the surplus of production where 
benefit exceeds cost up to point QO (area S) is swallowed up by the deficit of 
overproduction where cost exceeds benefit from point QO to Q* (area D). The 
bureau can drive up the output to this level by only offering this level of output to 
the sponsor rather than intermediate levels. This situation enables the bureau to 
produce twice the level of output that would have been supplied had the bureau 
production been produced in a market, which would have led to output of QO. 
Niskanen also introduces the possibility that the sponsor’s demand for the bureau’s 
output might be so inelastic, shown by line B2, that the marginal benefit of extra 
output would fall to zero before all the net surplus from initial production had been 
exploited in inefficient over-production, resulting in output Q2. At this point the 
sponsor is satiated and the bureau cannot deliver output which gives a negative net 
benefit which would be noticeably bad to the sponsor.
Although Niskanen's model is commonly known as 'budget maximising' it 
is really a 'budget related to output maximising model' because the bureau has to 
produce output with the budget. In the terms used here, there is a tension between 
the behavioural model and the equilibrium model. This problem has been 
previously recognised-
TSfiskanen assumes that the goal of the bureaucrat is to generate the 
largest possible budget. This is equivalent to saying that bureaucrats 
maximise output subject to the bureau's budget constraint. Carrying 
this to its logical conclusion would imply zero fiscal residuum 
remaining for such utility dimensions as salary, prerequisites and 
security - dimensions which Niskanen assumes were the 
consequences of budget maximisation'. (Orzechowski 1977: 230)
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However if the model is taken as a simple budget/output maximising model, 
regardless of underlying motivations for this behaviour this objection is less 
relevant.
The model doesn't directly predict the nature of reorganisations but the 
implication of the assumptions is that reorganisations will be pursued to maximise 
budgets. But this general structure of the model seems to lack empirical validity in 
the UK case. The institutions that Niskanen describes does not seem to apply to the 
UK parliamentary system with executive politicians located in ministries, instead it 
was developed for the US to explore bureaucracies interacting with Congressional 
committees to get funding. Similarly, the implications for Next Steps do not appear 
consistent with the practice of the reform. Next Steps involved departments handing 
over large sections of their administrative budgets to agencies, and seems 
inconsistent with departmental officials wanting to keep as much budget as possible 
for themselves. In terms of the performance of agencies, budgets were reduced in 
the ‘mature’ phase of the reform, which does not fit with Niskanen’s expectations. 
The agency model does not seem to have been a very successful budget maximising 
strategy. A more general evaluation of the Niskanen model, examining broad 
changes in administrative spending in the UK central state during the 1970s and 
1980s similarly found little evidence of successful budget maximising behaviour 
(Dunsire and Hood 1989:39-42).
However, Dowding argues that, whilst the equilibrium model does not fit
the UK case, the behavioural model can be salvaged because bureaucrats may have
tried unsuccessfully to maximise budgets. He argues that 'The problem, though, is
not so much the self-interested assumptions of the model, but rather Niskanen's
unrealistic description of bureaucratic organisation especially as applied to
Britain.'(Dowding 1995:88). However it is unclear whether Dowding is referring to
the behavioural model as consisting of budget maximising or more general self-
interested motivations. In his broad discussion of the behavioural model it seems to
be the former (Dowding 1995:83-87). This is a difficult position to hold on the
British case because bureaucrats have not always defended budgets to the exclusion
of other concerns even when this may have been possible. Dowding's evidence is 
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mostly drawn from before 1987; the Next Steps reform since 1988 is a clear 
example of departmental officials giving up large parts of their budgets, without 
active opposition by these officials. This evidence is clearly against budget 
maximising as the main motivating force. However at times Dowding seems to 
argue that the behavioural model consists of self-interested behaviour; the quote 
given above seems to support this interpretation. Dowding argues-
'Officials may pursue their own objectives ranging from the individually 
private to the collectively public: for example, vertical promotion in the 
bureau, promotion across departments, upward re-grading of their particular 
job, workload reduction, diversion of money to their own pet schemes, 
general improvement in working conditions, general pay increases across all 
levels of staff, budget maximisation and so on. In other words pursuing self 
interest may not always lead to budget maximisation. Indeed civil servants 
may gain approbation through cutting budgets.' (Dowding 1995:96-97).
However, if the behavioural model is considered to be general self- 
interested motivation rather than budget maximising then the model is no longer 
Niskanen's because his model was clearly focused on budget maximising. It could 
be argued that promotion may be a structural consideration, a way to get into a 
position with a higher budget, and part of the equilibrium model not the behavioural 
model. But a concern with working conditions and workload are most obviously 
part of the 'self-interest' motivation of the behavioural model. The Dowding
reformulation of Niskanen's behavioural model as self-interested behaviour may 
appear to be more applicable to the British case but it creates problems of its own. 
The reformulation is so vague as to be compatible with any course of events. Most 
action can be interpreted as purposive and self-interested in this general sense, for 
example seemingly altruistic acts can be interpreted in terms of benefits to the self. 
For these reasons, beyond the insight that bureaucrats may be concerned with 
welfare derived from their budget, the Niskanen model does not seem very helpful 
for explaining agencification.
Niskanen himself suggested a second, different model, changing the
behaviourial assumption to the maximisation of discretionary budget (for example 
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see Niskanen 1991). But the models suffer from the same two problems that the 
original Niskanen model has for the purposes of this research. Firstly, the models 
were developed primarily for the US context and fail to take into account the 
different institutional structure in the UK. Secondly, they are too general to generate 
specific implications for a reorganisation like Next Steps. However, they offer the 
valuable insight of suggesting that the state is fragmented and that public officials 
interests may affect the course of the reform, rather than state actors pursuing the 
public interest.
Section Three: The Bureau-shaping Model
The bureau-shaping model (Dunleavy 1985; 1991) offers considerable 
potential for understanding the agency reform because it focuses directly on the 
reorganisation of public bodies. Dunleavy developed his model in part based on the 
earlier work of Anthony Downs (1967). The Downs model is a hybrid of pluralist 
and rational choice approaches, looking at groups of bureaucrats, individual 
incentives and outcomes to develop ’a useful theory of bureaucratic decision 
making’ (Downs 1967:1). His model is premised on the view that officials act 
rationally to achieve their goals in the most efficient manner and are motivated by 
self interest. The primary characteristics of bureaux identified by Downs are-
1) Bureaux are large, the highest ranking members know less than half of all the 
other members.
2) The majority of members are full time workers who depend upon their 
employment in the organisation for most of their income.
3) The assessment of the performance of personnel is by the way they perform their 
organisational role (for example not race, class, patronage).
4) The major portion of a bureau’s output is not directly or indirectly evaluated in 
markets external to the organisation by means of voluntary quid pro quo 
transactions (Downs 1967: 24-25).
Downs argued that some form of hierarchy is a functional requirement of
effective operations for non-market organisations to settle internal conflict.
Alternative mechanisms, such as voting, are rejected as inefficient (Downs 
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1967:51-53). These characteristics are broadly in line with the inside of the UK 
central state. Down also suggested that different types of official can be found in 
bureaux. These include two types of purely self interested officials who are 
motivated 'almost entirely by goals that benefit themselves rather than their bureaus 
or society as a whole' (Downs 1967:81). The types include climbers who consider 
power, income and prestige as nearly all important in their value structures and 
conservers who consider convenience and security as nearly all important and seek 
to maintain existing levels of income, power and prestige rather than maximise 
them. There are three further types of mixed motive officials who have goals that 
combine self interest and altruistic loyalty to larger values. These types are zealots 
who are loyal to sacred, relatively narrow policies and power seeking, advocates 
who are loyal to a broader set of functions or to a broader organisation than zealots 
and also power seeking and statesmen who are loyal to society as a whole and who 
seek power to improve general welfare as they see it. They resemble classic public 
administration theory bureaucrats. (Downs 1967: 88-89)
Down's argued that psychological predisposition and the nature of the 
position occupied by the bureaucrat influences which type an official will be. This 
assumption contrasts with the role specific preferences usually assumed in rational 
choice accounts, leading Dunleavy to call this element of the work pluralist 
(Dunleavy 1991:). The complex set of goals attributed to officials makes the 
theoretical focus less clear. Downs argues that an official's type can be identified by 
spotting the behavioural characteristics of the official. Predictions about the official 
can then be made on the basis of type. However unpredictability is introduced 
because in the theory officials may also switch types on the basis of the official's 
assessment of the successfulness of behaviour associated with the type. Several of 
Down's predictions are independent of the types of official and are based on the 
original primary characteristics of bureaux (Downs 1967:91), so problems with the 
types does not damage the whole theoretical project. Unfortunately the problems do 
affect predictions about reorganisation. It seems strange that Downs introduced 
such vague psychological proclivities into his theory of bureaucracy which are 
largely absent from his work on parties and elections (Downs 1957).
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Downs used his model of bureau characteristics and bureaucrat types to 
examine change in bureaux. He argued that change can occur on a number of levels 
'The shallowest consists of the specific actions taken by the bureau, the second of 
the decision making rules it uses, the third of the institutional structure it uses to 
make those rules, and the deepest of its general purposes’. (Downs 1967: 167-8). 
The Next Steps reform is a third level change in Down’s model. Downs argued that 
such change is initiated when officials recognise performance gaps between what 
they are doing and what they believe they ought to be doing (Downs 1967:191). 
The resulting change depends on the interaction between those officials who have 
identified a performance gap and other officials in the bureau. This interaction is 
affected by the membership of the bureau, including key individual members and 
the relative importance of different types of official (zealots tend to initiate change 
whereas conservers resist). Other factors of importance include internal technical 
changes, bureau size and external factors including complexity of the social 
function of the bureau, the influence of external actors with power over the bureau 
and the behaviour of rival bureaux attempting to take over the bureau's functions.
In terms of ‘Next Steps’, the account moves beyond the official account to 
examine conflict between groups in the bureaucracy and is helpful for explaining 
the contradictory accounts of ‘Next Steps’ presented by different parts of the UK 
central state that were noted in earlier chapters. Downs suggested that change will 
often be difficult to achieve - he noted that creativity or actively seeking change in 
rare in bureaux (Downs 967: 202). He also suggested that most bureaucrat types 
will resist changes that involve losing function and control over resources (Downs 
1967: 196-7). This prediction seems at odds with the rapid change and departments 
voluntarily handing over functions to agencies. Downs also suggested that changes 
were likely to have to come from outside rather than from within organisations, 
because the number of conservers relative to advocates and zealots in a bureau 
tended to grow over time. Much of the change in the agency initiative came from 
within departments themselves as well as central agencies.
However, the bureau-shaping model of reorganisation appears to have more
relevance for explaining ‘Next Steps’. The model was developed by Dunleavy
(1985, 1984, 1989b, 1991) as an attempt to overcome some of the problems of 
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Downs’ and Niskanen’s models. The bureau-shaping model uses a universal view 
of bureaucrat tastes as the same as in standard economics accounts (Mueller 1991) 
and makes behaviour vary according to the constraints/possibilities encountered by 
officials which vary by role. By this reasoning, Downs’ types can be viewed as 
strategies for officials which are not fundamental, in the sense of psychologically 
grounded and reflecting different types of personality. The bureau-shaping model 
has two main elements. Firstly, an assessment of the benefits from budget 
maximising and, secondly, the insight that officials gain welfare from ‘work related 
utility’ which is not necessarily related to budgets.
Firstly, the model suggests that, whilst bureaucrats may be concerned with 
budgets, there are several different types of budget which yield different types of 
benefit to the official. The model suggests that Niskanen's concern with global 
budget is misplaced. Dunleavy argued, drawing on the literature on budget 
maximisation explored in the last section, that welfare will not be equally associated 
with different types of budget. The relationship between types of budget, benefits 
and rank of official are summarised in Table 6.1.
Bureaucrats' welfare maximising strategies depend on their rank and the 
relative significance of components of a bureau's budget. The model suggests that 
junior bureaucrats will be more concerned with maximising core budgets and top 
officials more concerned with bureau budgets and programme budgets. Mid-ranked 
officials’ benefits are more evenly spread across the budget types. The implications 
are that in types of bureau where core budget is a major part of bureau and 
programme budget, for example delivery and servicing types, junior and more 
senior officials will have a common interest in pushing up programme or bureau 
budget. Bu the conditions under which coalitions will form is not specified, and the 
main thrust of the rest of the model is that senior rather than junior officials will 
have the most influence over the bureau. The difficulties with using the rank and 
variety of benefits aspects of the Dunleavy model make these parts of the model 
difficult to use in this analysis. However, the main contribution of the bureau- 
shaping model is the insight that all officials gain from core budget but less from 
the bureau budget or programme budget. For this reason, Niskanen was
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oversimplifying by concentrating on overall, or in Dunleavy’s terms bureau or 
programme budget, maximisation.
Table 6.1 Welfare Associated With Different Parts of the Budget
Budget Welfare Salience for Ranks: 
Bottom Middle Top
Core Budget Improving job security ++ + 0
Expanding career prospects + ++ 0
Increased demand for skills + ++ 0
Triggering upward 
regrading
0 ++ +
Reducing conflict in 
management
0 + ++
Bureau Budget Boosting bureau prestige 0 + ++
Improved relations with 
clients or contractors
0 + -H-
Slack to cope with crises 0 + ++
Programme Budget Slack to cope with crises 0 + ++
Increased patronage powers 0 0 ++
Source: Adapted from Dunleavy (1991:192)
The Dunleavy model suggests that officials will pursue strategies to push up 
core budget, by advocating new programmes or reorganisations which contribute to 
this aim. In terms of the agency model, this implies that officials in the core 
department should be reluctant to give up parts of their organisations to agencies 
because of the related reductions in their core budget. Under the agency reform, the 
department looses core budget to the agency but its programme budget is swelled as 
the agency is under the strategic control of the department. This conclusion is 
contrary to the experience with Next Steps, where a large amount of activity was 
transferred to agencies. This part of the bureau shaping model cannot, by itself, 
form an account of the change.
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\However, the bureau-shaping model recognises that officials' utilities are 
not exclusively dependent on budgets. Dunleavy argues that 'welfare maximising 
officials in policy making ranks are primarily concerned to improve their welfare 
by providing themselves with congenial work and a valued work environment' 
(Dunleavy 1991:200). The positive and negative values ascribed to  bureaucrats 
are summarised in Table 6.2. Bureaucrats are assumed to prefer working in staff 
units with a collegial atmosphere and a central location to working in line 
functions with a corporate atmosphere and a peripheral location.
Table 6.2 Characteristics of a Bureau which are either Positively or 
Negatively Valued by Officials in the Bureau-shaping Model
Positively valued Negatively valued
Staff functions: including innovative 
work, high level of discretion and broad 
scope of concerns
Line functions: including routine work, 
low discretion and narrow tasks
Collegial atmosphere: including small 
work units and co-operative work 
patterns
Corporate atmosphere; iincluding large 
work units and non-elitte and conflict 
ridden work patterns
Central location: including proximity to 
political power sources and high status 
social contacts
Peripheral location: including remoteness 
from political power sources and 
remoteness from highi status social 
contacts
Source: Adapted from Dunleavy (1991:2(32)
Dunleavy suggests that bureau-shaping will predominately (occur amongst 
senior officials who are able to control die form of their organisation. The bureau- 
shaping model views reorganisations as strategies by bureaucrats wlho seek to alter 
bureaux to suit their self-interests. Dunleavy argues:
'rational bureaucrats orientated primarily to work-related utilities pursue a 
bureau-shaping strategy designed to bring their bureau into ia. progressively 
closer approximation to 'staff (rather than 'line') functions, a collegial 
atmosphere and a central location'.(Dunleavy 1991: 202-3)
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There are a wide range of strategies associated with bureau-shaping. 
These include major internal reorganisations to promote policy work over routine 
activities, transformations of internal work practices towards policy work, 
redefinition of relations with external partners to enhance policy contacts, 
competition with other bureaux to protect the scope of interesting work, load 
shedding, hiving off and contracting out functions which are seen as undesirabel 
(Dunleavy 1991:203-204).
The model recognises that officials are likely to experience collective action 
problems in seeking to pursue welfare enhancing strategies. Whilst an individual 
may obtain benefit from higher budget or from a reshaped bureau, he or she incurs 
costs from advocating such a change, for example time spent lobbying. The official 
would prefer to let others lobby for the change, from which he or she as a member 
of the organisation cannot easily be excluded, and save personal exertion of effort. 
A model of this problem is suggested for budget maximising but not for the bureau- 
shaping. Following Dunleavy’s general argument, whilst he doesn't specify the type 
of interaction and its problems, the decision of individuals whether or not to 
contribute to strategies resembles a chicken game. For an individual official, if 
others contribute the individual is better off not contributing but if no-one else 
contributes then the individual is better off contributing than not contributing. The 
outcome is a mixed strategy, the balance depending on estimates of probable 
behaviour and net payoff sizes.
Dunleavy suggests that the model forms a potential explanation of ‘Next
Steps’. Writing at an early stage of the reform processes he argued that
‘Opposition to this rolling programme [of agency creation] has come mostly
from the public expenditure sections of the Treasury...They are directly
threatened by proposals to allow deconcentrated agencies the freedom to transfer
money between budget heads, operate their own salaries and conditions policies,
recruit and promote as they see fit, and adopt new technology without clearing
their decisions through the Treasury.’ He continued that, in contrast, ‘most senior
officials in other Whitehall ministries have endorsed the government’s strategy.
The full implementation of the reforms would drastically reduce their 
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departments’ personnel and core budgets...On the bureau-shaping model the 
hiving-off proposals provide senior bureaucrats with a unique opportunity to 
engage in wholesale reshaping of their bureaux to obtain the ideal form of small, 
elite, staff agencies. The government report which triggered the reorganisation 
process candidly admitted that political and policy proposals preoccupied policy- 
level officials and inherently were always likely to do so.’ (Dunleavy 1991:226).
Few attempts to evaluate the bureau-shaping model as an explanation of 
Next Steps have been made. However, one account rejected the model on a 
number of grounds. Marsh, Smith and Richards (2000) suggested that it neglected 
the role of politicians in driving the process, wrongly specified the tastes of 
officials, who were instead interested in management work, and that the changes 
have involved officials spending more time on management. Some of this critique 
appears to have relevance, for example the absence of politicians in the reform 
process in the Dunleavy model.
However, there are two main problems with the Marsh, Smith and Richards 
critique. Firstly, they use methods that are based near exclusively on evidence from 
interview material. The rational choice approach, and the style adopted in this work, 
does not rely exclusively on taking at face value the statements of participants in the 
reform process. Instead, support for conclusions based on such statements should be 
triangulated by other evidence, especially revealed preferences where individuals 
have to forgo some other alternative in order to do something, giving the action a 
cost for the actor. There is a danger that some statements given to researchers in 
interviews reflect what the individual feels he or she is supposed to say or would 
make a good impression rather than what was really going on. Individuals involved 
often had a vested interest in presenting reforms in a way which suggested that they 
were directed by politicians and in the interests of wider societal actors. The 
difficulties of relying on the face value of official statements to explore analysis has 
already been demonstrated, for example in the cases of nominal agencification 
where the exercise was largely a relabelling exercise but was included in the reform 
in a similar way to changes that were more fundamental.
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The second problem with the Marsh, Smith, Richards critique is that some 
of the main problems with the Dunleavy model are not picked up by their analysis. 
These defects are so fundamental that it the model cannot be evaluated without 
further specification. The model is not very clear in the relationship between 
bureau-shaping strategies and budget-maximising strategies or how this affected a 
reform such as Next Steps (James 1995). For most of the text discussion, Dunleavy 
assumes that work related utilities are de-coupled from budget levels, contingent on 
the organisation of the bureau. However, at times, the argument is not clear. In 
Figure 7.11 (Dunleavy 1991: 207), reproduced as Figure 6.2 at the end of this 
chapter, the marginal advocacy costs of advocating higher levels of budget and 
benefits from a shaped bureau are related to programme budget. This implies higher 
benefits from lower levels of programme budget in a shaped bureau, and 
equilibrium sizes of bureau where marginal costs and benefits intersect. However, 
the figure conflicts with an interpretation of work related utilities as completely de­
coupled from the budget. Officials are presented as being more concerned about 
protecting benefits from low levels of programme budget and less concerned with 
higher levels of this budget shown by shifting the diminishing marginal utility curve 
from DMU1 to DMU2. The relationship between work related benefits and budget 
benefits needs clearer articulation, particularly whether they largely separate 
benefits or whether work benefit is dependent on a certain level of programme 
budget or some form of core budget within the overall programme budget. The 
empirical relevance of the model to the UK is unclear beyond the general 
assertion that bureaucrats prefer certain types of work to others and will engage 
in bureau-shaping strategies to try and reorganise their activities. However, the 
model offers the potential to be incorporated into a more comprehensive and 
more fully specified bureau-shaping account.
Conclusion
The institutional rational choice approach offers an alternative
explanation to the public interest model. However, the existing rational choice
models offer insights without by themselves being adequate accounts. The
hypotheses about the UK reform are shown in Table 6.3, along with some of the
evidence relating to them. The general rational choice models are not specific in 
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the hypotheses they generate about agencification. The Niskanen (1971) model 
does not address reorganisation directly but the idea of self interested behaviour 
by bureaucrats appears to fit the UK better than the public interest account. 
However, the idea of budget maximising does not seem appropriate and the UK 
institutional structure is different to that in the US. The Downs model is more 
directly focused on reform but does not seem relate to the UK institutional 
environment.
The bureau-shaping model, which suggests that officials attempt to 
reshape and re-organise the bureaucracy into a different form that makes their 
own jobs more pleasant and satisfying, distancing top bureaucrats from tedious 
routine, is a valuable insight. However, the model needs more specification. The 
model lacks an adequate conception of the UK institutional environment, and in 
particular does not incorporate politicians sufficiently in the analysis. The next 
chapter constructs the mark II bureau-shaping model, synthesising insights from 
Dunleavy’s model in a broader model that pays more attention to the institutional 
structure of the UK central state.
172
Table 6.3: Hypotheses about the Creation of Agencies from Rational Choice 
Models and Evidence from the UK
Rational Choice 
Model
Hypotheses Relating to UK 
Agencification
Evidence from UK
Niskanen (1971)
budget/output
model
No specific claims, but 
agencification will generally 
force up budgets and will 
only be undertaken for these 
reasons
Contradicted by departments 
passing on budget to 
agencies, and falls in agency 
budgets in the mature phase 
of the reform
Downs (1967) 
model of 
reorganisation
Where advocates and 
statesmen bureaucrats have 
influence, possibly outside of 
the organisation, reform will 
overcome resistance from 
conservers
Contradicted by rapid moves 
towards the use of agencies 
and departments passing on 
functions to agencies
Dunleavy (1991)
bureau-shaping
model
Bureau shaping strategies by 
senior officials will result in 
the creation of agencies to 
handle routine tasks staffed 
by more junior officials, but 
underspecification of why 
these strategies should occur
Unclear hypotheses, apparent 
neglect of politicians and 
other actors in the reform 
process, some support for 
agency creation as a bureau- 
shaping strategy
Source: Chapter Six
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Figure 6.1 Niskanen (1971) Budget 
Maximising Model
Marginal 
Costs & 
Benefits
Q2 Quantity
Figure 6.2 The Bureau-shaping Model’s View of the 
Impact of Reorganisation (Dunleavy 1991:207)
DMU 
& MAC
Q2 Q1 Programme
Budget
Chapter 7: The Mark II Bureau-shaping Model
‘The skills of top civil servants are still policy oriented. Promotion to 
senior jobs is given to those whose main skills and experience are in 
policy and ministerial support. Very few have had direct experience of 
working in large executive organisations’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:24).
The mark II bureau-shaping model is an alternative explanation for agency 
creation. The model incorporates insights from the bureau-shaping model to suggest 
that senior officials’ preference for policy work rather than management work was 
an important reason for the way the reform was undertaken. Section One specifies 
the model of the overall institutional structure of the central state and how 
politicians’ and civil servants’ positions within these structures affected their role in 
the agency reform. Section Two focuses on the role of actors in the departments 
involved in identifying and setting up agencies. Section Three specifies how 
officials in central units and in agency candidates affected the course of the reform.
Section One: The Institutional Structure of the Central State
The mark II bureau-shaping model consists of a set of mechanisms by 
which the agency reform was brought about by the actions of individuals within the 
institutional structure of the central state. Actors’ behaviour was influenced, in part, 
by the institutional context in which they operated which structurally suggested 
aims and opportunities. Officials and politicians did not simply seek to follow some 
version of the public interest. Instead their behaviour was influenced by the 
mandate of their organisation, personal welfare and career advancement. The way 
these goals were best achieved varied according to the institutional structure in 
which they operated, as did their ability to embark on individual or collective 
strategies to pursue these aims. This way of proceeding is a ‘mixed’ method, 
avoiding the assertion that everything happening in the central state was furthering 
a single public interest, as in the public interest model. The approach also avoids 
falling into the trap of stipulatively defining an alternative set of motives for 
bureaucrats, such as budget maximising or bureau-shaping, which seem to be
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unjustifiably plucked out of the air and, as the previous chapter showed, did not 
seem to fit the UK case.
Most of the actors involved in the reform were located within the central 
state, reporting to Parliament and the wider public. However, the legislature was not 
greatly involved in the process. No legislation was required to establish agencies, 
although there were some minor changes to the law to extend the provision of 
Trading Fund status to agencies in 1990. The most influential actors were senior 
officials and politicians. The civil servants all had some things in common. Their 
shared environment principally consisted of a career organising and running the 
central state working with politicians and, at least formally, attempting to 
implement the policies of the government of the day. Civil servants were recruited 
by similar procedures, and worked with each other in the central state over a 
prolonged time.
However, these individual officials and politicians were located in different 
parts of the state, giving actors a different outlook and incentive structure. The 
groups of officials are shown in Figure 7.1 at the end of this chapter. Each of the 
groups was important in the reform process. The first group was actors in central 
units, including the Efficiency Unit which came up with the original 
recommendations and the Next Steps Project Team which took over direction of the 
reform from 1988. The Project Team and other parts of the Cabinet Office issued 
guidance and acted as a central point for monitoring departments’ progress and 
encouraging them to carry out the reform. Secondly, the Treasury, although part of 
the central group, was a separate body. The Treasury was semi-detached from the 
development of the reform, but could have blocked ,or delayed it because of its 
position as the source of authority on budgeting and accounting systems. Thirdly, 
beyond the central group, were officials in departments responsible for identifying 
agency candidates and setting them up. A fourth group was officials who were 
working in potential agency candidates and who were involved in the process of 
identifying candidates and setting up agencies.
The career structures of politicians were very different. They arrived in the
central state through appointment as part of the Government. The Government was 
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formed of around 110 politicians located in different parts of the central state (Hood 
and James 1997). In the late 1980s, they were members of the Conservative party 
and most of them were elected Members of Parliament. The main split was between 
those located at the centre, principally the Prime Minister and ministers in Cabinet, 
and those located in departments, including ministers not in the Cabinet. Prime 
Minister Thatcher was leader of the Conservative Party, set the government’s 
agenda and acted as overall co-ordinator for the reform. Thatcher issued the 
statement announcing the Government’s acceptance of the Efficiency Unit report in 
February 1988. Each of these two groups of politicians interacted with civil 
servants in the analogous organisational units. The relationships were between the 
Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister and Cabinet and between departmental 
officials and ministers not in the Cabinet, and between departmental officials and 
Cabinet ministers when outside of their role in Cabinet.
The public interest model’s specification of the broad motivations of 
politicians seemed largely consistent with the evidence. Because politicians were 
elected, they had some incentive to be responsive to the wishes of the broader 
public, including taxpayers and the users of public services. In this sense, 
politicians were keen to try and improve the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of services. The Conservative Party won an election in 1987 prior 
to the reform, and won again in 1992, having held office continually since 1979. 
After the main period of agency creation they lost an election in 1997.
However, the electoral salience of agency creation appears to have been 
low. There was no mention of the reform in the Conservative Party Manifesto for 
the 1987 election. Instead this document couched intentions in general terms, 
stating ‘We will press on with long-term management reforms in order to 
improve public services and reduce their cost’ (Conservative party 1987:42). The 
Manifesto for the 1992 election mentioned the desire to continue setting up 
agencies as part of a wider programme ‘to raise quality and efficiency in 
government’ (Conservative Party 1992:15). The use of agencies was not a major 
issue in either of the two elections that took place once the reform was 
established (Butler and Kavanagh 1992:155-210;1997:133-185). Instead, intra­
state processes seem to have been particularly important in affecting how the 
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broad for improving public services emerged as the agency reform. The 
politicians did not appear to have a blueprint for the reform. In her 
autobiography, Margaret Thatcher only thought Next Steps worthy of a footnote 
and spoke of it in general terms as an attempt to improve management. She did 
not suggest that her ministers or party originated the reform or specify ways in 
which the reform was supposed to bring about improvements (Thatcher 
1993:49). Instead, the reform appears to have been brought about by interaction 
between officials and politicians operating in different parts of the central state.
Section Two: Senior Officials and Politicians in Departments
The mark II bureau-shaping model suggests that senior officials and 
politicians in the departments highly significant in shaping the reform. Senior 
officials are defined as those civil servants of Grade 5 (Assistant Secretary) and 
above. In 1988 there were 3,613 officials of this grade out of a total of 492,527 non­
industrial officials (Treasury 1988b, Cabinet Office 1995b). In 1995 the figures 
were slightly lower but with a similar proportionate split, with 3,445 senior officials 
from a total of 474,880 (Cabinet Office 1995b). By 1998, after a minor 
reorganisation of grades to create the Senior Civil Service, which mostly 
incorporated staff at Grades 1-5 but added some other staff raising the total, there 
were 3,720 senior staff out of 430,460 in total (Cabinet Office 1999). Whilst a few 
hundred of these staff were located in the Cabinet Office and the Treasury the bulk 
were in other departments.
The model suggests that important decisions relating to the creation of
individual agencies were taken by senior officials at departmental level. Senior
officials saw developing policy as their key role and, with this in mind, were
concerned to protect the amount of time they spent on policy work in their day to
day activities. This is compatible with the public interest model that sees officials as
primarily seeking to develop and implement public policy as communicated to
them in general terms by politicians. However, it suggests that the institutional
structure in which civil servants worked entrenched this position regardless of the
sense it made for transaction cost minimisation in organising services. The central
state institutions worked thorough selection mechanisms at entry and through 
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promotion to entrench this viewpoint. In recruitment, emphasis was put on 
recruiting officials at a young age after university and schooling them in the ways 
of the Civil Service throughout their career. This feature is confirmed by numerous 
studies. In the 1970s Heclo and Wildavsky found Civil Servants to be a tight knit 
group working together over a long period of time (Heclo and Wildavsky 1981). A 
study of Permanent Secretaries, the most senior grade, in 1980 and 1993 found that, 
on average each had worked in the Civil Service for thirty years prior to 
appointment at the top job (Theakston 1995:37).
Within the service, policy work was seen as the way to get promoted and 
the main business of the top of the service. Policy work was valued because it 
involved innovation and often entailed working in small staff units in close 
proximity to political power sources, such as ministerial private offices. In contrast 
hands on management work was disliked because it involved the routine 
implementation of procedures and the monitoring and direction of junior staff. 
Management work often entailed working in a large, extended hierarchy rather than 
small staff units and tended to consist of work at the point of delivery, remote from 
political power sources. Although the term management is sometimes used in a 
broad sense to mean strategic, innovative work, these activities are policy work by 
the definition developed here. Senior civil servants saw it as their job to act in an 
overall supervisory role in running public services, as in the public interest model. 
But they did not see their job as spending much time in hands on management of 
these activities.
Senior civil servants themselves acknowledged their liking for policy work
rather than management work. Sir Robert Armstrong, a former Cabinet Secretary
and Head of the Civil Service, commented on senior officials' continued interest in
policy work despite the attempts of reforms to increase the profile of management
tasks (Hennessy 1990: 737-738). The most systematic part of the 1988 Efficiency
Unit Report’s evidence was the 150 interviews with senior officials and ministers
and further group interviews with around 85 senior officials (Efficiency Unit
1988:33-34). The Report stated ‘Many people commented to us that too few senior
civil servants showed the qualities of leadership which would be expected from top
managers in organisations outside the Civil Service’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:24). 
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Officials demonstrated similar attitudes five years after Next Steps began. A survey 
of officials in the top three grades and fast-stream entrants at lower grades found 
that the interesting nature of strategic work was one of the aspects of their jobs 
which they liked the most (Efficiency Unit 1993: 105-8).
Whilst officials’ statements might not be taken at face value, there appears 
to be corroborating evidence. The choice of career path involves an opportunity 
cost to officials of forgone alternative, which is not something that is present in 
interview evidence, and makes the evidence more reliable. The 1988 Efficiency 
Unit Report noted that ‘The business of top managers in many departments is still 
dominated by the policy and political support tasks’ (Efficiency Unit 1988:24). 
Numerous academic studies have found that policy jobs were valued by officials 
and brought about promotion. For example, three quarters of the Permanent 
Secretaries in 1980 and 1993 had worked in ministers’ private offices, which was a 
key policy job given to potential ‘high flyers’ expected to get to the top of the 
Service during their careers (Theakston 1995:37-43). A study by Zifcak which 
examined civil servants' attitudes to the FMI found civil servants happy to run large 
organisations but at the same time reluctant to get involved in management. He 
quoted a Deputy Secretary to illustrate this finding who said, 'Management is a 
tiresome business, nobody goes into it unless they have to.' (Zifcak 1994:40). A 
later survey of civil servants backed up this finding, remarking on a continued 
disinclination to acquire management skills (Efficiency Unit 1993: 105-8).
Instead of simply undertaking transaction cost minimisation in an unbiased
way, as in the public interest model, the mark II bureau-shaping model suggests that
officials’ views of their role acted as a lens through which this process was
conducted. The model explores the organisation of a department in terms of the
levels of executive activity and policy work which the department conducts itself,
relative to that which it passes on to other bodies to carry out. Executive activity
involves the implementation of public policy through administrative structures and
procedures. The level of executive activity is measured by the core budget per
senior official. The core budget is defined, as in earlier chapters, as the part of a
bureau's budget which is spent on running costs and includes the cost of
administrative structures such as offices, machinery and staff. This activity is 
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something that officials handled to satisfy their aim of running public services on 
behalf of ministers, but they did not associate this task with having to do day to day 
management of this activity. They were not conscientious in the operation of ad hoc 
monitoring and control systems. The discussion of organisational control in Section 
One in Chapter One suggests that these systems are the main way integrated 
organisations are run. Instead, officials preferred to spend their time on policy work, 
setting the aims of public services, evaluating implementation structures and 
proposing new structures. Bureaucrats preferred a larger proportion of policy work 
time in total work time, and by implication the lower the proportion of management 
work time.
The preferences of an individual official for organisation of his or her 
department is shown in Figure 7.2 at the end of this chapter. The formal mark II 
bureau-shaping model is presented in Appendix 10. In Figure 7.2, each indifference 
curve links equally preferred organisational configurations, the slope of each curve 
representing the rate of substitution required between levels of core budget per 
senior bureaucrat (X) and proportion of policy work time in total work time (Y) to 
maintain an equally preferred combination. The curves are convex to the origin 
because a diminishing marginal rate of substitution between X and Y is assumed. 
At high levels of core budget per senior bureaucrat officials require more additional 
core budget per senior bureaucrat to compensate for the loss of a unit of policy 
work time than at low levels of core budget per senior bureaucrat. The curves are 
ranked in order of preference with curves furthest from the origin representing more 
preferred combinations (U3 preferred to U2 preferred to U1 in Figure 7.2). The 
model does not suggest that individual officials sat down and drew figures similar 
to those in Figure 7.2, rather that the model captures the underlying structure of 
their preferences and the situation in which they found themselves.
This part of the model has been criticised by Marsh Smith and Richards for
having similar failings to the Dunleavy model, especially for arguing that civil
servants benefited from the agency reform and political leadership was unimportant
(Marsh Smith and Richards 2000:476-477). However, this critique fails to
recognise sufficiently that the mark II model was developed as a critique of the
existing bureau-shaping model to include the role of politicians in the reform. The 
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model recognises that civil servants were not the only ones involved in deciding the 
organisation of service delivery. Their freedom to chose any combination, which 
would have tended towards greater amounts of policy work time and larger core 
budget levels, was limited by politicians’ views about what was an efficient 
combination of activities.
Politicians’ position was closer to the public interest model than civil 
servants, because the institutional structure in which they operated made them more 
responsive to the public. However, their understanding of how to go about 
organising the public sector was not as sophisticated as suggested in the public 
interest model. Their view can be characterised as the position that higher levels of 
core budget per senior bureaucrat imply greater need to spend time on ad hoc 
monitoring of activities within the organisation, and less time on policy work in the 
organisation. There was strong evidence that governments in the 1980s became 
more concerned about the performance of civil service management in a more 
sustained way than in earlier periods. This is expressed schematically as a 
movement of the politicians' constraint on organisation from 1 to 2 in Figure 7.3 at 
the end of this chapter. The change represents an increase in the proportion of 
management work time for each unit of core budget per senior bureaucrat 
demanded of officials
The change in politicians' attitudes has been called the 'rise of neo- 
Taylorism' by Pollitt (1993: 53). Neo-Taylorism is the view that efficiency is 
improved by using modem technology to increase the monitoring of the use of 
resources, especially the achievements of individual employees, and by 
rewarding employees in accordance with their performance. This position flowed 
from the findings of the many Efficiency Unit encouraged scmtinies conducted 
in the 1980s, which formed the background to the 1988 Report. Whilst scmtinies 
were mostly carried out by officials, the Efficiency Unit was headed by non-civil 
servants, firstly Raynor from ICI then Ibbs from Marks and Spencer. The 
scmtinies opened the lid on civil service activities, ‘getting down to where the 
work is done’ and ‘reporting direct to ministers’ (Lord President of the Council 
1981:2). They revealed the problems of management to serving ministers, 
bypassing the civil service hierarchy. A senior minister, Michael Heseltine, 
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commented in 1987 'When the literacies of the Civil Service and the generalities 
of intention are turned into targets which can be monitored and costed, when 
information is conveyed in columns instead of screeds, then objectives become 
clear and progress towards them becomes measurable and far more likely'. 
(Pollitt 1993: 58). However, it was less clear that beyond the general concern 
with a lack of monitoring politicians had a solution. Politicians had supported 
FMI in the early 1980s which sought to improve management information and 
allocate responsibility for performance within integrated organisations (Zifcak
1994). This reform was an alternative to the Next Steps model of passing on 
responsibility for executive tasks to agencies
However, faced with the changed constraints, senior officials preferred to 
hand over executive work to agencies rather than become hands on managers as 
under the FMI plan. Some authors have suggested that ministers also preferred the 
agency model to FMI type schemes because they thought it was a way of escaping 
blame for operational failures (Marsh Smith and Richards 2000:471). However, 
Dowding points out that ministers have not generally resigned because of 
operational failings. In his study of the period 1945-91, he found ministers resigned 
in only 15 per cent of cases where there were serious demands from the press and 
MPs for them to step down (Dowding 1995:163-165). Dowding made no 
distinction between policy and operational issues, so the percentage of resignations 
relating to tasks that were passed to agencies was even lower.
More fundamentally, there were good reasons to think that the move to
agency status did not insulate politicians from dissatisfaction because they were still
going to be held responsible for service delivery overall. After all, politicians were
associated with setting up the agency structures in the first place, or condoned their
continued use. If an agency failed it was a politician that was responsible for using
the agency form and performance problems were still ultimately their
responsibility. Ministers’ serious cause for concern with agencies, outlined in
Chapter Five, in part reflected criticism they were receiving for poor overall
performance of the structures. In the case of the Benefits Agency, the Department
and the Agency appeared together before the various parliamentary committees to
explain problems, as discussed in Section Three of Chapter Three. In the case of the 
184
Prison Service, there was pressure on the Home Secretary to resign, and 
performance issues were compounded by further difficulties of separating out 
policy from implementation, as discussed in Chapter Three.
The main aim of politicians seemed to be improving public services. The 
push towards ‘Next Steps’ as a delivery structure was in large part a response from 
the civil service to pressure from politicians for more attention to be paid to 
managing services to improve their performance. This statement does not imply 
that all civil servants thought this way, or that there were not debates amongst 
officials as to whether the agency model would enable them to keep control over 
policy relating to the services but, at the same time, pass on responsibility for 
management to agencies. In this context, the observation that civil servants in the 
DSS were slow to react to the original Efficiency Unit report (Marsh, Smith and 
Richards 2000:471) is unsurprising. Debates occurred and it is the overall 
preponderance of action that is shown by the change in individual officials’ ideal 
points in Figure 7.3.
The situation before the change in politicians’ constraint is shown by line 1 
where officials prefer point A to other possible positions. However, after the 
constraint shifted to line 2, making A unobtainable, officials preferred point C to the 
alternative point B. The point B represents the alternative of keeping activities in 
house and senior officials becoming hands on managers. Developing the top 
management information systems as part of the FMI would have been one such 
reform. The Next Steps idea was acceptable to politicians, because it fitted their 
objectives. But the organisational form was brought about by officials because it 
fitted with their view of the best organisation. These officials were important in the 
reform because they were responsible for identifying and setting up agencies.
The cases of pure and mitigated agencification are represented as a bureau-
shaping strategy entailing the changes from XI to X2 and Y1 to Y2 in Figure 7.3.
The changes represent passing senior officials passing on responsibility for
executive activity to agencies and concentrating on policy work instead. This
change required individual senior officials to act together to bring about the
necessary alterations. The strategies discussed by Dunleavy imply that individual 
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bureaucrats incur both costs and benefits from pursuing them (Dunleavy 1991:205), 
which present potential collective action problems because the strategies are public 
goods for officials. The strategies produce non-rival benefits that are consumed by 
an individual official without implying a reduction in benefits received by other 
officials in the organisation. It is also difficult to exclude non-contributors from 
consuming the benefits, because all the officials in the ‘shaped’ departmental 
organisation receive the benefits. Public goods tend to lead to free riders who seek 
to benefit without contributing to costs, which may result in the good not being 
provided at all.
The model developed here suggests that the strategies did not incur great 
costs for senior officials. Politicians set the range of possible combinations of core 
budget per senior bureaucrat and proportion of policy work time and were 
indifferent between these points. Officials did not incur high costs in persuading 
politicians to sanction a change involving a move between these combinations and 
needed only to perceive their common interest in order for bureau-shaping 
strategies to occur. Senior officials were in close contact with each other so it was 
easy for them to communicate ideas and get an impression of what was going on in 
the system, as part of the debates that Marsh, Smith and Richards noted (2000)
However, the mark II model has been criticised by John. He acknowledges
that ‘some of the limitations of Dunleavy’s formulation are overcome in James’
[1995a; 1995b] reconstruction of the model’ but that ‘James argues rather than
shows that civil servants bureau-shaped in response to the managerialism of the
1980s’ (John 1998:133-136). However, John’s critique refers to early work
presenting the critique of the Dunleavy model and the bare bones of an alternative
formulation rather than the more substantial empirical evaluation presented here.
The purpose of the model constructed here is to outline the main factors involved in
the reform. More detailed aspects of the reform in particular instances clearly
require further explanation, invoking the role of individuals and particular
institutions in particular cases. John further argues in opposition to the model that
‘It is just as likely that they [senior officials] would have supported the reforms
whether managerialism had been introduced or not’ (John 1998:133-136). This
critique provides some support for the model because it implicitly accepts that 
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mannafgerialism, in the sense of politicians’ interest in civil servants’ monitoring of 
execicuitive activities, was becoming important in the 1980s. But John’s critique also 
quesistiions why the reform happened in the 1980s. Dunleavy’s original model did 
not p prrovide a clear rationale for the timing of the reform. However, in the mark II 
burejeaiu-shaping model, politicians triggered the changes. This aspect of the model 
helpps i explain why the central state resisted the use of structures that had found 
favoouir in the private sector much earlier, through the use of M rather than U forms 
as diiisscussed in Chapter Four. The mark II model suggests that bureau-shaping was 
a resspponse to politicians’ demands, so there was a form of joint responsibility for 
the ( omtcome. The mark II model appears to be consistent with the processes 
invoblwed in establishing the Benefits Agency.
Examining the case of the Benefits Agency involves a consideration of 
agenncsification throughout the Department of Social Security because of the 
intenrdlependence of the processes identified in Section One of Chapter Two. Most 
seniaorr officials in the Department expected to find themselves located in the DSS 
Headdcquarters after the reform, carrying out favourably valued policy work tasks. By 
19935,, out of 121 officials of Grades 1-5, 66, over half, worked in the DSS 
Headdcquarters (DSS HQ). There were 2,671 more junior staff in the DSS HQ. In 
contrtraast, 51 officials of Grades 1-5 worked in the DSS agencies, with 86,404 other 
staffT iin these bodies (Cabinet Office 1995b:21 and 23). The figures show that the 
vast t bbulk of staff moved into agencies were less senior officials. However there 
were-e, in 1995, 51 senior posts in the agencies. The most significant were the heads 
of thhei agencies. The head of the Benefits Agency was a Grade 2, ITS A a Grade 3, 
Contitrributions Agency a Grade 4, Child Support Agency a Grade 4, War Pensions 
Agecnccy a Grade 6 and the Resettlement Agency a Grade 6. Beyond these 6 posts, 
42 oof' the 51 agency posts were at Grade 5, the least senior of the senior posts, 
leavi/injg just 3 non chief executive posts of Grade 1-4 in agencies (Cabinet Office 
19955to).
The DSS itself was responsible for choosing agency candidates which could
havee Head to delays if senior officials had objected to the reform. One commentator
notecd that ‘The resistance to Next Steps is not however as strong amongst senior
headdq\uarters civil servants as could be expected’ (Greer 1994:51). However, this is 
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not a surprising if the reform is viewed as a bureau-shaping strategy. The 
Resettlement Agency was chosen as the first candidate by senior staff in early 1988. 
The creation of this body was mitigated agencification. The wider changes occurred 
later after the Hickey report discussed in Section One of Chapter Two. The depth of 
senior DSS officials' support for the agency form of organisation is further 
demonstrated by the similarity between Next Steps and their own suggested 
reforms before the publication of the Efficiency Unit report. An internal 
departmental report, produced in 1988, recommended setting up separate structures 
to handle the implementation of social security policy, which resembles the idea of 
executive agencies (Moodie et al 1988).
The enthusiasm for passing on responsibility for management to the 
Benefits Agency meant that the change was conducted without sufficient thought 
for the possible harmful effects of the agency model on performance, which came 
to pass, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Section Three of Chapter Four 
indicates that on some criteria, including the routine nature of much activity and the 
low level of parliamentary questions per £m of expenditure, the activities were 
consistent with use of the agency for transactions cost minimisation. However, the 
split between policy and implementation and system of performance measures did 
not cope with the activities and performance in important areas was poor. That civil 
servants and politicians did not sufficiently anticipate these problems appears, in 
part, because of their eagerness to pursue bureau-shaping strategies. They did not 
systematically evaluate the potential effect of the model and there were no pilot 
studies of its likely effects (115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
The even more radical option of privatising the services by passing 
responsibility to a private firm acting under contract was considered but rejected at 
the time of setting up the Benefits Agency. Privatisation of the agency was again 
considered in 1995 during the review of the Agency’s status but again rejected (115 
Senior Official, Benefits Agency). In terms of simple bureau-shaping motivations, 
either would have been acceptable to senior officials because both involved passing 
on activity to other organisations. However, the interviewee commented on 
concerns about using a contract for controlling the services provided by a private
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firm, so transaction cost minimisation were mixed with officials’ view of their 
policy role in the decision.
Moving beyond the general explanation offered by the mark II model, there 
were further factors which explain the detailed form the Agency took. The views of 
the Permanent Secretary were important in separating out the Benefits Agency to 
handle welfare payments from the Contributions Agency to handle collection of 
National Insurance contributions. But the more fundamental change was the 
movement of executive activities to the agencies as reflected in the model. This way 
of operating was continued with the creation of the Child Support Agency to handle 
a new function in which the agency form was chosen rather than the Headquarters 
delivering the service itself.
The process in the Benefits Agency has broader relevance because civil 
servants in other departments were in similar situations. Senior officials moved 
between departments; officials beyond the DSS were interested in its organisational 
structure because they might move to that department during their careers. DSS 
officials were similarly concerned with the organisation of other departments. 
These officials had a common view on their role as policy workers in departments, 
with agency organisation limited to areas of non-policy work. The senior civil 
service union, the First Division Association, did not oppose the reform (II Senior 
Official, Cabinet Office), but unions were not in any case the main way senior 
officials were able to influence the reform, they had more direct means in setting up 
candidates.
The common interests of the senior civil service were maintained in the 
1994 Government White Paper on the future of the Civil Service which proposed 
setting up a new Senior Civil Service composed of officials of Grade 5 and above 
(Prime Minister et al 1994: 36). These officials were mainly concerned with policy 
work. The White Paper stated that 'The Government does not, however, envisage 
extending the formal establishment of agencies into areas of the Civil Service 
primarily concerned with policy... For day to day support for Ministers on policy 
matters, policy divisions on existing lines will continue to be the preferred model,
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adapted by departments as necessary to deal with changing workloads.' (Prime 
Minister etal 1994: 13).
However, ‘Next Steps’ was of varying significance across different 
departments, as the survey of agency creation in Chapter Two revealed. The 
creation of agencies was a major change in the DSS but was less significant in 
some other departments. But most senior officials ended up working in parent 
departments more often than agencies as a result of the changes. The location of 
senior officials in departments and agencies in 1995, after the bulk of the reform, is 
summarised in Table 7.1. In 13 of the 18 departments with agencies over 70 per 
cent of senior staff worked in the parent department. The Department for Education 
and the Welsh Office come out top in terms of percentage of senior staff in the 
parent department at 98 per cent, although these departments did not have many 
agencies.
The DSS was a highly agencified department where the reform was a 
significant change. In contrast, the Lord Chancellor’s Department (LCD) was 
very different. Only three agencies were created. However, the agencies were 
largely responsible for executive tasks, in contrast to the LCD itself which is 
consistent with the account suggested here. The LCD was responsible for policy 
making and reforms to the civil law and civil courts and the overall direction of 
other policies including legal aid. Most senior staff were located in the LCD 
itself, 42 out of 72, or 58 per cent. This figure left a substantial portion in the 
agencies, most notably 23 in The Land Registry, with 5 in The Public Record 
Office and 2 in the Public Trust Office. However, of the 23 in the Land Registry, 
only 3 were above Grade 5 (Cabinet Office 1995b). In this department the lack of 
suitable executive work seems to have been the reason for less agencification. 
The availability of suitable functions seems to account for much of the variation 
in the use of agencies between departments, although in some cases agencies 
handled policy work and some explanation of this phenomenon is required.
Each of the LCD’s agencies already had a significant degree of freedom 
before Next Steps, reflecting nominal agencification. The first agency to be set 
up was HM Land Registry, established in July 1990. This body was already a 
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separate government department, a regulatory bureau responsible for maintaining 
and developing a stable and effective land registration system. The second 
agency, The Public Record Office, set up in April 1992, was already a separate 
government department, a delivery bureau responsible for safe keeping of 
records and making them available to the public. The third agency, The Public 
Trust Office, was set up in July 1994, was not a separate government department 
but was a trust corporation and an associated office rather than an integral part of 
the Department. The Office was a delivery bureau, carrying out administration of 
wills and property under certain circumstances, including cases of an individual’s 
mental illness. Why so many cases of nominal agencification were part of the 
reform is not sufficiently explained by looking at senior officials preferences for 
organisation of delivery structures, other actors in the central state were 
important.
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Table 7.1 Senior Staff (Grades 1-5) in Parent Departments, Agencies and 
Percentage of Senior Staff in the Parent Department in 1995
Department Number of Senior 
Staff in Parent 
Department
Number of Senior 
Staff in Agencies
Percentage of 
Senior Staff in 
Parent 
Department
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food
117 34 77 per cent
Cabinet Office including Office 
of Public Service and Science
102 41 71 percent
Ministry of Defence 338 85 80 per cent
Department for Education 67 1 98 per cent
Employment Department Group 183 24 88 per cent
Department of the Environment 164 36 82 per cent
Department of Health 192 41 82 per cent
Home Office 113 87 (includes 69 at 
Grade 5)
57 per cent
Lord Chancellor’s Department 42 30 (includes 25 at 
Grade 5)
58 per cent
National Heritage Department 23 4 85 per cent
Northern Ireland 18 9 67 per cent
Overseas Development 
Administration
43 4 91 percent
Scottish Office 162 13 93 per cent
Department of Social Security 66 55 (includes 42 at 
Grade 5)
55 per cent
Department of Trade and 
Industry
231 76 75 per cent
Department of Transport 95 61 (includes 53 at 
Grade 5)
61 per cent
Treasury 103 39 73 per cent
Welsh Office 66 1 98 per cent
Source: Cabinet Office 1995b
192
Section Three: Officials and Politicians in Other Parts of the Central State
Other actors who were involved in the reform process were mainly located 
in one of two groups, as shown in Figure 7.1 at the end of this chapter. Firstly, 
people located in central units. Secondly, people in agency candidates. Officials in 
central units included people working in the Efficiency Unit, the Next Steps Project 
Team, the Cabinet Office more generally and HM Treasury. They had an interest in 
the organisation of the departments to which they might move later in their careers 
but worked in organisations with missions to improve Civil Service economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. They gained career benefits from coming up with new 
' successful reform initiatives and were important policy entrepreneurs. These units 
were described as ‘ginger groups’ and ‘places for strategic thinking’ by officials 
who worked in them (II Senior Official, Cabinet Office, 12 Senior Official, Cabinet 
Office). Departments did not invent the bureau-shaping technology of Next Steps, 
the central units were important in this process. However, the need for their reforms 
to be successfully implemented meant co-operating with the departments eventually 
tasked with putting them into practice. The requirement constrained the range of 
possible technologies that could be proposed by central units.
The idea of the Next Steps reform was proposed in the Efficiency Unit 
report. The team that wrote the report was a mix of central state outsiders and 
insiders, and most of the team were not working for the civil service by the mid 
1990s (II Senior Official, Cabinet Office). At the time of the report the Unit was 
supervised by the Adviser to the Prime Minister on Efficiency, Sir Robin Ibbs. He 
was not a career civil servant, having spent much of his career in private industry at 
ICI, and had little reason to embark on bureau-shaping strategies. The choice of 
reform proposals was, however, limited by the need to take into account the wishes 
of officials in the bureaux affected to ensure that the reform chosen could be 
implemented successfully.
Efficiency Unit officials undertook extensive consultation with civil
servants in the departments about possible reform options as part of their research
for the report. Interviews were conducted with twenty six Permanent Secretaries or
equivalents, twenty six Grade 2's, and group discussions held with Grade 3's and 
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Grades 5-7 (Efficiency Unit, 1998: Annex C, pp. 33-4). The officials in the 
Efficiency Unit saw that Next Steps was more likely to be accepted than a reform 
forcing senior civil servants to increase their proportion of management work time. 
They learnt from the FMI that reforms in which senior officials became involved in 
hands-on management were previously greeted with hostility. Zifcak argues that his 
investigation of FMI supports a view advanced by Clive Ponting in 1989. 'Ponting 
argued that the continuing devotion of senior officials to advising ministers and 
developing policy doomed the FMI to fail as an exercise to turn senior civil servants 
into resource managers and directors of executive operations... The evidence in this 
survey suggests similarly that top management systems were given only passing 
attention in senior echelons.' (Zifcak, 1994). The Efficiency Unit report reached a 
similar conclusion. 'Our evidence suggests that Top Management Systems are seen 
as having more relevance in executive functions and in the regions, than in 
headquarters or policy functions.' (Efficiency Unit 1988 22). Instead the report 
suggested the creation of agencies to manage executive activity.
Officials in the Next Steps Project Team and the Cabinet Office were tasked 
with encouraging the reform and monitoring departments and applying pressure 
through officials and ministers where it was felt that a department was not setting 
up enough agencies. They reported directly to the Head of the Civil Service and the 
Prime Minister. The Next Steps Project Team was limited in its actions by the need 
to work with departments. The Project Team was too small to carry out the 
implementation of the reform itself, initially consisting of the Project Manager, Sir 
Peter Kemp, and three assistants. The need for the co-operation of departmental 
officials was noted by Diana Goldsworthy, a member of the Project Team. She 
commented that 'effective practical proposals for reform should originate from 
those who have responsibility for bringing them about, i.e. those working within the 
services concerned. Only in this way will those who are responsible for making 
these changes feel that they own them and are committed to them.' (Goldsworthy 
1991)
The Project Team held regular meetings with departmental officials,
intended to 'foster support for and a sense of purpose about Next Steps at a senior
level', during implementation of the reform (Goldsworthy 1991: 22). The Project 
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Team grew in size and drew on other Cabinet Office staff but was never more than 
a small group of 10-20 people. Staff in the unit had only an indirect interest in 
bureau-shaping strategies because their career prospects depended on the successful 
implementation of reform. They were more concerned with achieving targets for 
agency creation.
The 1988 Report suggested that 90 per cent of the service could be put into 
agencies. The Project Team interpreted this target as a rolling programme without a 
clear upper limit (Goldsworthy 1991:20). The first Project Manager, Peter Kemp, 
was constantly asked about progress towards targets and how much of the Civil 
Service could be put into agencies. In evidence to a Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee inquiry in 1989 he set an unofficial target that at least 20 agencies 
would be established by April 1990. As it turned out, 31 were established by this 
time and in June 1990 he stated that the Government expected at least half the Civil 
Service would be operating in agencies by the end of 1991 (Treasury and Civil 
Service Committee 1990:1). The interest in targets for numbers of agencies was 
reflected in the Project Manager’s frequent appearance before the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee to talk about progress. He appeared five times between the 
launch and June 1990, giving his targets for progress including that over three 
quarters of civil servants would end up in agencies.
Whilst he commented that ‘setting up agencies was only the start’ (Treasury
and Civil Service Committee 1990:16-17), the Project Team did not take a great
interest in the criteria departments used in selecting agency candidates.
Goldsworthy commented that there were ‘no absolute rules’ and candidates were
dealt with by departments ‘pragmatically, case by case’ (Goldswothy 1991:25).
This lack of concern appears surprising from the public interest model, but not
given the incentives of the Project Team. The finding that cases of nominal
agencification were included in the official accounts of progress in the reform is
consistent with the bureau-shaping model because it helped the central units, which
collected the figures, appear successful in their mission to implement the reform.
Similarly, as Chapter Two shows, the figures for staff in agencies were initially a
disappointment for the unit, running at 36 per cent of total staff in 1991. However,
the Project Manager was able to announce that over half the service was covered by 
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the reform in 1992 by including civil servants operating in HM Customs and Excise 
and Inland Revenue who were operating on ‘agency lines’, although not being 
agencies in many other respects (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1992:6).
A second group of officials were located in the Treasury and were 
responsible for co-ordinating budgetary and accounting systems in central 
government. The Treasury was historically a source of ideas about how to organise 
and control central government. The public expenditure surveys set up in the 1960s 
drew heavily on the experience of senior Treasury officials (Thain and Wright
1995). Their mission helps make the initial opposition of Treasury officials, which 
seems inconsistent with the public interest model, more understandable. The ‘Next 
Steps’ reform was not a Treasury idea, instead it arose from a competing source of 
reform ideas, the Efficiency Unit in the Cabinet Office. One official commented 
that the centre of government was always full of different new ideas about how to 
improve government (13 Senior Official, Cabinet Office).
The reform initially appeared to make the Treasury’s mission to control
public expenditure more difficult because there was some uncertainty about how
the model was to be incorporated in existing public expenditure control systems
(IA1 Senior Official, Treasury). The Treasury’s concerns resembled the hypotheses
of the Niskanen budget/output maximising model outlined in Chapter Six, with the
Treasury as the sponsor not knowing the cost curve of the bureau. However, the
Treasury was eventually convinced by the Cabinet Office and others in central
government that the necessary financial information on costs could be made a
requirement of agencies before they were set up and that Treasury access would not
be compromised (II Senior Official, Cabinet Office). The Treasury was able to
enshrine these principles in a White Paper The Financing and Accountability of
Next Steps Agencies, published in December 1989 and used by departments in
setting up agencies (Treasury 1989). A similar logic was eventually accepted in a
wider review of Treasury expenditure control across the central sate. Under the
Treasury’s own Fundamental Expenditure Review, the expenditure control system
changed towards fewer, more strategic, bottom line controls on expenditure with
more freedom for departments to use expenditure as they wished and carry over
funds from one year to the next (Parry, Hood, James 1997).
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People working in agency candidates were also involved in the reform 
process. These officials were generally lower ranking than those in departments and 
central agencies. The preferences of senior officials suggests that they generally 
saw working in agencies as undesirable. In the case of the DSS, the agency chief 
executives were already in post in the sections which became the Contributions 
Agency and the Resettlement Agency, and as such were in the organisation which 
was deciding on the reform. However, they were not amongst the most senior 
people in the DSS and would have had difficulty in opposing the reform, had they 
been minded to do so.
In other cases the chief executives of agencies came from outside and were 
unable to influence the agency creation process. The chief executive of the Benefits 
Agency came from local government and the Child Support Agency’s first head 
came from the voluntary sector. The role of more junior staff in agency candidates 
during the ‘Next Steps’ reform appears to have been limited. The unions were 
consulted in the process of agency creation for particular agencies but did not have 
a major role in the reform (Goldsworthy 1991:16). The Civil and Public Servants 
Association were not hostile to the reform, but the National Union of Civil and 
Public Servants did oppose the change. Partly because of the splits between the 
unions, and partly because of their reduced influence in the 1980s, the unions were 
not able to mount a campaign against the agency initiative. An illustration of the 
weakening of unions is the reduction of time the DSS allowed union representatives 
to work on union business. In 1990 the 90 union representatives could spend all 
their time on union business, this was cut to 50 per cent of time by the mid 1990s, 
with the rest being spent on official DSS duties (Greer 1994: 54).
However, the opposition of a major union does suggest that the agency
initiative was not seen as benefiting more junior officials. But junior officials were
not successful in mobilising wider public support against the reform. The Treasury
and Civil Service Committee and Public Accounts Committee took an interest in
issues raised by evidence from unions, but their concerns centred on the
implications for accountability to Parliament. The former committee noted that its
role was primarily monitoring rather than initiating or opposing change. In the end, 
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the committee broadly supported the initiative (Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee 1990: v).
However, some groups of officials in potential agency candidates were able 
to see benefits from the reform, setting up pull as well as push factors in the agency 
creation process. The pull forces were particularly strong cases where the officials 
did not feel themselves to be part of the mainstream career civil service, and did not 
share the view of their role defined in Section Two. These groups included 
professionals, such as scientists working in research and consultancy activities, and 
other officials with sector specific skills, including information technology staff. 
Whilst a complex set of factors was at work in each case of agency creation, these 
pull factors seem to help explain the use of agencies for some non-routine policy 
activities which were inconsistent with the public interest model.
In the DSS, the clearest example of ‘pull’ factors contributing to the 
creation of an agency was the Information Technology Services Agency. The 
agency was an example of mitigated agencification. The head of the computer 
section of the DSS was a key figure in the report team which recommended the 
establishment of the agency. One of the key arguments for setting up ITSA was the 
distinctiveness of IT staff (Greer 1994:33). These staff were different from other 
civil servants and part of an IT labour market which cut across the standard civil 
service career structure, with people moving in and out of government and 
widespread use of private contractors. The IT staff wanted more freedom to develop 
their specific skills (II Senior Official, Cabinet Office). ITSA was able to make use 
of freedoms to group staff by function and respond flexibly in pay and conditions to 
recruit and keep IT staff (ITSA 1996:20).
Conclusion
The mark II bureau-shaping model contrasts with the public interest model,
as summarised in Table 7.2. The mark II bureau-shaping model stresses the role of
intra-state processes in bringing about agencification. This chapter suggests that
bureau-shaping model’s hypotheses receive better support than equivalent
hypotheses derived from the public interest model. Hypothesis one suggests that 
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key groups of officials were involved in the reform and that the state was not a 
unitary actor. Each of these groups had a different view of how to deliberate about 
transaction costs. Hypothesis two suggests that officials in the Efficiency Unit and 
Project Team were able to provide senior officials in the departments with a bureau- 
shaping solution to the problem facing them as a result of politicians’ demands for 
more attention to be paid to managing activities. The result was a push to set up 
agencies. Most senior officials ended up working in departments rather than 
agencies, with a mean figure of around 70 per cent of each departments’ senior 
officials located in the department after the reform. In most cases junior officials 
were unable to oppose the reform. On occasions there was inappropriate agency 
creation contributing to performance problems, as in the case of the Benefits 
Agency.
The official classification of nominal agencification as part of the reform 
alongside more significant changes was partly the result of the Next Steps Project 
Team’s keenness to present a ‘successful’ reform, in terms of targets for agencies 
created and staff working in agencies. The Unit appeared less interested in whether 
departments were using the right criteria in matching activities to the agency form 
than in hitting its targets. In some cases, officials in agency candidates welcomed 
the opportunity to develop their own careers separate from the civil service 
mainstream, setting up pull factors, for example contributing to the creation of the 
Information Technology Services Agency in the DSS. This factor seems to help 
explain why some research and consultancy, non-routine policy activities were put 
into agencies.
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Table 7.2 Hypotheses Drawn from the Public Interest Model and Mark H 
Bureau-shaping Model________________________________________________
Part of 
Model
Public Interest Model Mark II Bureau-shaping Model
One 
(process 
of reform)
1) Pure and mitigated agencification 
was conducted by a unitary central 
state seeking to deliberate and 
minimise transaction costs
1) Pure and mitigated agencification 
was conducted by a fragmented 
central state. The deliberation about 
transaction cost was conditioned by 
entrepreneurial actors in central units 
producing innovative organisational 
solutions acceptable to departmental 
officials concerned to protect career 
policy roles and peripheral groups of 
officials seeking to develop separate 
careers from the mainstream civil 
service
Two
(rationale
for
reform)
2)Transaction costs changed in the 
1980s or the state’s deliberations 
were brought up to date in this period 
triggering pure and mitigated 
agencification for ‘executive’ rather 
than ‘policy’ activity. Transaction 
costs were unchanged in cases of 
nominal agencification
3) Agencies performance was in 
keeping with the expectations of 
transaction cost analysis in terms of 
economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness and they performed 
better than alternative forms of 
organisation
2) Managerialism involved 
politicians reassessing transaction 
costs and becoming more concerned 
with more attention needing to be 
paid to management of executive 
activities triggering pure and 
mitigated agencification as bureau- 
shaping strategies, leading to some 
inappropriate agency creation. 
Nominal agencification was the result 
of central units’ eagerness to pursue 
successful reforms
3) Agencies performance was 
partially consistent with the 
expectations of transaction cost 
analysis in terms of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness but, in 
cases of inappropriate use of the 
model, performance was not as good 
as that expected by the public interest 
model
Source: Section Two of Chapter Four and Chapter Seven
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Part Three: The Future of Agencies
Chapter 8: Likely Futures for the Agency Model
‘Great gains in public sector management have come from definition of 
task and delegation of management and the Government is determined 
that these are not lost. However, this concentration on specific tasks has 
sometimes distracted attention from the wider general objectives of 
government and people. The Government wants to give more attention to 
the coherence of policy across institutional boundaries...to operate in a 
joined up way.’ (Minister for the Cabinet Office 1999:1)
The public interest model and the mark II bureau-shaping model have 
expectations about the likely future use of the agency model and agencification 
processes. The hypotheses are summarised in Table 8.1. New initiatives during 
the latter part of the period 1988-1998 give some indication of which model best 
captures future reform processes and which reforms are most likely to emerge. 
Section One examines closing implementation gaps in use of the agency model 
and making minor adjustments to improve the operation of agencies. Section 
Two looks at the use of alternative forms of control in a way largely consistent 
with continued use of the agency model. Section Three looks at more radical 
changes involving dismantling the agency model.
Section One: More and Better Use of the Agency Model
The public interest model suggests more use of the model where
appropriate for handling executive activity. The mark II bureau-shaping model
suggests further implementation so long as politicians keep up managerial
pressure for more attention to be paid to delivering services. Both expect efforts
to close implementation gaps, where agency systems were not fully established,
and refinement of agency systems. Both suggest that the scope for future
agencification will be limited by the increasing scarcity of executive activity
suitable for being passed on to agencies. However, the mark II bureau-shaping
model suggests continued agencification because of bureau-shaping strategies by
officials, pressure from central units and pull factors from groups desiring more
autonomy, which may lead to less suitable use of the agency model.
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Table 8.1 The Public Interest Model and M ark II Bureau-shaping Model: 
Basis of Models and Hypotheses About Future Developments
Public Interest Model Mark II Bureau-shaping Model
a) Basis of Model
Adjustment of structures through 
deliberation and minimisation 
transaction costs to ensure 
economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services
Adjustments through 
deliberation about transaction 
costs conducted by a fragmented 
central state with entrepreneurial 
actors in central units producing 
innovative organisational 
solutions acceptable to 
departmental officials concerned 
to protect career policy roles and 
peripheral groups of officials 
seeking to develop separate 
careers from the mainstream 
civil service
b) Possible Future Developments
More and 
better use of 
the agency 
model
Changing transaction costs 
trigger further changes or no 
change if they remain stable. 
Any ‘mistakes’ in allocation of 
tasks are rectified with agencies 
used for ‘executive’ activity 
rather than ‘policy’ activity with 
moves to close implementation 
gaps from the earlier period
Unless politicians reverse 
managerialism, the use of 
agencies will be stable and there 
will be some moves to close 
implementation gaps
Use of other
control
forms to
complement
agency
working
Agencies’ performance is in 
keeping with the expectations of 
transaction cost analysis in terms 
of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness and they perform 
better than alternative forms of 
organisation so little likelihood 
of ‘unnecessary’ extra control 
forms
Agencies performance is 
partially consistent with the 
expectations of transaction cost 
analysis in terms of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness but, 
in cases of inappropriate use of 
the model, performance is not as 
good as the expectations of the 
public interest model. These 
factors, combined with 
entrepreneurial activity by actors 
in central units, makes the use of 
extra control forms very likely
Dismantling 
the agency 
model
Little likelihood of reversing the 
agency model, unless transaction 
costs change or in cases of 
inappropriate initial use of the 
model
Very poor agency performance 
in some cases may lead ministers 
to rethink managerialism and 
prefer hands on management to 
the agency model
Source: Section Two of Chapter Four and Chapter Seven
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At the end of the period 1988-1998 departments continued to implement 
the agency reform. In the second half of 1998 there were 19 candidates for 
agency status, employing 36,275 staff (Cabinet Office 1998:62). There were 
innovations that built on the initial agency model and the logic underlying it. 
There were several initiatives to improve the relationships between departments 
and agencies to maintain ministerial control but improve management 
flexibilities. The 1991 Fraser Report argued for a single senior figure within the 
department as the principal source of advice for the minister and point of contact 
for the agency (Efficiency Unit 1991:18). This person became known as the 
‘Fraser figure’. In a review of the operation of this system, Trosa found that he or 
she was often unable to devote enough time to monitoring the agency or 
representing its interests to the department (Trosa 1994:6). Trosa suggested 
strengthening the role of the Fraser figure, as a go-between for the agency and 
department and possibly an advocate for the agency, but this recommendation 
was not accepted by the Office of Public Service which felt it might interfere 
with ministerial control of agencies (Next Steps Team 1995:14-16).
There were attempts to improve the advice for ministers in their task of
regulating agencies. One initiative was use of Ministerial Advisory Boards
(MABs). The boards advised ministers on target setting and monitoring of the
agency. They arose from the Fraser Report of 1991 which suggested that
ministers needed more assistance in performing this activity (Next Steps Team
1995b:30-31). MABs included both executive members of agency management,
civil servants from the departments and non executive directors, often with a
private sector background. However, MABs evolved without a central direction
and there was considerable variety in their use. In about 40 per cent of cases
MABs performed the role outlined above, but in other cases the board was more
integrated into the agency as an internal management tool (Trosa 1994:23). The
Trosa report suggested that MABs should be extended to all departments and the
proportion of outsiders should be increased to one third, partly to increase their
independence from agency management (Trosa 1994:19-22). The review of
strategic management of agencies found MABs more effective than Fraser
figures where a wide range of skills were needed to set targets for the agency 
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(Next Steps Team 1995: 16-21). Out of 72 agencies surveyed in 1997 47 had 
MABs. There was no clear relationship between MABs and better performance 
in terms of economy, with a similar proportion of agencies experiencing budget 
falls with and without MABs (Appendix 7).
The case of the Benefits Agency shows that the initiatives did not always 
achieve the desired results. The Agency did not have a Fraser figure. The DSS as 
a whole did not use a Fraser figure for any of its agencies (Next Steps Team 
1995:17-18). Instead, the Benefits Agency Management Team ran the Agency, 
with the Chief Executive having a seat on the Departmental Management Board. 
In the initial stages of Agency operation the Management Board was something 
of a ‘talking shop’ and the BA mostly ran itself. However, the problems of 
maintaining departmental control over the agency led the Headquarters to use the 
Departmental Management Board more from the mid 1990s (113 Senior Official, 
Benefits Agency). None of the officials interviewed in the Agency or Department 
side felt use of a Fraser figure or an advisory board would have made much 
difference to the performance of the Agency (113,Senior Official, Benefits 
Agency; 114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security; 115 Senior Official, 
Benefits Agency).
There were attempts to improve the operation of performance targets. The 
review of the strategic management of agencies suggested best practice in the 
aims of target setting, but at the same time indicated some of the problems 
seemingly embedded in the very idea of setting targets. One aim was to keep the 
focus of agency performance targets reasonably stable over time, with increases 
in the difficulty of the target each year to stretch the agency. But this aim 
conflicted with changing the target’s focus if it was found to conflict with other 
objectives or needed to reflect changes in the aims of the agency (Next Steps 
Team 1995:38-45).
The Benefits Agency’s performance target regime was strengthened by
bolstering the systems for monitoring performance against targets. More
resources were put into establishing central teams to collect date on payment
accuracy for benefits rather than relying on information collected by districts 
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(NAO 1998b:49). From 1997-98 the funding of an area became dependent on 
their recorded workload, so Internal Audit checks were increased. The internal 
audit unit concluded that for 1996-97 and 1997-98 only a limited assurance could 
be given in respect of the integrity and reliability of performance data. In 1996- 
1997 there were doubts about whether one of the Secretary of State’s targets had 
been reached, for Income Support clearance time. In 1997-98 the validation 
processes by internal audit meant that unvalidated data for Express Family credit 
could not be used towards achieving the target and it had to be reported as not 
achieved for that year in the Annual Report (NAO 1998b:52-3).
There was greater independence for performance checkers through 
separating out the Internal Audit Unit from other parts of the Agency. An 
Agency Audit Committee, chaired by one of the agency’s non-executive 
directors, oversaw the Unit and a Corporate Director of Internal Audit, based 
outside the Agency in the Department HQ oversaw activities. These groups and 
individuals reported to the Department Audit Committee, again chaired by a non­
executive director (NAO 1998b:58). However, NAO recommended that the 
mechanisms were still not independent enough from the Agency and the 
Departmental Accounting Officer, and that a fully independent agent was 
required, although the agent should be able to draw on internal audit work. The 
Committee of Public Accounts agreed with this position (PAC 2000:Sec 8). 
However, the Treasury did not require such external validation, although it 
suggested that on occasion a minister may require it (NAO 1998b: Appendix 6). 
In this sense, the logic of external checking of performance was not fully 
developed
There were changes in the targets to try and avoid the displacement effect
of concentrating on certain targets to the detriment of other work. In 1998 the
Department of Social Security reviewed the Benefits Agency targets planned for
1999. As a result, the Agency’s external targets were reduced to concentrate on
five accuracy targets and two financial recovery targets, partly in an admission of
poor performance in these areas. New targets were set for anti-fraud work. These
were laid down in the document Safeguarding Social Security published in 1999
(DSS 1999b). An overall aim was to reduce programme losses in Income 
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Support and Job Seeker’s Allowance by 30 per cent by 2007 with at least 10 per 
cent by 2002 (DSS 1999b:4). This change meant that some benefits were no 
longer covered, clearance times were de-emphasised and the targets did not cover 
efficiency or some aspects of customer satisfaction. The NAO recommended 
more use of composite targets based on several other targets (NAO 1998b:38- 
40). This system gave some flexibility to trade off target achievement. However 
not all targets were pursued at once. The experience in BA suggested that when 
one area of work was prioritised, other areas tended to suffer and it was not 
possible to concentrate on all areas at once because this diluted effort. One 
response to this problem was that the Agency put the targets that had been 
relatively downgraded on an informal ‘care and maintenance’ basis, attempting 
to avoid deterioration in performance but focusing management attention on the 
new prioritised targets (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency).
The effectiveness of the tweaks to the agency model were reviewed in a 
number of studies, for example those undertaken by Trosa (1995) and the report 
on the Strategic Management of Agencies (Next Steps Team 1995). The studies 
found that some of the changes were overcoming teething problems. However, 
more serious problems with the agency model remained unresolved and did not 
seem amenable to minor reforms. In the Benefits Agency, the changes in use of 
the Management Board, performance target setting and monitoring were not 
enough to satisfy ministers that the Agency could be controlled using the model 
(114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security; 115 Senior Official, Benefits 
Agency). The problems of performance led to pressure building for more radical 
changes as outlined in Sections Two and Three, which appear more likely to 
develop in the future.
Section Two: Use of Other Control Forms to Complement Agency Working
The public interest model suggests that, where used appropriately, the 
agency model should be sufficient to deliver public services in an economic, 
efficient and effective way and that the use of other control forms is unnecessary. 
However, the mark II bureau-shaping model suggests that performance problems 
associated with agencies, and the presence of officials in central units with 
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incentives to come up with innovative solutions to these problems, will lead to 
new initiatives. There were indications that additional initiatives, broadly 
compatible with the agency model, were emerging in the period. The main 
emerging solutions were increased use of private sector firms for certain chunks 
of activity and more regulation by bodies other than the parent department.
The increased use of private sector firms arose as part of the Competing 
for Quality initiative, which was called market testing from 1986 to 1992. This 
initiative covered all central government and was not focused specifically on 
agencies. However, it became increasingly about agencies’ activities as the 
proportion of central government tasks run by agencies rose over the period. The 
reform was developed by the Treasury, consistent with the mark II bureau- 
shaping model’s emphasis on this organisation as one of the sources of 
innovation in public sector reform. The reform encouraged the evaluation of 
service delivery arrangements in central government against severed options. 
These were the abolition of the service, privatisation, strategic contracting out 
where private sector bids were invited but not bids from existing public 
providers, and market testing where bids from the existing public provider were 
evaluated against other bids (Efficiency Unit 1996:2). The reform was similar to 
the prior options review of agencies carried out as part of an agency review.
Each department put forward a programme of activities including those 
handled by agencies. Whilst individual agencies were responsible for identifying 
bits of work to subject to the competing for quality examination, the initiative 
had a strong central push from the Cabinet Office. Agencies felt under pressure 
to comply with the initiative (Mellon 1993; Price Waterhouse 1994). In this 
sense the reform came close to a violation of the agency principle of delegation 
of responsibility to agencies, but ultimately central targets for individual agencies 
were not set.
Calculations from figures contained in a review of the initiative reveal
that about £39m was subject to market testing each year between 1986-1991.
Under competing for quality, initiated after a substantial number of agencies had
been created, this figure rose to £659m for 1992-1995 (Efficiency Unit 1996:93- 
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94). The range of services covered expanded from ancillary support such as 
catering and cleaning to a wider range of services including professional and 
white collar services although these were still in the support services category 
and included estate management and IT support (Efficiency Unit 1996:4). The 
initiative was described as giving agencies an extra push to improve 
performance, efficiency in particular (13 Senior Official, Cabinet Office)
In terms of effects, the Efficiency Unit estimated savings net of the costs 
of organising the process of between 13 and 18 per cent of the pre test cost. 
However some smaller agencies felt that the costs of organising tests for small 
packages of services were too high relative to savings. In order to run the 
initiative many departments and agencies set up central units (Efficiency Unit 
1996:29,35). In this sense, the agency initiative made Competing for Quality 
more costly to implement because of the fragmentation of services into separate 
agencies made the packages smaller and lead to a multiplication of these units. 
The effects on quality were mixed with users divided near equally on whether 
services had improved with a third feeling there had been no change (Efficiency 
Unit 1996:14,21). On a crude measure, these lower cost and on average stable 
quality estimates suggest that efficiency did rise. However, the processes tended 
to concentrate on small packages of existing work rather than involving redesign 
of activities or attempts to work across organisational boundaries. Whilst a 
supplement to the performance target setting regime, Competing for Quality was 
not a replacement for it.
There was additional regulation of agencies by bodies other than the 
parent department. These bodies include the Cabinet Office, Treasury and 
National Audit Office, and specialist regulators. These changes were part of a 
broader growth in regulatory systems focusing on standard setting, monitoring 
and enforcement of performance standards in central government in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Hood and James 1997, Hood et al 1999, Hood, James, Scott 2000). In 
some senses the regulatory developments conflicted with the idea of giving 
agencies as much freedom from system wide rules as possible, but overall the 
regulatory developments went with the grain of the fragmented structures rather
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than seeking to reverse the organisational separation set in train by the agency 
reform.
The Cabinet Office introduced a number of performance systems of 
agencies. Some of these had a mandatory element and were directly regulatory, 
others relied more on exhortation to adopt them. Under the Citizen’s Charter 
pubic service bodies, including agencies, were required to develop standards for 
services, monitor performance against them and raise their performance if it was 
unacceptable. Taking the benefits Agency case as an example, the standards were 
introduced in 1993 and were self set by the Agency in consultation with the 
Department and the Citizen’s Charter Unit (NAO 1998b:43). The group in the 
agency responsible for developing Secretary of State’s targets and management 
targets incorporated these targets in Agency planning and ensured that the other 
targets were consistent with the requirements of the Citizen’s Charter Unit, 
which was renamed the Service First Unit in 1998 (NAO 1998b:37).
The standards were supposed to be linked to existing performance 
systems, so they went with the grain of the agency system (IA9 Senior Official, 
Cabinet Office). However they toughened up the regime for the Agency. One 
interviewee commented that the Unit was able to block proposals by the Agency 
if it felt they were lowering standards (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). For 
example, some Agency targets were set to cover 60-70 per cent of customers. 
But the Service First recommendation was that the quality of service should be 
achievable for 100 per cent of clients. To fulfil this requirement, on performance 
at the time, the Agency had to lower the standard set to raise percentage of 
clients covered (NAO 1998b:44).
The Cabinet Office encouraged agencies to gain accreditation under the
Investors in People scheme, requiring them to demonstrate training for
employees and development of their skills. The Cabinet Office announced that
by the year 2000 all civil servants should be working in organisations with
accreditation. By 1998, 32 agencies had been fully accredited and more were
expected to undergo the process (Cabinet Office 1998:8-9). By April 1999 all
Benefits Agency staff worked in units recognised by Investors in People (DSS 
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1999:57). The Charter Unit in the Cabinet Office developed its own, public 
sector wide, quality recognition system, the Charter Mark scheme. Under the 
scheme, agencies were encouraged to apply for external assessment and 
recognition of quality services focused on the customer. Winners had to provide 
evidence that they performed well on the principles of the Citizen’s Charter, 
which included publishing explicit standards, being open to customers, offering 
choice, operating in a courteous and helpful way, redressing complaints and 
providing value for money. They also had to show improvement over time. In 
the first three years of the scheme from January 1992 to the end of 1994, sections 
of 15 agencies received the Charter Mark (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
1994: ii-iii). This figure had risen to 49 by 1995 (Next Steps Team 1996: 17), 71 
by the end of 1996 (Next Steps Team 1997:12), 91 by the end of 1997 (Next 
Steps Team 1998:14)
The Cabinet Office also encouraged participation in comparative quality 
systems using benchmarking of agency performance against each other and the 
private sector organisations. The benchmarking scheme was announced in 
October 1995 by the Cabinet Office and run by the British Quality Foundation 
who used the Business Excellence Model to measure agencies against standards. 
The schemes were voluntary for agencies and they undertook self assessment 
rather than external assessment. After the first phase of 30 agencies in 1995-6, a 
second phase ran from April 1997 to January 1998 which included over 100 
government organisations including 70 agencies and a third phase was 
introduced to run for three years from 1998 (Samuels 1998:12).
Benchmarking was intended to assist agencies to learn from best practice
in other organisations and it was hoped that comparisons between bodies might
create peer pressure to drive up performance (Samuels 1997:3). The experience
of agencies in the pilot exercise suggested that they did feel lessons could be
learned from other bodies (Samuels 20-22). The Benefits Agency was closely
involved in using the Business Excellence Model and participated in the pilot
scheme in 1996. The commitment of senior staff was demonstrated by the Chief
Executive Peter Mathison’s membership of the governing board of the European
Quality Foundation as a representative of the public sector (Social Security 
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Committee 1998: Q153). However, an analysis of a summary of the 30 
improvement plans resulting from the BEM process in the agencies (Samuels 
1997: Annex C) revealed that two thirds of the improvements were focused on 
changes to internal processes, with one third including an element of external 
relations with customers or other stakeholders. The focus on external clients was 
more apparent in trading agencies than other types of agency. However, because 
the scheme was voluntary it is less likely to lead to resolution of externalities 
between agencies and other bodies which were not in the interests of any 
individual agency to solve by themselves.
The National Audit Office, reporting to and funded by Parliament, was an 
important regulatory of agencies. Whilst the resources devoted to financial audit 
were largely static, there were more value for money studies conducted in the 
1990s than in the 1980s (Hood et al 1999). These studies by and large did not 
focus directly on performance of agencies. However, there were some studies of 
agencies, especially in cases of poor performance, for example in the Benefits 
Agency. The NAO conducted reports on the Agency’s assessment of 
performance against targets and exposed cases of poor performance (NAO 
1998b). The NAO saw the Agency as an important area for value for money 
investigation in the late 1990s (15 Senior Official, National Audit Office; 112 
Senior Official, National Audit Office).
The Benefits Agency developed its own internal quality systems in 
response to the growth in external regulatory systems. In response to the 
inaccuracies in Income Support, the IS Accuracy Project was set up in 1993. In 
1997 the project was renamed the Benefits Accuracy project with a wider remit 
to cover Jobseeker’s Allowance and Incapacity Benefit which were also seen as 
having high levels of inaccuracy (Benefits Agency 1999a). The Project led to a 
Quality Support team, established in 1994. This team monitored local 
performance twice a year and was a central unit separate from staff carrying out 
administration of benefit, although staff previously worked in benefits 
administration. In this sense it was intermediate between external regulation and 
internal management within the Agency. The quality support system was itself
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then open to review by the NAO and the BA internal auditors (Benefits Agency
1999).
The Benefits Agency was subject to more regulation than most agencies 
because a new regulator was established devoted to monitoring the Agency and 
bodies working with the body. The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) was 
launched in November 1997 to provide independent assurance about social 
security systems in central and local government amid widespread concern about 
the high levels of fraud in the social security system (Secretary of State for Social 
Security and Chief Secretary to the Treasury 1999:22). The BFI cost £6.5m to 
run in 1998/99 and employed 133 staff, a substantial investment in additional 
regulation. The BFI was formally part of the DSS but independent of those 
responsible for administering benefits and reported direct to the Secretary of 
State. It operated under the Social Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1997 
(BFI 1999d:Sec 1). The motivation behind setting up the inspectorate was in 
large part the DSS HQ staffs feeling that the BA was not able to deal with the 
problem of fraud by itself and that the HQ needed more information about the 
agency and levers to influence performance. The agency model was not by itself 
providing effective enough control systems (111 Senior Official, Department of 
Social Security).
The BFI carried out inspections of the BA, other agencies and local 
authorities and made recommendations. In its first inspection of the Benefits 
Agency, 30 BFI staff visited 20 sites in the London South Directorate of the BA 
(AD3), 2 Benefit Centres and BA Central Services over an 8 week period. The 
report attempted to highlight better ways of working in the allocation of National 
Insurance numbers, in part to help the CA and improvements to Income Support 
processing to help LAs with Housing Benefit processing (BFI 1999a). The aim 
of the inspection and subsequent report was to get the BA to make the 
improvements. The BFI followed up the report to check that the situation has 
been improved. The BFI also attempted to improve joint working across 
organisational boundaries. It disseminated good practice across DSS agencies 
and LAs which might not otherwise get distributed across organisational
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boundaries and set up seminars involving BA and LA staff to encourage 
exchange of ideas (BFI 1999d: Sec. 2).
The initiatives to complement agency working lend further support to the 
mark II bureau-shaping model which suggests that performance problems present 
opportunities to entrepreneurial officials in central units. They did seem to 
mitigate some of the problems of performance with agencies whilst at the same 
time not reversing the agency reform. However, in some cases of more severe 
under performance, including that of the Benefits Agency, the mark II bureau- 
shaping model suggests more radical solutions are likely to develop.
Section Three: Dismantling the Use of the Agency Model
The dismantling of the agency model involves the most radical form of 
change, the main alternatives are abolishing the activities, moving them to the 
private sector in some form or reintegrating them into a department. Such 
changes are suggested by the public interest model only where the agency form 
is used inappropriately or where transaction costs change. The mark II bureau- 
shaping model suggests that poor performance will be tolerated by senior 
officials if the alternative is senior officials taking over management themselves. 
However, if the alternative is privatisation, these officials do not object because it 
does not involve them getting involved in hands on management. In some cases 
privatisation is a course of action reinforced by pull factors from officials in non­
mainstream civil service careers seeking to increase their autonomy. The mark II 
bureau-shaping model suggests that only in cases of very severe under 
performance of agencies will ministers question the agency model as a way of 
promoting managerialism.
Radical departures from the use of the agency model were rare in the
period, but there were changes, as summarised in Table 8.2. The most extreme
alternative was abolishing an agency, as happened to the DSS’s Resettlement
Agency in 1996. However this change was not because of problems with the
model, but rather that the agency had completed its task of handing over
responsibility for running homes to local authorities and other bodies. There were 
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several mergers and rationalisations of agencies. The mergers reflected the 
departmental focus of reform highlighted in the mark II bureau-shaping model, 
with mergers between agencies within departments rather than between agencies 
of different departments. An example was the creation of the Defence Evaluation 
and Research Agency of 11,248 staff from the merger of the Defence Research 
Agency of (8,770), the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (620) 
and the Defence Operational Analysis Centre (160). The primary reason for the 
creation of the agency, according to the chief executive, was to gain from 
‘economies of scale’ (Talbot 1996:42). The agency model was retained for the 
relationship between the agency and the department.
Another radical change to status was privatisation of agencies, where 
ownership was passed to the private sector or provision of the service was passed 
to a private company under contract. Initially the government claimed that the 
agency initiative was not intended as a prelude to privatisation. However, the 
1993 Next Steps Review announced that agencies were all potential candidates 
for privatisation. In total, 11 agencies were privatised and 2 agencies had their 
functions contracted out over the period. Most of the privatised agencies retained 
government as one of their major customers. In some cases ‘pull’ factors based 
on the desires of staff in agencies were important in privatisation. For example 
Chessington Computer Centre was sold to a consortium including management 
and employee teams (Appendix 11). The changes in these agencies nearly always 
involved considerable input from the staff in the agency (II Senior Official, 
Cabinet Office).
There were few attempts at reintegrating agencies back into departments.
By 1998 there had only been one clear case of full re-integration, the Securities
Facilities Executive Agency. However, in some areas the boundaries between
ministerial responsibility and agency responsibility were clarified. A high profile
example was the clarification of the Home Secretary’s role in relationship to the
Prison Service agency, which was a matter of dispute between Derek Lewis and
Michael Howard. Under an internal review of the management of the Prison
Service the Home Secretary became more closely involved in reviewing
performance and the Framework Document altered to outline reporting to 
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ministers more clearly. This change followed on from the Home Secretary rather 
them the Chief Executive answering Parliamentary Questions about the Agency 
(Prison Service 1998:27)
Table 8.2 Changes to Agencies’ Status 1988-1998
Type of Change Number Example
Privatisation 11 HMSO sold to the National Publishing 
Group in Sept 1996
Complete contracting out 
of functions
2 National Physical Laboratory’s functions 
contracted out to Serco in Oct. 1995
Mergers and 
rationalisations
5 Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 
formed from merging three agencies in April 
1995
Abolition of functions 1 Resettlement Agency abolished in March 
1996
Change of status 1 Historic Royal Palaces became an NDPB in 
April 1998
Functions transferred back 
to the department
1 Security Facilities Executive Agency 
functions moved back into the Cabinet 
Office in July 1998
Source: Appendix 11
By 1998, there was increasing recognition that the agency model and the 
wider structure of central government, as traditionally organised, did not always 
allow co-ordination of activities across separate bodies. Government thinking 
was turning towards some of the problems of the system, but there were few 
concrete policy proposals. The Modernising Government White Paper published 
in March 1999 recognised the importance of ‘joined-up’ government, focusing 
on policy and implementation solutions regardless of organisational boundaries 
(Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet Office 1999). Similarly, the Cabinet 
Office Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) found problems with the 
treatment of ‘cross-cutting’ issues in the setting overall policy objectives, 
through target setting and implementation (PIU 2000).
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The White Paper suggested more ‘joined-up’ working so that 
organisations’ performance regimes should take into account the effects of their 
actions on other bodies. Improvements were needed to bring all the information, 
regardless of which organisation collected to assist policy makers. The PIU 
report crystallised thinking from the late 1990s and emphasised joint 
management teams with shared performance aims and evaluation systems and 
joint budgeting arrangements (PIU 2000: Sec 4). Two central funds were 
established to promote co-operative working between departments and agencies. 
The £230m per year Invest to Save budget funded innovative projects involving 
two or more departments and the £2,500m Capital Modernisation Fund was 
awarded in part to encourage joint projects (PIU 2000: Box 9.1). The PIU report 
was anxious to stress that the cross-cutting approach should be balanced against 
the merits of traditional structures but did not go very far in developing the 
conditions under which one method was more appropriate than the other (PIU 
2000: 1.3).
There were attempts to improve joint working predating the White Paper. 
There was more joined up performance appraisal and budgeting under the Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs) which arose from the Comprehensive Spending 
Reviews of 1998. The Comprehensive Spending Reviews were conducted for 
different sectors of central government. PSAs were intended to integrate target 
setting in different areas under an overall umbrella, setting out some 
departmental outputs and the funding allocated to them (Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury 1998:1-3). The PSAs were public documents, like the agency 
performance targets. Departments had to report progress to the Ministerial 
Committee on Public Services and Public Expenditure (PSX) (PIU 2000:7.18). 
But the first batch of PSAs was modest in the extent to which they joined up 
performance systems. There were 28 PSAs based on departmental boundaries 
with only three cross cutting PSAs in criminal justice, drugs and help for young 
families with 50 targets which are held jointly by two or more departments out of 
several hundred (PIU 2000: Box 9.1).
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The effect of PSAs was to integrate agency performance plans within a 
broader system of plans spanning central government. The Benefits Agency 
performance target systems were increasingly integrated into systems for other 
parts of government, to try and improve the treatment of joint working. The 
Agency’s targets were incorporated in a DSS Public Service Agreement and an 
Output and Performance Analysis statement published in March 1999 (PAC 
2000:Sec.5). The BA instituted a new Performance Management Regime from 
April 2000 to take account of this development (DSS 1999:57). This reduced the 
tendency of the BA systems to focus attention on an overly narrow conception of 
the organisation’s activities (114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security).
There were further attempts to link up departments’ activities by 
integrating civil service careers. Initially, there was concern about reduced staff 
movement between agencies and departments. The Trosa Report found that, in 
general, arrangements for this kind of transfer had not been thought out and that 
moving to sin agency was not thought to be advantageous to civil servants’ 
careers (Trosa 1994:48-49). There were attempts to integrate careers linking 
senior staff in different departments. The Senior Civil Service was set up in 1996 
to encourage civil servants to take a broader perspective than the department or 
agency in which they were working. But this reform had limited success. The 
PIU found that it was hard to get people to move across departments. The 
percentage of staff moving on loan outside their own department was just under 
5 per cent in 1995/6, and had risen to only just under 7 per cent by 1997/8 (PIU 
2000: Figure 8.2). The report suggested trying to get a ‘critical mass’ of civil 
servants with experience of working in other organisations in the civil service 
and beyond as soon as possible.
To strengthen linked careers and encourage a corporate identity for the
service, a Civil Service Management Committee, later renamed the Management
Board, was set up in February 1999 (PIU 2000:4.11). The top 600 postings were
more actively managed by the Board as part of this process. The importance of
career progression involving experience in a variety of settings was emphasised
by the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU 2000: Sec 1.5). This principle was
reiterated by Sir Richard Wilson in his report to the Prime Minister on Civil 
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Service reform. He said that, in order to reach the Senior Civil Service, people 
should have experience in working in frontline delivery or operational 
management and of working in more than one culture (Wilson 1999: Sec 16). An 
attempt to improve mobility was the proposal to set up an electronic marketplace 
for vacancies by June 2000 (Wilson 1999:Sec 16). However, by the end of the 
1990s, these moves were being discussed as possibilities rather than being put 
into practice.
The implications of ‘joined-up’ working were greatest for agencies 
involved in working with other bodies for large parts of their work, in complex 
tasks where specifying targets for executive activity was difficult, and where 
encouraging direct responsiveness to customers through trading relationships was 
not possible. The Benefits Agency was one of these bodies. The initial response 
to the problems of joined-up working in the Agency was muted. The BA could 
not embark on short term solutions, in part because of resource constraints 
imposed by financial targets (113 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). However, 
from the mid 1990s the BA planned to link the Housing Benefit and Council Tax 
computer systems in the Agency and local authorities. In November 1998, the 
Affinity consortium was selected to carry forward this work. In the short term the 
BA provided local authorities with remote access terminals so that they could 
read relevant files on its computer system. The partial ‘solution’ in the end came 
from the Department not the Agency, a recognition that the Agency did not have 
the incentives to solve the problem (15 Senior Official, National Audit Office). 
The Department offered terminals to all 409 local authorities and over 350 
applied for them, by the end of January 1999 171 terminals were operating. 
However the systems were limited and did not enable the local authority to 
correct any errors on these files or update them. There were attempts to match 
data on different computer systems to expose cases of fraud and error. By the end 
of 1998 this service was in operation in over 300 local authorities. The data 
matching scheme was, however, a small scale operation resulting in savings of 
£ 13m to 1999, a small proportion of total losses (NAO 1999a:30-32).
The Benefits Agency strengthened its Service Level Agreements with 
local authorities to try and improve liaison, particularly in the administration of 
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Housing Benefit. Service Level Agreements were made mandatory for Benefits 
Agency district managers (DSS 1999:24). Another attempt to improve joint 
working was the active, modem, service project which was launched in 
December 1997 (DSS 1999:41). As part of this initiative projects were set up to 
work more closely with local authorities. For example, schemes were established 
with the London Boroughs of Lewisham and Camden involving the BA and the 
Information Technology Services Agency, which provided IT support. In 
Camden, lone parents were offered a single point of call for electronic claims for 
Income Support, Child Support and Housing Benefit. In Lewisham the Benefits 
Agency worked with the local authority to complete a combined Income Support 
and Housing Benefit and Council Tax benefit form (DSS 1999:26). These 
schemes were cited by the Department of Social Security in response to the 
criticisms in NAO reports about the lack of joined up work (DSS 1999:40-41).
There were more radical changes to the Benefits Agency being planned at 
in 1998. The broad thrust of the proposal was to link Benefits Agency working 
with other bodies. The Single Work Focused Gateway, announced in September 
1998, and later renamed ONE, brought together the Employment Service, 
Benefits Agency, Child Support Agency, local authorities and other welfare 
providers to provide a more coherent service for claimants. The idea was to give 
a claimant a personal adviser to take their details and assess employment, benefit 
and training options from an initial ‘start-up meeting’. The personal advisor 
called on a team of experts to provide advice to claimants and brought these 
organisations services together to focus on the needs of the claimant.
The ONE projects were cited as examples of joined-up government in 
action in the Modernising Government White Paper. However, this style of 
working initially covered only a small part of the BA’s work. There were 12 
ONE pilots from June 1999 (DSS 1999:11-12). In funding these pilots, £79.5m 
came from the Treasury ‘Invest to Save’ budget out of the total of £112m for all 
12 pilots (Social Security Committee 1999: Para. 1). The pilots were co­
ordinated by a partnership of departments with a Project Board answerable to a 
joint ministerial group. Management of the field was by traditional lines within
the BA through a series of district, area and regional offices. Relations between 
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organisations were generally semi-contractual at the top, and by liaison at the 
delivery level, with stronger links between BA and Employment Service in the 
area of Jobseeker’s Allowance. However, the ONE pilot projects were managed 
through Project Management Groups at regional level bringing BA, Employment 
Service and local authorities together to manage the pilots in their region. Each 
individual pilot was headed by a single manager who was drawn from one of the 
partner organisations and who oversaw a mixed team of BA, Employment 
Service and local authority staff (PIU 2000: 10.11). There were two variants of 
joint working in ONE, the first using call centres the second using private and 
voluntary sector bodies in the provision of services, for example coaching for 
interviews, customer inquiries about benefit (Social Security Committee 
1999:Para. 10).
However, several difficulties of joint working under the agency system 
emerged during the projects, which point to potential pressures for reforms to the 
agency model. The different target regimes set for the agencies meant that it was 
difficult to set targets for the pilots. No new targets were formally set, which 
makes evaluation of the pilots more difficult. The Social Security Committee 
expressed concern that the job placement target would be too crude to measure 
the outcomes and that clearer assessment of the quality of advice about benefits 
be undertaken (Social Security Committee 1999: paras 68 and 70). The different 
target regimes affected the styles of working which often clashed. Local 
authorities were felt to be more ‘can do’ and focused on solving clients’ 
problems whereas the Agency style was more ‘hierarchical’ (Social Security 
Committee 1999: para. 41). This hierarchical approach was partly because of a 
concern to meet management targets linked to the external accountability 
structures of the agency.
Differences in personnel systems between the Benefits Agency and other
bodies caused problems. Each agency involved in the joint working had its own
pay banding and promotion structure. Staff from the Employment Service,
Benefits Agency, Child Support Agency and local authorities were asked to
apply for start up adviser and personal adviser posts in the pilot areas. ONE posts
were assessed as broadly equivalent to the executive officer post but people from 
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different agencies remained on their ‘home agency’ terms. These agencies also 
had different priorities and managerial and disciplinary systems. The 
Implementing Managers were spending three-quarters of their time on sorting out 
these staffing issues (Social Security Committee 1999: paras 34 and 35). Another 
barrier to joint working was variety in IT systems. The main operational support 
was provided by the existing Labour Market System used by the Employment 
Service, OpStrat used in the Benefits Agency combined with a new Gateway 
Enquiry System. DfEE and DSS were exploring the possibilities of using small 
scale developmental IT prototypes, for example in Lewisham, to make better use 
of integrated IT (Social Security Committee 1999: para. 44), but these were at an 
early stage.
Finally, the initiative was largely centrally driven by DSS and the 
Department for Education and Employment. The Local Government Association 
and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities complained that they were 
brought into the process too late to contribute sufficiently to the project planning 
and that local authorities were not allowed to become leaders on the project 
(Social Security Committee 1999: paras 38 and 39). Local authorities were not 
involved as lead commissioning bodies in the initial pilots to involve private and 
voluntary sector organisations, the central government agencies did not want to 
lose control over the projects (Social Security Committee 1999: paras 38 and 39).
The problems with the Benefits Agency seemed to be creating pressure 
for some aspects of the agency mode to be de-emphasised. Reforms were being 
discussed to stress flexibility of staff movement between bodies, joint 
management boards, and targets which were not narrowly focused on the 
organisation’s own tasks (115 Senior Official, Benefits Agency). There were 
proposals to move back some of the functions given to the Agency to the 
Department of Social Security to enable the Department to develop strategic 
policy more effectively. The split between specifying policy and implementing it 
in a separate agency was under threat with proposals to establish an ‘agency’ of 
working age to deal with clients of this type and an ‘agency’ of pensionable age 
to deal with pensioners. These bodies, whilst called ‘agencies’, were intended to 
have ‘seamless’ team working, with those developing policy also involved in 
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specifying implementation systems and monitoring performance on the ground 
(114 Senior Official, Department of Social Secutrity).
The severe and chronic performance problems of the Agency appeared to 
make ministers and senior officials lose trust in the agency model as a way of 
improving performance. The Labour administration elected in 1997 had a 
different agenda to the Conservatives, aiming to improve employability rather 
than concentrate on keeping down the cost of the welfare system. These more 
ambitious aims made the use of the agency model even more problematic than 
previously (114 Senior Official, Department of Social Security; 115 Senior 
Official, Benefits Agency). Under these circumstances, the mark II bureau- 
shaping model and the public interest model both suggest possible reversal of use 
of the agency model. However, these plans were at an early stage at the end of 
the 1990s. There was little evidence of similar thinking in about the majority of 
agencies in other departments (II Senior Official, Cabinet Office). The 
performance of most agencies did not lead to severe ministerial dissatisfaction 
and the mark II bureau-shaping model suggests that reversal of the model is 
unlikely in these cases.
Conclusion
The attempts to combat some of the emerging problems with agency 
working give some indication that the mark II bureau-shaping model’s 
expectations seem more likely to develop than those of the public interest model. 
The future is likely to vary between individual agencies, depending on the type 
of agency and its performance. Continued use of the model, with minor 
tweaking, is likely in cases where there are performance problems but these are 
not very severe. The findings from earlier chapters suggest this is likely to apply 
to the majority of agencies.
The mark II bureau-shaping model suggests that complementary reform
initiatives are likely with officials in central units coming with new schemes and
continued resistance to hands on management from senior departmental officials.
The development of initiatives including the Competing for Quality/Market 
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Testing scheme devised by the Treasury and the Charter Mark scheme devised 
by the Citizen’s Charter Unit can be seen in this light. In the Benefits Agency, a 
regulatory solution was attempted, supplementing oversight of the agency by the 
department with monitoring by the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate.
More radical changes are less likely than minor reforms for most 
agencies, according to the mark II bureau-shaping model. However, in some 
cases, pull factors may contribute to continued privatisation of agencies. These 
factors are most important in agencies with staff who are not part of the 
mainstream civil service, for example those involved in specialist research and 
consultancy services. In cases of severe under performance other radical 
solutions may also be attempted. Whilst developments in the Benefits Agency 
were at a very early stage in the late 1990s, they did seem to point towards 
substantial changes in use of the model. The ONE pilots de-emphasised the 
corporate identity of the Agency by encouraging the adoption of similar pay and 
conditions and working practices to those used by other bodies. The reform 
proposals for the relationship between the Agency and the Department stressed a 
seamless link between policy development and implementation, de-emphasising 
organisational separation between the two bodies.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
The research provides answers to the three questions set out in the 
Intrcoedtuction. Section One examines conclusions relating to the first question: 
h ow  (diid the creation of agencies, or agencification, work in the period and was 
the ireefform a substantial change? Section Two discusses conclusions relating to 
the isesccond question: why was the reform adopted and did agencies bring about 
beneffitts in the delivery of services? Section Three looks at the conclusions 
relattimg to the third question: what is the likely course of future developments in 
the uisse: of agencies?
Sectdcom One: The Agency Model was Widely Used and Mitigated 
Agexncciification was Predominant in the Reform
The study reveals the way in which the agency model was used, including 
the pattfcem across the central state and its use in the Benefits Agency, evaluating 
officiiail <claims that the reform was a major change. The agency model is defined 
in Ghaipiter One as involving organisational separation between an agency and a 
depairtmnent with some autonomy for the agency and little or no ad hoc 
intervention by senior officials and ministers. There is regulation of the agency 
by the department, principally through a system of rule based output oriented 
performance targets, with a chief executive to head the agency and account for 
performance. Four principle types of agency are identified based on 
distinguishing those that receive grants from those that receive funds through 
trading in markets and distinguishing those that use their budget on their own 
activities, from those that pass their budget on to others. The four mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive types formed from these two distinctions are the 
delivery, trading, contract/transfer and trading contract/transfer types.
The survey of agencies in Chapters Two and Three reveals that the UK
central state made extensive use of the agency model in the period 1988 to 1998.
Chapter Two shows that, over the period, 155 agencies were created. By 1998,
65 per cent of civil servants worked in 138 agencies. This finding suggests that
the official accounts were correct in suggesting that the agency model was in 
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widespread use in the UK central state. However, the picture in terms of agency 
creation processes is more variegated than the official version suggested.
The research reveals the variety of agencification processes. Four types of 
agencification are identified, pure agencification involving substantial change 
and dismantling of integrated structures, mitigated agencification involving 
substantial change to a unit with some separate identity, nominal agencification 
consisting of limited change and new function agencification where the activity 
was not previously performed. The so called ’Next Steps’ reform was 
predominately mitigated agencification, where there was already some separation 
of activities prior to the reform. This type of agencification accounted for 69 per 
cent of cases. There was pure agencification in 14 per cent of cases, in which the 
reform was an even more significant reorganisation; the case of the Benefits 
Agency was an example of this form of agency creation. However, in 14 per cent 
of cases, there was nominal change and the reform was largely a relabelling 
exercise. New function agencification was found in only 2 per cent of cases.
Different types of agency emerged from these processes. Agencies were 
predominately of the delivery type, with 119 agencies or 77 per cent of this type, 
followed by the contract/transfer type with 20 agencies or 13 per cent, trading 
type with 15 agencies or 9 per cent and trading/contract/transfer with 1 agency. 
The contract/transfer type was the most significant in terms of staff, with around 
40 per cent of civil servants, in part because the largest agency, the Benefits 
Agency, was of this type.
The practice of agency working reflected use of the core features of the 
model, as shown in Chapter Three. All agencies had organisational separation, 
some framework of flexibilities and regulation by their departments using 
performance targets and accountable chief executives. The agencies were 
incorporated into existing central state rules for public expenditure and 
accounting controls, which identified them to varying degrees as separate bodies. 
However, the practice of agency working was not always fully consistent with 
the model.
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The Benefits Agency illustrated some of the difficulties in separating 
tasks between the department and agency and establishing a clear corporate 
identity for the agency, whilst at the same time continuing to allow departmental 
control of the organisation. There were disputes between the Department of 
Social Security Headquarters and the Benefits Agency about duplication of 
policy capacity within the Agency. The system of rule based controls through 
performance targets was incompletely implemented, with targets missing for 
some aims of the organisation and inaccurate measurement of performance in 
some areas.
Section Two: The Reform Reflected Bureau-shaping Motivations Rather 
than Straightforward Pursuit of the Public Interest
The institutional rational choice approach, through the bureau-shaping 
model, makes a substantial contribution to understanding why the reform 
occurred. The official justifications for the reform were fragmented and, at some 
points, inconsistent. Chapter Four constructs the public interest model to form a 
more coherent and complete justification for agencies based on the official view 
of the benefits of the reform principally contained in the 1988 Report. The public 
interest model suggests that senior officials and politicians had the goals of 
delivering public services in an efficient and effective manner with maximum 
economy, expressed through minimising transaction costs associated with 
delivering services. Agencies promoted this goal in handling routine, executive 
activities rather than non-routine, policy activities. The choice of agencies rather 
than other forms, including an integrated department or a contract with a private 
firm, was a way to minimise transaction costs.
However, the public interest model does not seem to be consistent with
some aspects of agency creation, as revealed in Chapter Four. In particular,
disputes between parts of the central state, the bracketing of nominal changes
with more significant ones under the overall ‘Next Steps’ reform banner, and use
of the agency model for non-routine policy work were inconsistent with the
model. The performance of agencies did not match all the expectations of the
public interest model, as shown in Chapter Five. Economy was not improved, 
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instead the model was associated with real terms rises in central government 
administrative costs and total costs between 1988 and 1998.
However, there were improvements in running costs in the mature phase 
of the reform process at the end of the period once most agencies had been 
created. Total central government administrative expenditure fell in real terms by 
4.8 per cent between 1995/96 and 1997/98. A survey of 72 agencies showed a 
fall of 4.6 per cent in their combined administrative costs in real terms over the 
same period. There were differences between the non-trading agencies, which 
showed a median fall of 5.3 per cent, and trading types, which showed a median 
rise of 8.2 per cent. This difference may have in part reflected trading agencies 
responding to consumers, as is suggested in the public interest model, and in this 
sense was not inconsistent with the model. The case of the Benefits Agency 
reflected the overall pattern for non trading types, real terms administrative 
spending falling in the period 1995/96 to 1997/98 by 4.4 per cent. But, in 
1997/98, the Agency’s administrative spending was 17 per cent higher than in 
the first year of agency working.
The lack of systematic data makes a fully comprehensive assessment of 
efficiency and effectiveness a difficult task. On a few key criteria, the majority of 
agencies appeared to perform reasonably consistently with the model’s 
expectations. The survey of 72 agencies showed that 88 per cent were generally 
perceived by ministers to have performed satisfactorily. However, features of the 
model appeared to contribute to performance problems in the case of the Benefits 
Agency, as shown in Chapter Five. The organisational separation between the 
Agency and the Department Headquarters exacerbated the long running problem 
of policy being made without sufficient reference to the needs of implementation 
and, on occasion, there was poor communication between the two bodies. The 
performance target regime caused speed of clearance time to be prioritised over 
accuracy in the early 1990s, contributing to poor performance on accuracy of 
payments. The target system encouraged the Agency to focus on its own 
activities rather than joint working with other bodies, particularly contributing to 
difficulties in co-operating with local authorities in the delivery of Housing 
Benefit.
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The research demonstrates that the insights of the bureau-shaping model 
can be used to help understand the reform. Chapter Six explores how the insights 
of institutional rational choice are used in Patrick Dunleavy’s bureau-shaping 
model, but that the original model is inadequate for explaining the ‘Next Steps’ 
reform. The model is not clearly specified and does not include the relationship 
between politicians and senior officials or account for why the reform happened 
when it did rather than previously. The mark II model is developed in Chapter 
Seven to overcome the inadequacies of the original model.
The mark II bureau-shaping model is an important theoretical advance for 
understanding the reasons for the reform. The model appears to be consistent with 
evidence of the reform process during the period, as explored in Chapter Seven. A 
range of evidence is used for exploring the model, including official statements and 
interview material. However, unlike traditional public administration research, the 
methodological approach does not necessarily take this material at face value 
because it is potentially open to misrepresentation. Instead, the evidence is cross­
checked using evidence of choices made by actors during the period and other data, 
including budget data.
The mark II bureau-shaping model is supported by evidence about
developments during the period. Different groups of officials’ institutional
positions gave them different interests in the reform process. Senior officials in the
departments saw their role primarily as policy work rather than the direct, hands on,
management of executive activities. Senior officials’ reluctance to work in agencies
and in management positions, both before and after the agency reform, lends
support to the model. Voting with their feet by officials indicated their motivations
better than interview material by itself because of the potential for
misrepresentation of the motive for action in such material. Senior officials’ dislike
of management work affected how they responded to politicians’ demands for more
attention to be paid to managing activities. Their institutional position enabled them
to act together as a group to pursue their interests through bureau-shaping. In
departments with agencies, 70 per cent of senior officials ended up working in the
parent department after the creation of agencies.
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Entrepreneurial officials in the Cabinet Office Efficiency Unit had career 
incentives to come up with innovative organisational solutions to problems of 
public service delivery that were successfully implemented. They provided senior 
officials in departments with the agency model as a piece of bureau-shaping 
technology, enabling them to respond to politicians by passing on executive work to 
agencies. The agency model offered a new organisational from that would be 
accepted by officials in the departments who were responsible for implementing the 
reform. Once the reform was underway, the Next Steps Project Team was keen to 
promote the reform as a success. They included nominal agencifications and other 
bodies ‘working on agency lines’ in the totals for progress under the reform as well 
as cases where the reform was a more significant change.
Officials in agency candidates had different degrees of influence over the 
reform. Most junior officials were not a key part of the process, as was reflected in 
the weakness of unions in deciding on the changes. However, pull factors were 
important in agencies where staff did not see themselves as part of the mainstream 
Civil Service, helping to account for cases where non-routine, policy, work was 
transferred to an agency. These factors which promoted use of the form, even if it 
was not always appropriate. From this perspective, the performance problems, for 
example those associated with the case of the Benefits Agency, are consistent with 
the mark II bureau-shaping model.
Section Three: Widespread Use of the Agency Model is Likely to Continue 
with Radical Changes Only in Cases of Very Poorly Performing Agencies
The public interest model and the mark II bureau-shaping model suggest
different ways in which the use of the agency model is likely to develop, as
explored in Chapter Eight. The expectations are not greatly dissimilar because
both models stress that reforms were undertaken, in part, to try and improve the
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public services. But the mark II bureau
shaping model stresses the institutional position of different state actors in the
process. The model suggests that bureau-shaping strategies will continue to be an
important influence on the reform in the future as will entrepreneurial officials in 
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central units who have incentives to come up with new mechanisms for 
improving public services.
The most likely future for most agencies appears to be continued use of 
the agency model with closure of implementation gaps. Likely changes in these 
agencies include refinements to performance target regimes and experimentation 
with alternative forms of department-agency relationship. The use of Ministerial 
Advisory Boards is a development consistent with the main features of the 
agency model and is likely to become more widespread, in part because several 
central unit reports have commented favourably on the operation of Boards.
These developments are likely to be supplemented by additional 
mechanisms in agencies with moderate performance problems. Some of these 
forms centre on ways for the agency to improve its own performance, for 
example the benchmarking scheme which was undertaken from the mid 1990s is 
likely to continue. In other cases there has been more use of external, regulatory, 
systems. The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate, set up to oversee the Benefits Agency 
and local authorities, is an example of a form that may be used in areas where 
departments’ oversight needs to be supplemented by other bodies.
In a few cases of very poor performance more radical changes are more 
likely. Partial dismantling of the agency model may occur in the Benefits 
Agency. Organisational separation between the department and the agency and 
the performance target system have contributed to severe problems of 
performance. The agency systems have detrimentally affected joint working with 
local authorities and the achievement of certain of the Agency’s own aims, 
particularly limiting fraud and error of payments. Whilst the proposed reforms 
are at an early stage, the long term viability of the agency model may be in doubt 
in this case.
Conclusion
Overall, the agency reform was a substantial organisational change but
was more variegated than official accounts suggested, with mitigated 
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agencification most significant and some nominal changes. The reform seems to 
have been brought about, in part, by bureau-shaping strategies by senior officials 
in departments combined with entrepreneurial behaviour by officials in central 
units. Whilst continued use of the agency model is likely in most cases of agency 
working, complimentary regulatory reforms and more radical dismantling of the 
model are likely in cases of very poor performance.
These findings have relevance beyond the UK because the agency model 
is a core NPM organisational form and agencification a core part of NPM reform 
processes. Increasing use of NPM forms has been identified in many countries 
and there are many countries with similar structures and processes (Hood 1994; 
Rhodes 1997; Pollitt et al 2000). However, the findings have most relevance for 
countries that have directly attempted to emulate UK central government’s use of 
agencies. The Cabinet Office hosted delegations from several countries interested 
in looking at the ‘Next Steps’ reform (Goldsworthy 1991 :i-ii). A few countries 
set up their own versions of agencies based on the UK experience (Pollitt et al:
2000). Focusing on two countries that emulated the UK, the US and Japan, 
illustrates how findings from this study can be used to sketch answers to three 
key research questions about NPM.
The first question is how did the creation of agencies, or agencification, 
work and was the reform a substantial change? The US Government developed 
Performance Based Organisations based on the UK reform. The head of the Next 
Steps Project Team, Jeremy Cowper presented the UK experience to staff of the 
National Performance Review and the Office of Management and Budget (II 
Senior Official, Cabinet Office; NPR 1996). All the key documents relating to 
Next Steps were obtained by OMB and made available to US officials. A special 
report on the UK experience was prepared in 1996 as the basis of the PBO 
initiative (NPR 1999). In Japan, the Government started to set up Independent 
Administrative Corporations in the late 1990s. Japanese officials visited the UK 
and participated in international conferences on the agency model, stating that 
their initiative was influenced by the UK reform (Kaneko 1999).
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In the US, PBOs incorporated the main features of the agency model. 
They involved separating service operation functions from their policy 
components and placing them in separate organisations reporting to the 
department. The PBO had more freedom to manage personnel, procurement and 
other services. A chief executive headed each PBO, who was hired on a fixed 
term contract through a competitive search and was held accountable for 
performance. The PBO and the department negotiated a three to five year 
framework with measurable goals and targets for improvement.
Initially, seven functions were proposed for PBO status by the National 
Performance Review team in 1997. Congress blocked these, but in 1998 
approved the conversion of the Education Department’s office of student 
financial assistance. The PBO was set up as the Office of Financial Assistance 
Programs. The 2000 budget proposed that organisations requesting PBO status 
that had previously been blocked reapply, along with Seafood Inspection 
Services, the Rural Telephone Bank, the National Technical Information Service 
and the Federal Lands Highway Program (Friel 1999). However, the reform did 
not take off and, in 2000, the PBO reform did not look like becoming such a 
large scale change as the agency reform in the UK.
In Japan, Independent Administrative Corporations (IACs) were proposed 
by government to handle executive tasks separate from ministries (Wright 1998). 
The bodies resembled the agency model. Under the proposal, IACs had a degree 
of management freedom with targets set by ministers and the supervising 
department and were supposed to produce a business plan. IACs were not 
formally part of central government departments, unlike UK agencies, but had a 
similar arms length relationship with ministries. IACs were headed by a chief 
executive who, along with management personnel, was recruited from outside 
government. By the middle of 2000, the changes had been approved and steps 
taken to prepare bodies to be transferred to IAC status (Hirose 2000). 89 
activities will be transferred in April 2001 including research activities, mint and 
printing operations and operational activities such as motor vehicle inspection 
(Matsuda 1999).
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The second question is why was the reform adopted and did agencies 
bring about benefits in the delivery of services? Because the reforms in the US 
and Japan are at an earlier stage than the UK this question is discussed 
simultaneously with the third question, what is the likely course of future 
developments in the use of agencies? Rather than outlining a full explanation of the 
reforms this section sketches a general explanation to evaluate the relevance of the 
mark II bureau-shaping model in these contexts. The model does not appear to be 
as relevant in the US as in the UK because the institutional structure of the 
central state did not facilitate an executive dominated reform. In developing 
reforms, the president and vice-president had central executive bodies in the 
executive branch including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
the Office of Personnel Management (OMP), and created advisory bodies such as 
the National Performance Review team (Peters 1996:133). These units resembled 
the UK Efficiency Unit and Cabinet Office, with entrepreneurial officials seeking 
out new reforms. The NPR team was an important in observing UK experience 
and advocating the reform. The Office of Management and Budget and Office of 
Personnel Management shared the development of the reform (NPR 1996).
Beyond the central units, the executive was split into departments which 
co-ordinated reforms in their areas of responsibility and established conversion 
teams to work on the administrative and legislative changes required to set up the 
new bodies. The executive employed Federal Government personnel in the 
Senior Executive Service providing a stable set of officials to implement the 
reform across the central bodies and departments. The use of presidential 
appointees, which constitute about nearly all of the 830 odd members of the 
Executive Schedule of senior officials and 10 per cent of the approximately 7000 
SES membership, was a significant source of control and helped foster support 
for reform (Fesler and Kettl 1996:179 and 191-184).
However, in contrast to the UK, the US system offered multiple sources
for advocating reforms and vetoing implementation, because of the constitutional
separation of powers. The US Congress was much more influential than
Parliament in the UK. Congress formally created all executive departments and
most of the bodies outside of them, determined the funding of programmes and 
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head the power to reorganise government bodies. Each PBO required legislation 
approved by Congress, which not only slowed down change but offered a way to 
bllock the creation of these bodies and made the prospect of setting one up more 
daunting, in terms of time and effort required. Expertise about the likely effect of 
reforms was provided by bodies including the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), the Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget 
Olffice (Peters 1996: 134-6). The US had a long history of unsuccessful reform 
imitiatives developed by presidents and blocked by Congress (Kettl 1994). In the 
period during the introduction of PBOs, Congress was controlled by the 
Riepublican Party, who were not keen to help reforms associated with a Democrat 
President. PBOs were perceived as enhancing the executive’s control over 
delivery structures to the detriment of congressional influence (GAO 1997a: 12- 
2 5 ;  1997b).
In contrast to the US, the Japanese system facilitated centrally led 
executive reform, making the mark II bureau-shaping model potentially more 
relevant. The administrative system had a permanent elite civil service and strong 
central coordiantion, facilitating implementation (Muramatsu and Krauss 
1996:241). The proposals arose from an Administrative Reform Council, 
established in 1996, which reported in December 1997. The reform got strong 
central direction in 1998 with the establishment of the Headquarters for Central 
Government reform, headed by the Prime Minister and composed of all the 
Ministers of State. The process was disrupted by an election in 1998 but the 
strong central direction of the reform continued despite the change of 
personalities. A Minister of State for Administrative Reform was given 
responsibility for the Headquarters, Seiichi Ohta. The other central agency 
involved in the reform was the Management and Co-ordination Agency. Ohta 
was at the same time appointed head of this body.
The central executive was powerful relative to other organs of
government. The political executive consisted of the Prime Minister’s Office and
22 ministerial level departments under the Cabinet, although a new government
structure with fewer Cabinet level departments was planned for 2001. There was
a need for legislation in Japan, like the US, but this was more easily introduced 
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and passed. The Japanese Parliament, to which the executive was responsible, 
was under the control of the government (Kaneko 1999:1). After the report of the 
Council in December 1997, a Basic Law for the Reform of Ministries and 
Agencies was submitted to the Diet in February 1998 and enacted in June 1998. 
The ability of the central executive to push through reform was reflected in 
proposed speed of creation of IACs. The IAC candidates were approved by the 
Cabinet in April 1999 (Matsuda 1999).
The analysis of developments in the US and Japan suggest limits to the 
scope of findings from this study. The agency model and agencification models 
are tools for comparative analysis that can be used as benchmarks for exploring 
the extent of reform in the US and Japan. However, the mark II bureau-shaping 
model is not directly useful as explanations of the reforms. Many factors were 
important in influencing developments in the US and Japan. However, the 
institutional rational choice approach suggests that the institutional structures of 
the central states were important factors affecting the course of reform. In Japan, 
whilst legislation was required, the executive was dominant relative to the 
legislature. In this context, a reformulated mark II bureau-shaping model might 
have some potential relevance. In contrast, the strength of the US Congress, 
especially the need for legislation combined with Congress’s fears that its 
influence would be reduced by PBOs, limited implementation. A model 
exploring bureau-shaping strategies in the context of bureaucrat-legislature 
relations would appear to be potentially more relevant than the mark II bureau- 
shaping model.
Unlike the US, but with some similarities to Japan, the UK agency reform 
was executive dominated New Public Management reform. Legislation was not 
required to create the agencies, only minor legislative changes were needed to 
facilitate some aspects of agency working. The mark II bureau-shaping model 
centres on senior departmental and central unit officials’ relationships with 
executive politicians and its effect on reforms. The model suggests that these 
actors will be important in determining the future use of agencies in the UK 
central state.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Census of Agencies Created Between 1988-1998 Classified by 
Bureau-tools Type with Year of Creation
Agencies are classified into one of the four mutually exclusive types 
defined in Table 1.2 in Chapter One. The types are delivery, contract/transfer, 
trading and trading/contract/transfer. The distinction between trading and non­
trading is based on the classification by UK government of the agency as a 
‘trading fund’. The distinction between a delivery and contract/transfer agency is 
based on the predominance of budget for the agency’s own use, usually called 
‘running costs’ in official documents, or budget passed on by the agency to 
others. The passed on budget is the difference between an agency’s ‘running 
costs’ and total budget. The year of creation is given, next to the name of each 
agency. The information necessary for this classification was gathered from the 
Next Steps annual reviews from 1990 onwards (Prime Minister and Minister for 
the Civil Service and the Minister of State, Privy Council Office 1990; 1991; 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 
Minister for the Cabinet Office 1999;2000).
1. Delivery (119 agencies)
Armed Forces Personnel Administration 97
Army Base Repair Organisation 93
Army Base Storage and Distribution 95
Army Individual Training Organisation 96
Army Personnel Centre 96
Army Technical Support 95
CADW: Historic Monuments 91
Chessington Computer Centre 93
Coastguard 94
Court Service 95
Debt Management Office 98
Defence Accounts 91
Defence Codification 96
Defence Communications Service Agency 98
Defence Dental Agency 96
Defence Estates 97
Defence Postal and Courier Service 92
Defence Transport and Movements Executive 95 
Disposal Sales 94
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 90 
Duke of York's Military School 92 
DVL (NI) 93
Environment and Heritage Service 96
Forest Enterprise 96
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Forest Service 98
Health Estates NI 95
Historic Royal Palaces 89
Historic Scotland 91
HM Prison Service 93
Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence 96
Land Registers of NI 96
Maintenance Group Defence 94
Maritime and Coastguard Agency 98
Meat Hygiene Service 95
Medical Supplies Agency 96
Ministry of Defence Police 96
National Savings 96
Naval Aircraft Repair 92
Naval Base and Supply Agency 96
Naval Manning Agency 96
Naval Recruitment and Training Agency95
NHS Estates 91
NI Prison Service 95
Public Record Office 92
Public Record Office NI95
Public Trust Office 94
Queen Victoria School 92
RAF Logistics Support Service 96
RAF Maintenance Group Defence Agency 91
Recruitment and Assessment 91
Rivers Agency NI 96
Royal Parks 93
Scottish Court Service 95
Scottish F isheries Protection 91
Scottish Prison Service 93
Scottish Record Office 93
Security Facilities Executive 93
Service Children's Education 96
Service Children Schools 91
Ships Support Agency 96
Social Security Contributions 91
Social Security: Resettlement 89
Training and Employment NI 90
UK Passport 91
Valuation and Lands (NI) 93
V aluation Office 91
Vehicle Certification Agency 90
Water Service 96
Wilton Park 91
Accounts Services 91
ADAS 92
Building Research Establishment 90
Business Development Service 96 
CCTA 96
Central Science Laboratory 94
Central Statistical Office 91
Central Veterinary Laboratory 90
Chemical and Biological Defence 91
Civil Service College 89
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Defence Analytical Services 92
Defence Animal Centre 93
Defence Intelligence and Security Centre 96
Defence Operational Analysis 92
Defence Research 91
DVOIT 92
Forensic Science Agency NI 95
Forensic Science Service 91
Government Property Lawyers 93
Industrial Research and Technology Unit 95
Information Technology Services Agency 90
Laboratory of the Government Chemist 89
Logistic Information Systems Agency 94
Marine Safety 94
Medical Devices Agency 94
Medicines Control Agency 91
Military Survey 91
National Engineering Laboratory 90
National Physical Laboratory 90
National Weights & Measures Laboratory 89
Natural Resources Institute 90
NI Statistics and Research Agency 96
Occupational Health Service 90
Office for National Statistics 96
Ordnance Survey 90
Ordnance Survey (NI) 92
Pesticides Safety Directorate 93
Planning Inspectorate 92
Planning Service NI 96
Property Advisers to the Civil Estate 96
Radiocommunications Agency 90
RAF Signals Engineering Establishment 94
RAF Training Group Defence Agency 94
Scottish Agricultural Science Agency 92
The Insolvency Service 90
Transport Research Laboratory 92
Treasury Solicitors Dept 96
Veterinary Medicines Directorate 90
Veterinary Laboratories Agency 90
Warren Spring Laboratory 89
2. Trading (IS agencies)
Companies House 88
Driving Standards Agency 90
DVT (NI) 92
HM Land Registry 90
HMSO 88
Patent Office 90
QEII Conference Centre 89
Registers of Scotland 90
Royal Mint 90
Vehicle Inspectorate 88
244
Central Office of Information 90
Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 95
Fire Service College 92
Hydrographic Office 90
Meteorological Office 90
3. Contract/transfer (20 agencies)
Compensation 96 
Defence Bills Agency 95 
Defence Clothing & Textile Agency 94 
Employment Service 90 
Government Purchasing Agency96 
Highways Agency 94 
Intervention Board 90 
NHS Pensions 92
Northern Ireland Child Support Agency 93 
Pay and Personnel Agency 96
Paymaster 93 
Rate Collection Agency 91 
Roads Service 96 
Scottish Office Pensions 93
Social Security (NI) 91 
Social Security Benefits Agency91 
Social Security Child Support Agency 93 
Social Security War Pensions Agency 94 
Student Awards for Scotland 94 
Teachers' Pensions 92
4. Trading/contract/transfer (1 agency)
Buying Agency 91
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Appendix 2 Agencies Classified by Department with Year of Creation
The agencies are classified by the department in which the member of the 
government to which they reported, generally the Secretary of State, was located 
at the time of its establishment. There were very few agencies with multiple 
reporting lines. However, responsibility for the Intervention Board was split 
between Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices in these areas; 
responsibility for the Meat Hygiene Service was split between Scottish and 
Welsh Offices in these regions; responsibility for Forest Enterprise was given 
jointly to the Welsh Office as well as the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and 
Food. The departments are listed below, ranked by the number of agencies 
created in each department. The source for the information needed for this 
classification is the annual reviews of Next Steps agencies, as referenced in 
Appendix 1.
Ministry of Defence (45 agencies)
Disposal Sales 94
Defence Animal Centre 93
Queen Victoria School 92
Duke of York's Military School 92
Chemical and Biological Defence 91
Defence Accounts 91
Defence Postal and Courier Service 92
Army Base Repair Organisation 93
Logistic Information Systems Agency 94
Naval Aircraft Repair 92
Military Survey 91
RAF Signals Engineering Establishment 94
Service Children Schools 91
RAF Training Group Defence Agency 94
Defence Research 91
Defence Operational Analysis 92
Armed Forces Personnel Administration 97
Army Base Storage and Distribution 95
Army Individual Training Organisation 96
Army Personnel Centre 96
Army Technical Support 95
Defence Analytical Services 92
Defence Codification 96
Defence Communications Service Agency 98
Defence Dental Agency 96
Defence Estates 97
Defence Intelligence and Security Centre 96
Defence Transport and Movements Executive 95
Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence 96
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Maintenance Group Defence 94
Medical Supplies Agency 96
Ministry of Defence Police 96
Naval Base and Supply Agency 96
Naval Manning Agency 96
Naval Recruitment and Training Agency95
RAF Logistics Support Service 96
RAF Maintenance Group Defence Agency 91
Service Children's Education 96
Ships Support Agency 96
Hydrographic Office 90
Meteorological Office 90
Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 95
Defence Clothing & Textile Agency 94
Defence Bills Agency 95
Pay and Personnel Agency 96
Northern Ireland Departments (24 agencies)
Ordnance Survey (NI) 92
DVL (NI) 93
Valuation and Lands (NI) 93
Training and Employment NI 90
Business Development Service 96
Environment and Heritage Service 96
Forensic Science Agency NI 95
Forest Service 98
Health Estates NI 95
Industrial Research and Technology Unit 95
Land Registers of NI 96
NI Prison Service 95
NI Statistics and Research Agency 96
Planning Service NI 96
Public Record Office NI95
Rivers Agency NI 96
Water Service 96
DVT (NI) 92
Compensation 96
Rate Collection Agency 91
Northern Ireland Child Support Agency 93
Social Security (NI) 91
Government Purchasing Agency96
Roads Service 96
Cabinet Office (10 agencies)
Occupational Health Service 90 
Chessington Computer Centre 93 
Recruitment and Assessment 91 
Civil Service College 89 
Security Facilities Executive 93 
CCTA 96
Property Advisers to the Civil Estate 96 
Central Office of Information 90
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HMSO 88 
Buying Agency 91
Department of Trade and Industry (10 agencies)
National Weights & Measures Laboratory 89
Accounts Services 91
National Engineering Laboratory 90
The Insolvency Service 90
Laboratory of the Government Chemist 89
Radiocommunications Agency 90
National Physical Laboratory 90
Warren Spring Laboratory 89
Companies House 88
Patent Office 90
Department of Transport (merged to form the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions) (10 agencies)
Marine Safety 94
Vehicle Certification Agency 90
Coastguard 94
Transport Research Laboratory 92
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 90
DVOIT 92
Maritime and Coastguard Agency 98
Vehicle Inspectorate 88 
Driving Standards Agency 90
Highways Agency 94
Scottish Office Departments (9 agencies)
Scottish Agricultural Science Agency 92 
Historic Scotland 91
Scottish Record Office 93 
Scottish Fisheries Protection 91
Scottish Prison Service 93 
Scottish Court Service 95 
Registers of Scotland 90 
Student Awards for Scotland 94
Scottish Office Pensions 93
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (8 agencies)
Veterinary Medicines Directorate 90
Pesticides Safety Directorate 93
Central Science Laboratory 94
Central Veterinary Laboratory 90
ADAS 92
Meat Hygiene Service 95 
Veterinary Laboratories Agency 90 
Intervention Board 90
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HM Treasury (7 agencies)
Valuation Office 91
Central Statistical Office 91
Debt Management Office 98
National Savings 96
Office for National Statistics 96 
Royal Mint 90
Paymaster 93
Department of Social Security (6 agencies)
Social Security: Resettlement 89 
Social Security Contributions 91 
Information Technology Services Agency 90 
Social Security Child Support Agency 93 
Social Security War Pensions Agency 94 
Social Security Benefits Agency91
Department of the Environment (merged to form the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions) (5 agencies)
Historic Royal Palaces 89
Planning Inspectorate 92
Building Research Establishment 90
Ordnance Survey 90
QEII Conference Centre89
Department of Health (4 agencies)
Medicines Control Agency 91
NHS Estates 91 
Medical Devices Agency 94
NHS Pensions 92
Home Office (4 agencies)
Forensic Science Service 91
HM Prison Service 93
UK Passport 91 
Fire Service College 92
Lord Chancellor’s Department (4 agencies)
Public Record Office 92
Public Trust Office 94
Court Service 95 
HM Land Registry 90
Department of Employment (merged to form Department for Education 
and Employment)
Employment Service 90
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Department of National Heritage
Royal Parks 93
Department of Education (later merged to form Department for Education and 
Employment)
Teachers' Pensions 92
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Wilton Park 91
Overseas Development Administration 
Natural Resources Institute 90 
Treasury Solicitors Department
Government Property Lawyers 93
(Treasury Solicitors Department itself became an agency of the Attorney General in 96) 
Welsh Office
CADW: Historic Monuments 91
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Appendix 3: Types of Agencification for Agencies with Year of Creation
Agencies are classified according to the framework of four types of 
agencification: pure agencification, mitigated agencification and nominal agencification 
as outlined in Chapter One and summarised in Table 2.6 in Chapter Two. The types are 
identified by differences in the status of the organisational unit previously responsible 
for handling the activities that were put in agencies. The agencies are identified in 
Appendix 1. Information about the previous location of the activities handled by 
agencies was gathered from the annual Civil Service Yearbooks (Cabinet Office 
1988; 1989; 1990; 1991 b ; 1992b; 1993;1994; 1995d, 1996,1997a, 1998b). In some cases, the 
pre-agency arrangements were not obvious from looking only at the Civil Service 
Yearbook because the function was not clearly located in a unit with a similar title and 
location. In these cases the annual review of agencies, referenced in Appendix 1, was 
consulted for the first year of the agency’s existence. This approach enabled the previous 
position of the activities to be established using the Civil Service Yearbook.
1. Pure Agencification (22 agencies)
Army Base Repair Organisation 93 
Maintenance Group Defence 94
Recruitment and Assessment 91
Royal Parks 93 
Security Facilities Executive 93
Social Security Contributions 91
Central Science Laboratory 94
Defence Analytical Services 92
Defence Research 91 
DVOIT 92
Information Technology Services Agency 90
Logistic Information Systems Agency 94
Medical Devices Agency 94
Medicines Control Agency 91
RAF Signals Engineering Establishment 94
RAF Training Group Defence Agency 94
Defence Clothing & Textile Agency 94
Highways Agency 94
Rate Collection Agency 91
Social Security (NI) 91
Social Security Benefits Agency91
Social Security War Pensions Agency 94
2. Mitigated agencification (108 agencies)
Armed Forces Personnel Administration 97 
Army Base Storage and Distribution 95 
Army Individual Training Organisation 96 
Army Personnel Centre 96
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Army Technical Support 95
CADW: Historic Monuments 91
Chessington Computer Centre 93
Coastguard 94
Debt Management Office 98
Defence Accounts 91
Defence Codification 96
Defence Communications Service Agency 98
Defence Dental Agency 96
Defence Estates 97
Defence Postal and Courier Service 92
Defence Transport and Movements Executive 95 
Disposal Sales 94
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 90
Duke of York's Military School 92 
DVL (NI) 93
Environment and Heritage Service 96
Forest Enterprise 96
Forest Service 98
Health Estates NI 95
Historic Royal Palaces 89
Historic Scotland 91
HM Prison Service 93
Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence 96
Maritime and Coastguard Agency 98
Medical Supplies Agency 96
Ministry of Defence Police 96
Naval Aircraft Repair 92
Naval Base and Supply Agency 96
Naval Manning Agency 96
Naval Recruitment and Training Agency95
NHS Estates 91
NI Prison Service 95
RAF Logistics Support Service 96
RAF Maintenance Group Defence Agency 91
Rivers Agency NI 96
Scottish Fisheries Protection 91
Scottish Prison Service 93
Ships Support Agency 96
Social Security: Resettlement 89
Training and Employment NI 90
UK Passport 91
Valuation and Lands (NI) 93
V aluation Office 91
Vehicle Certification Agency 90
Water Service 96
Wilton Park 91
Accounts Services 91
ADAS 92
Building Research Establishment 90
Business Development Service 96 
CCTA 96
Central Veterinary Laboratory 90 
Chemical and Biological Defence 91
Civil Service College 89
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Defence Animal Centre 93
Defence Intelligence and Security Centre 96
Defence Operational Analysis 92
Forensic Science Agency NI 95
Forensic Science Service 91
Government Property Lawyers 93
Industrial Research and Technology Unit 95
Laboratory of the Government Chemist 89
Marine Safety 94
Military Survey 91
National Engineering Laboratory 90
National Physical Laboratory 90
National Weights & Measures Laboratory 89
Natural Resources Institute 90
NI Statistics and Research Agency 96
Occupational Health Service 90
Office for National Statistics 96
Pesticides Safety Directorate 93
Planning Inspectorate 92
Planning Servie NI 96
Property Advisers to the Civil Estate 96
Radiocommunications 90
Scottish Agricultural Science Agency 92
The Insolvency Service 90
Transport Research Laboratory 92
Treasury Solicitors Dept 96
Veterinary Medicines Directorate 90
Vetinary Laboratories Agency 90
Companies House 88
Driving Standards Agency 90
DVT (NI) 92
Patent Office 90
QEII Conference Centre 89
Vehicle Inspectorate 88
Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 95
Fire Service College 92
Hydrographic Office 90
Metrological Office 90
Compensation 96
Defence Bills Agency 95
Employment Service 90
Government Purchasing Agency96
NHS Pensions 92
Pay and Personnel Agency 96
Roads Service 96
Scottish Office Pensions 93
Student Awards for Scotland 94
Teachers' Pensions 92
Buying Agency 91
3 Nominal Agencification (22 agencies)
Court Service 95 
Land Registers of NI 96 
National Savings 96
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Public Record Office 92 
Public Record Office NI95 
Public Trust Office 94 
Queen Victoria School 92 
Scottish Court Service 95 
Scottish Record Office 93 
Service Children’s Education 96 
Service Children Schools 91
Central Statistical Office 91
Ordnance Survey 90 
Ordnance Survey (NI) 92 
Warren Sping Laboratory 89
HM Land Registry 90 
HMSO 88
Registers of Scotland 90 
Royal Mint 90
Central Office of Information 90 
Intervention Board 90 
Paymaster 93
4 New Function (3 agencies)
Meat Hygine Service 95
Northern Ireland Child Support Agency 93
Social Security Child Support Agency 93
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Appendix 4: Agencies Involved in Routine and Non-routine Activities by 
Type
Agencies are classified by the activity they were primarily involved in 
during the period, placing them in two categories, ‘routine’ activity or ‘non­
routine’ activity, as discussed in Chapter Four. The results are presented in 
summary form in Table 4.2 in Chapter Four. Routine activities involve 
standardised, executive, procedures. Indicators of this sort of activity include 
clearly specified programmes for the agency, a rule bound structure for the 
agency’s organisation, absence of a policy advice function or this activity 
forming only a small part of the agency’s work. In contrast, non-routine activities 
involve case by case treatments without clear rules and innovative, policy work. 
Indicators of this sort of activity include specification of agency tasks in terms of 
general principles or values rather than in a specific programme, flexible or ad 
hoc rather than rule bound organisational structure, and presence of a substantial 
policy advice function.
Most agencies were involved in both types of activities and are allocated 
according to their predominant activity. The information required to make this 
judgement was gathered from the one or two page descriptions of agencies in the 
Cabinet Office annual reviews of agencies and descriptions in the Civil Service 
Yearbooks, referenced in Appendices 1 and 3. In most cases, several years of 
annual review were available.
The distinction between routine and non-routine activity is the most 
complex of the categorisations used in the research because of the multiple 
indicators and multiple sources of information. For this reason, the methods used 
in classifying agencies are illustrated for the case of the Benefits Agency. This 
agency is used as an example because of the research focuses on this case. The 
annual reviews and Civil Service Yearbooks relating to the Benefits Agency 
were examined for the years 1992-1998 inclusive, as referenced in Appendices 1 
and 3. Applying the indictors to the annual review of 1994 shows the method in 
this case.
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Indicator One: Is the agency’s task stated as a clearly specified programme or 
expressed as general principles or values?
The Benefits Agency’s task is defined in the Review. ‘The main business of the 
Agency is to process enquiries, claims, payments, and changes of circumstance 
in relation to its benefits responsibilities.’ The Review continues ‘For 1993-94 
the Secretary of State for Social Security set 26 financial and service delivery 
targets’ (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1994:100). The targets reflected 
that the activities were standardised sufficiently to enable such measurement. 
This standardisation, even if not fully reflecting the activities, is more specific 
than general aims expressing goals such as improving welfare, which would 
involve greater scope for innovation and flexibility. On this indicator, the 
Agency is involved in routine activity.
Indictor Two: Is the organisational structure rule bound or flexible?
The Benefits Agency had a set of national procedures and was developing new 
ones during the period, including rolling out a national ‘service delivery 
programme’ reflecting rule constrained structure and method of working within 
the agency (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 1994:101). On this indicator, 
the Agency is involved in routine activity.
Indicator Three: Is the agency involved in policy advice or is the policy advice 
function absent?
The description of the Agency’s activities did not mention policy advice on 
welfare issues or social security as the main task of the Agency. Whilst the 
agency makes a contribution to policy making the ‘main business’ was described 
as delivering as set of programmes on behalf of the Government (Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster 1994:100). On this indicator, the Agency is involved in 
routine activity.
Overall: the Benefits Agency is involved in routine activity.
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A Primarily Routine Activities
1. Delivery
Army Base Repair Organisation 
Maintenance Group Defence 
Recruitment and Assessment 
Royal Parks
Security Facilities Executive 
Social Security Contributions 
Armed Forces Personnel Administration 
Army Base Storage and Distribution 
Army Individual Training Organisation 
Army Personnel Centre 
Army Technical Support 
CADW: Historic Monuments 
Chessington Computer Centre 
Coastguard
Debt Management Office
Defence Accounts
Defence Codification
Defence Communications Service Agency
Defence Dental Agency
Defence Estates
Defence Postal and Courier Service 
Defence Transport and Movements Executive 
Disposal Sales
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
Duke of York's Military School 
DVL (NI)
Environment and Heritage Service
Forest Enterprise
Forest Service
Health Estates NI
Historic Royal Palaces
Historic Scotland
HM Prison Service
Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Medical Supplies Agency
Ministry of Defence Police
Naval Aircraft Repair
Naval Base and Supply Agency
Naval Manning Agency
Naval Recruitment and Training Agency
NHS Estates
NI Prison Service
RAF Logistics Support Service
RAF Maintenance Group Defence Agency
Rivers Agency NI
Scottish Fisheries Protection
Scottish Prison Service
Ships Support Agency
Social Security: Resettlement
Training and Employment NI
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UK Passport
Valuation and Lands (NI)
Valuation Office 
Vehicle Certification Agency 
Water Service 
Wilton Park 
Court Service 
Land Registers of NI 
National Savings 
Public Record Office 
Public Record Office NI 
Public Trust Office 
Queen Victoria School 
Scottish Court Service 
Scottish Record Office 
Service Children's Education 
Service Children Schools 
Meat Hygiene Service
2. Trading
Companies House 
Driving Standards Agency 
DVT (NI)
Patent Office 
QEII Conference Centre 
Vehicle Inspectorate 
HM Land Registry 
HMSO
Registers of Scotland 
Royal Mint
3. Contract/transfer
Defence Clothing & Textile Agency 
Highways Agency 
Rate Collection Agency 
Social Security (NI)
Social Security Benefits Agency
Social Security War Pensions Agency
Compensation
Defence Bills Agency
Employment Service
Government Purchasing Agency
NHS Pensions
Pay and Personnel Agency
Roads Service
Scottish Office Pensions
Student Awards for Scotland
Teachers' Pensions
Intervention Board
Paymaster
Northern Ireland Child Support Agency 
Social Security Child Support Agency 
Buying Agency
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B Primarily Non-routine Activities
1. Delivery
Central Science Laboratory 
Defence Analytical Services 
Defence Research 
DVOIT
Information Technology Services Agency 
Logistic Information Systems Agency 
Medical Devices Agency 
Medicines Control Agency 
RAF Signals Engineering Establishment 
RAF Training Group Defence Agency 
Accounts Services 
ADAS
Building Research Establishment 
Business Development Service 
CCTA
Central Veterinary Laboratory 
Chemical and Biological Defence 
Civil Service College 
Defence Animal Centre 
Defence Intelligence and Security Centre 
Defence Operational Analysis 
Forensic Science Agency NI 
Forensic Science Service 
Government Property Lawyers 
Industrial Research and Technology Unit 
Laboratory of the Government Chemist 
Marine Safety 
Military Survey
National Engineering Laboratory 
National Physical Laboratory 
National Weights & Measures Laboratory 
Natural Resources Institute 
NI Statistics and Research Agency 
Occupational Health Service 
Office for National Statistics 
Pesticides Safety Directorate 
Planning Inspectorate 
Planning Service NI 
Property Advisers to the Civil Estate 
Radiocommunications Agency 
Scottish Agricultural Science Agency 
The Insolvency Service 
Transport Research Laboratory 
Treasury Solicitors Dept 
Veterinary Medicines Directorate 
Veterinary Laboratories Agency 
Central Statistical Office 
Ordnance Survey 
Ordnance Survey (NI)
Warren Spring Laboratory
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2. Trading
Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 
Fire Service College 
Hydrographic Office 
Meteorological Office 
Central Office of Information
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Appendix 5 Sections of the Parent Departments of Agencies Classified by 
Bureau-tools Type
A census was taken to give a broad indication of the types of activity handled by 
departments which had agencies. The date of 1995 was used, after the bulk of agencies 
had been created and just before major reorganisations of the central departments. 138 
sections were identified below the level of the department but above that of 
‘departmental sections’, to identify the main parts of each department. The application 
of this criterion produces slightly different kinds of unit in each department, because 
there is no standard structural form within departments across the central state, but 
allows broadly similar sections to be identified. In the case of small departments, for 
example the Northern Ireland Office, the department as a whole is used as the unit for 
analysis. In cases where there were several small units these are grouped to form a 
residual category. The routine/ non-routine distinction was operationalised in the same 
way as in Appendix 4. The activities were identified from the Civil Service Yearbook 
(Cabinet Office 1995d) and departmental report summaries (Treasury 1996).
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Food Safety: Non-routine Delivery
Food Science: Non-routine Delivery
Vet Field Services: Non-routine Delivery
European Community: Non-routine Delivery
Arable Crops and Horticulture: Non-routine Delivery
Livestock Group: Non-routine Delivery
Food, Drink and Marketing Policy: Non-routine Delivery
Land Use Conservation and Countryside: Non-routine Delivery
Fisheries and Inspectorate: Non-routine Delivery
Fisheries Research: Non-routine Delivery
Environment Policy: Non-routine Delivery
Economics and Statistics: Non-routine Delivery
Finance and Establishments: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Legal Group: Non-routine Delivery 
Regional Services: Non-routine Contract/transfer
Cabinet Office
Office of Public Service and Science Establishments: Non-routine Delivery 
Office of Public Service and Science Management Group: Non-routine Delivery 
Office of Public Service and Science Office of Science and Technology: Non-routine 
Delivery
Office of Public Service and Science Other Units: Non-routine Delivery 
Secretariat: Non-routine Delivery
Ministry of Defence
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Naval Department: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Army Department: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Air Force Department: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer) 
Scientific Staff: Non-routine Delivery
Office of Management and Budget: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine 
Contract/transfer)
Defence Information Division: Non-routine Delivery
Procurement Executive: Non-routine Contract/transfer
Defence Export Services Organisation: Non-routine Delivery
Other Parts of central MoD: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Department for Education
Schools Organisation: Non-routine Delivery 
Schools Funding: Non-routine Contract/transfer 
Pupils and Parents: Non-routine Delivery
Further and Higher Education and International: Non-routine Delivery 
Schools Curriculum and Teachers: Non-routine Delivery 
Establishments: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Employment Department Group
Industrial Relations and International Directorate: Non-routine Delivery 
Resources and Strategy Directorate: Non-routine Delivery
Training, Enterprise and Education Directorate: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine 
Contract/transfer)
Department of the Environment
Organisation and Establishments and Administrative Resources Group: Non-routine 
Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Central Management and Analysis Unit: Non-routine Delivery
Directorate of Communication: Non-routine Delivery
Local Government and Planning: Contract/transfer (Non-routine Delivery)
Cities and Countryside Group: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Property Holdings and Central Support Services Group: Non-routine Delivery
Housing and Construction Group: Non-routine Delivery
Environmental Protection Group: Non-routine Delivery
Chief Scientist: Non-routine Delivery
Legal: Non-routine Delivery
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
UN and Europe: Non-routine Delivery
Home Estate and Consular: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Aviation, Economic and Overseas Trade: Non-routine Delivery
South Asia, Far East, South Atlantic: Non-routine Delivery
Commonwealth and Middle East: Non-routine Delivery
Arms Control and Security: Non-routine Delivery
Department of Health
NHS Executive: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
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Departmental Resources and Services Group: Non-routine Contract/transfer (Non- 
routine Delivery)
Health and Social Services Group: Non-routine Delivery 
Home Office
Legal Advisers Branch: Non-routine Delivery 
Criminal, Research and Statistics Department: Non-routine Delivery 
Fire and Emergency Planning Department: Non-routine Delivery 
Police Department: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Equal Opportunities and General Non-routine Delivery 
Immigration and Nationality Department: Delivery
Personnel and Office Services and Finance Departments: Non-routine Contract/transfer 
(Non-routine Delivery)
Lord Chancellor’s Department
Judicial Appointments Group: Non-routine Delivery
Legal Group and Policy and Legal Services: Non-routine Delivery
Establishment and finance Group: Non-routine Delivery
Court Service Business Group: Non-routine Contract/transfer (Non-routine Delivery)
Department of National Heritage
Heritage and Tourism Group: Non-routine Delivery 
Broadcasting and Media Group: Non-routine Delivery 
Arts, Sports and Lottery Group: Non-routine Delivery
Libraries, Galleries and Museums Group: Non-routine Contract/transfer (Non-routine 
Delivery)
Resources and Services Group: Non-routine Contract/transfer
Overseas Development Administration
Finance and Personnel: Non-routine Contract/transfer 
Africa: Non-routine Delivery 
Asia and Pacific Division: Non-routine Delivery 
International Division: Non-routine Delivery
Latin America, Caribbean and Atlantic Department: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine 
Contract/transfer)
Other Divisions: Non-routine Delivery 
Department of Social Security 
Solicitors Office: Non-routine Delivery
Resource Management and Planning Group: Non-routine Contract/transfer 
Social Security Policy Division: Non-routine Delivery
Department of Trade and Industry
Establishments and Finance: Non-routine Contract/transfer 
Solicitor’s Office: Non-routine Delivery 
Corporate and Consumer Affairs: Non-routine Delivery 
Regional and Small Firms Command: Non-routine Delivery 
Laboratories: Non-routine Delivery
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Energy: Non-routine Delivery 
Industry: Non-routine Delivery
Trade Policy and Export Provision: Non-routine Delivery
Department of Transport
Infrastructure: Non-routine Delivery 
Operations: Non-routine Delivery
Central Services: Non-routine Contract/transfer (Non-routine Delivery)
Treasury
Personnel, Finance and Support Services: Non-routine Delivery
Fiscal and Monetary Policy: Non-routine Delivery
Overseas Finance: Non-routine Delivery
Economic Advice: Non-routine Delivery
Industry and Financial Institutions: Non-routine Delivery
Public Expenditure: Non-routine Contract/transfer
Public Services: Non-routine Contract/transfer
Accountancy: Non-routine Delivery
Civil Service Management and Pay: Non-routine Delivery
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Department: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Department of Economic Development for Northern Ireland
Resources Group: Non-routine Contract/transfer 
Regulatory Services: Non-routine Delivery 
Science and Technology Group: Non-routine Delivery
Department of the Environment (Northern Ireland)
Personnel and Management: Non-routine Delivery 
Planning and Urban Affairs: Non-routine Delivery 
Roads Service and Works: Non-routine Contract/transfer
Housing and Local Government: Non-routine Contract/transfer (Non-routine Delivery)
Department of Finance and Personnel
Supply and Resource Groups: Non-routine Contract/transfer 
Establishment Finance and Consultancy: Non-routine Delivery 
Other Sections: Non-routine Delivery
Department of Health and Social Services (Northern Ireland)
Central Management and Social Security: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine 
Contract/transfer)
Health and Personal Social Services Management Executive: Non-routine Delivery 
(Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Health and Personal Social Services Policy and Strategy Group: Non-routine Delivery 
Medical and Allied Services: Non-routine Delivery
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Scotland
Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department
Central: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Commodities and Land Group: Non-routine Delivery 
Fisheries: Non-routine Delivery
Scottish Office Environmental Department
Local Government: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Rural Affairs and Natural Heritage: Non-routine Delivery 
Housing: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Engineering, Water and Waste: Non-routine Delivery 
Other sections: Non-routine Delivery
Scottish Office Home and Health Department
Civil Law, Police, Fire and Emergency Planning: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine 
Contract/transfer)
Criminal Justice: Non-routine Delivery
Management Executive for NHS in Scotland: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine 
Contract/transfer)
Health Policy: Non-routine Delivery
Social Work Services Group: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer) 
Medical and Dental Services: Non-routine Delivery
Wales
Welsh Office
Finance and Legal: Non-routine Delivery
NHS Directorate in Wales: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer) 
Economic Affairs: Non-routine Delivery
Health Department: Non-routine Delivery (Non-routine Contract/transfer) 
Agriculture, Industry, Economic Development and Training: Non-routine Delivery 
(Non-routine Contract/transfer)
Education, Health and Social Services Policy, Housing, Environmental Protection, 
Transport, Highways Planning and Local Government Reorganisation: Non-routine 
Delivery.
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Appendix 6: Agencies Ranked by Written Parliamentary Questions Per £m 
of Running Costs 1995/96
Agencies are ranked using analysis conducted on Statistical Package for 
Social Scientists database by dividing the number of written Parliamentary 
Questions by £m cost of each agency. Budget figures are taken from Cabinet 
Office reviews of agencies, as in Appendix 1, and information on parliamentary 
questions per agency from Judge, Hogwood and McVicar (1997:109-112).
PQper£m Next Steps Agency Name
1 8.00 Veterinary Medicines Directorate
2 7.69 National Weights & Measures Laboratory
3 6.47 Wilton Park
4 6.00 Marine Safety
5 4.41 Vehicle Certification Agency
6 4.17 Compensation
7 3.88 CADW: Historic Monuments
8 3.20 Teachers' Pensions
9 2.89 Disposal Sales
10 2.50 Buying Agency
11 2.50 Government Property Lawyers
12 2.33 Occupational Health Service
13 2.14 Rate Collection Agency
14 2.14 Student Awards for Scotland
15 2.13 Highways Agency
16 2.00 Accounts Services
17 2.00 Scottish Agricultural Science Agency
18 1.94 Defence Animal Centre
18 1.94 Defence Animal Centre
19 1.93 Chessington Computer Centre
19 1.93 Chessington Computer Centre
20 1.89 Recruitment and Assessment
20 1.89 Recruitment and Assessment
21 1.86 Queen Victoria School
21 1.86 Queen Victoria School
22 1.81 Duke of York's Military School
22 1.81 Duke of York's Military School
23 1.80 National Engineering Laboratory
23 1.80 National Engineering Laboratory
24 1.72 Coastguard
24 1.72 Coastguard
25 1.67 Pesticides Safety Directorate
25 1.67 Pesticides Safety Directorate
26 1.60 Medicines Control Agency
26 1.60 Medicines Control Agency
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
52
53
53
54
55
55
56
56
57
57
58
58
59
59
60
60
61
61
62
62
63
63
64
1.59 Chemical and Biological Defence
1.58 Scottish Office Pensions
1.54 Companies House
1.53 NHS Estates
1.45 Intervention Board
1.39 Patent Office
1.36 Public Record Office
1.33 Social Security Child Support Agency
1.32 Ordnance Survey (NI)
1.27 Historic Scotland
1.17 Northern Ireland Child Support Agency
1.15 Scottish Record Office
1.11 DVT (NI)
1.10 Transport Research Laboratory
1.07 Public Trust Office
1.04 The Insolvency Service
1.01 NHS Pensions
1.00 Central Science Laboratory
.96 DVL (NI)
.95 Planning Inspectorate
.94 Laboratory of the Government Chemist
.87 Vehicle Inspectorate
.87 Medical Devices Agency
.85 Valuation and Lands (NI)
.82 Training and Employment NI
.75 Civil Service College
.75 Civil Service College
.73 Central Veterinary Laboratory
.73 Central Veterinary Laboratory
.73 Paymaster
.68 QEII Conference Centre
.68 QEII Conference Centre
.67 Social Security War Pensions Agency
.67 Social Security War Pensions Agency
.65 Radiocommunications
.65 Radiocommunications
.64 Fire Service College
.64 Fire Service College
.63 Driving Standards Agency
.63 Driving Standards Agency
.59 Scottish Fisheries Protection
.59 Scottish Fisheries Protection
.54 Defence Accounts
.54 Defence Accounts
.54 Royal Parks
.54 Royal Parks
.51 ADAS
.51 ADAS
.50 Forensic Science Service
65 .48
Science Service 
Natural Resources Institute
66 .46 Building Research Establishment
67 .44 Historic Royal Palaces
68 .42 Registers of Scotland
69 .37 Royal Mint
70 .36 Scottish Prison Service
71 .35 HM Prison Service
72 .34 Security Facilities Executive
73 .34 National Physical Laboratory
74 .34 Defence Postal and Courier Service
75 .31 Social Security: Resettlement
76 .26 Army Base Repair Organisation
77 .26 Logistic Information Systems Agency
78 .25 UK Passport
79 .22 Central Office of Information
80 .22 Naval Aircraft Repair
81 .18 Hydrographic Office
82 .18 HM Land Registry
83 .18 Employment Service
84 .17 Driver and Vehicle Licenscing Agency
85 .15 Social Security Contributions
86 .13 Ordnance Survey
87 .13 Military Survey
88 .11 Social Security (NI)
89 .10 Valuation Office
90 .10 RAF Signals Engineering Establishment
90 .10 RAF Signals Engineering Establishment
91 .09 Meteorological Office
91 .09 Meteorological Office
92 .09 Service Children Schools
92 .09 Service Children Schools
93 .08 Social Security Benefits Agency
93 .08 Social Security Benefits Agency
94 .06 Defence Clothing & Textile Agency
94 .06 Defence Clothing & Textile Agency
95 .04 Information Technology Services Agency
95 .04 Information Technology Services Agency
96 .01 RAF Training Group Defence Agency
96 .01 RAF Training Group Defence Agency
97 .01 Defence Research
97 .01 Defence Research
98 .00 Defence Operational Analysis
98 .00 Defence Operational Analysis
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Appendix 7: Box Plot of Percentage Change in Budget for 72 Agencies
1995/96 to 1997/98
Budget changes were calculated for the 72 agencies from annual reviews 
of agencies, as in Appendix 1, using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists. 
The left had axis of the box plot shows percentage change in budget, with a 
median of 4.4 per cent budget fall shown by the thick back line. The case nearest 
the median was the Benefits Agency, with a fall of 4.43 per cent. The lower and 
upper quartiles of cases are shown by the ends of the box with the thin lines 
showing the level of the maximum and minimum scores. The star is the extreme 
case of the Forensic Science Service which had a budget rise of 75.5 per cent. 
The largest fall was the Insolvency Service at 25.07 per cent. The data came from 
a database of agencies analysed using SPSS from data contained in Cabinet 
Office reviews of agencies and annual reports.
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Appendix 8: Box Plot of Percentage Budget Change for 72 agencies 1995/96
to 1997/98 by Type of Agency (with Number of Cases)
The thick line in the box plot shows the median scores for each type of 
agency as calculated using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists. There 
was a fall of 6.7 per cent for delivery agencies, a rise of 8.2 per cent for trading 
agencies and a fall of 0.9 per cent for contract/transfer agencies. The ends of the 
boxes show the lower and upper quartiles and the lines the minimum and 
maximum changes. For the delivery type, an extreme case was the Forensic 
Science Service with an increase o f 75.5 per cent and outliers shown by the circle 
were the Vehicle Certification Agency and Wilton Park Conference Centre both 
with 35.2 per cent increases.
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Appendix 9: Box Plot of Percentage Budget Change for 72 Agencies by 
Income Source Non-trading (Grant Financed) and Trading (Charged 
Services) 1995/6 to 1997/8 (with Number of Cases)
The results were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Scientists. The bold line in the box plot shows the median change in budget, a 
fall of 6.7 for non trading but a rise of 8.2 per cent for trading agencies. The edge 
of each box shows the lower and upper quartiles with the lines showing 
minimum and maximum scores. The extreme case shown by the star was the 
Forensic Science Service with an increase of 75.5 per cent.
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Appendix 10: The Formal Mark II Bureau-shaping Model
The maximisation problem for an individual official can be expressed 
formally and is analogous to the simple economic model of a consumer seeking to 
maximise utility subject to a budget constraint. The preferences of an individual 
official are represented by the utility function-
U= X1/2 + Y1/2
Where U is total utility, X is core budget per senior bureaucrat and Y is proportion 
of policy work time in total work time.
The bureaucrat's constraint imposed by politicians is- 
Y= 1-aX
Where 1 is the limited work time available to the bureaucrat, (a) is the proportion of 
management time in total work time which politicians insist a bureaucrat must 
spend supervising each unit of core budget per senior bureaucrat and 0 < a < 1.
The slope of each indifference curve is given by the marginal utility of X divided
by the marginal utility of Y-
dY/dX = - ( \ l 2 X m )l(\l2Y ~ m )= -Y
The slope of the constraint is given by-
dY/dX = -a
At the interior optimum, the slopes of the constraint and indifference curve are 
equal-
Y \i2fy \r i  = ^  or y  = a2X , which can be solved with the constraint to yield the 
optimum values of X and Y,
Y* = 1/ (l+(l/a))
X* = l/a(l+a)
The function used in the formal model assumes independence of the 
marginal utilities of X and Y implying that policy work time and core budget levels 
affect utility only by the sum of their separate contributions and not by forming 
particularly desirable or undesirable combinations. For the sake of clarity the 
figures are drawn schematically. The level of policy work is largely independent of 
the level of core budget per senior bureaucrat. A negligible level of core budget per 
senior bureaucrat is required to undertake policy work compared to that involved in
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executive activity because policy work tends to be more labour intensive in terms of 
senior officials and less intensive in other resources than executive activity.
The model also assumes a stable relationship between changes in executive 
activity and core budget per senior bureaucrat and between changes in the level of 
policy work and proportion of policy work time. Stability requires that the number 
of senior officials and efficiency in the use of core budgets and policy work time are 
constant. Without these assumptions core budget per senior bureaucrat, for 
example, could be reduced by increased efficiency leaving the level of executive 
activity unchanged.
The tightening of politicians' constraint on officials shown in Figure 7.3 is 
expressed formally by a rise in (a). The equations for optimum X and Y imply that 
a rise in (a) will cause a fall in X and a rise in Y. In order for a rise in (a) to cause a 
rise in Y the substitution effect of a rise in (a) must outweigh the income effect 
which tends to reduce the amount of Y.
273
Appendix 11: Radical Changes to Agencies 1988-1998
The changes are classified into several types, which are mutually 
exclusive. They are privatised or partially contracted out, wholly contracted out, 
merger or other change, wholly abolished. These changes were identified by 
analysis of Cabinet Office documents (Cabinet Office 1998).
1) Privatised or partially contracted out (11 agencies)
National Engineering Laboratory 
Building Research Establishment 
Chessington Computer Centre 
DVOIT 
HMSO
Laboratory of the Government Chemist 
Natural Resources Institute 
Occupational Health Service 
Paymaster
Recruitment and Assessment 
Transport Research Laboratory
2) Wholly contracted out (2 agencies)
National Physical Laboratory 
Teachers' Pensions Agency
3) Merger or other change (7 agencies)
Central Science Laboratory 
Chemical and Biological Defence 
Coastguard
Defence Accounts Agency 
Historic Royal Palaces 
Security Facilities Executive 
Warren Spring Laboratory
4) Wholly abolished (1 agency)
Social Security: Resettlement Agency
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Appendix 12: Interviews Conducted for the Study
The study uses a range of methods to explore its research questions. 
Interview material is particularly useful as a source for evidence not available in 
official publications or other sources. Whilst a standard set of questions was not 
used, the questions addressed the research questions of the overall study. This 
approach had two main elements. Firstly, interviews were used to identify the 
official version of the changes and to evaluate the public interest model by 
gathering information about the conduct and outcome of the reform and the 
performance of agencies. Secondly, interviews were used to gather officials’ 
opinions about inconsistencies in the official accounts and to gather evidence to 
evaluate the alternative mark II bureau-shaping explanation. However, in this 
regard, interview material was not used as the only source of evidence. Instead, 
findings from interview material were triangulated by other sources. This 
reduced the problem of relying on responses which might have reflected 
misrepresentation in some form, such as an official line or might further a 
purpose for the respondent rather than providing evidence for exploring the 
issues in this study.
The interviews were conducted on a Chatham House basis such that 
interviewees’ comments are not attributed to them by name, the list of 
interviewees is not a public document. As well as facilitating access to 
interviewees who were reluctant to be named, this approach reduced the 
incentive for officials simply to give the official line by removing the possibility 
that critical comments could be read by politicians or senior colleagues. This 
approach removed the fear that senior colleagues or politicians might take action 
against the interviewee, for example harming their careers, because of 
dissatisfaction with being implicated in failures by their testimony.
The interviews were conducted face to face and in nearly all cases lasted 
between one hour and one and one half hours, a few were conducted by 
telephone. The first set of interviews are coded Tx’ and were conducted 
exclusively for this study. The second set of interviews were conducted to inform 
this project but primarily for another study, the ‘Bureaucratic Gamekeeping’
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project. This project was lead by Christopher Hood and was part of the ESRC 
Whitehall Programme directed by Rod Rhodes. These additional interviews are 
coded ‘IAx’. The codes in brackets are those used in the Bureaucratic 
Gamekeeping project and in the book reporting the findings of the study (Hood, 
Scott, James, Jones, Travers: 1999).
Interviews Conducted Exclusively for this Study
11 9/8/97 Jeremy Cowper, Next Steps Team Leader, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Group, Cabinet Office
12 9/8/97 John Oughton, Director of the Efficiency and Effectiveness Group, 
Cabinet Office
13 9/8/97 Ian MacFadyen, Efficiency Unit, Cabinet Office
14 30/3/00 Lynda Pearce, HEO, Benefits Agency, Exeter Local Office 
(telephone)
15 30/3/00 Jane Wheeler, Director Social Security, National Audit Office, 
London (telephone interview)
16 4/4/00 John Thorpe, Director of Performance Measurement Audit, National 
Audit Office, London
17 4/4/00 Michael Whitehouse, Director of Modernising Government and Nick 
Lacy, Senior Official, National Audit Office, London.
18 4/4/00 Jim Marshall, Assistant Auditor General, National Audit Office, 
London
19 14/4/00 David Williams, Private Secretary to Hugh Bailey MP, Department of 
Social Security, London.
110 10/5/00 Debbie Williams, Business Improvement Unit, Benefits Agency, 
Exeter (telephone).
111 16/5/00 Chris Bull, Director, Benefit Fraud Inspectorate, London
112 17/5/00 Sir John Bourn, Comptroller and Auditor General, Michael 
Whitehouse, Chris Lambert, National Audit Office, London
113 1/6/00 Graham Carter, Area Director SW, Benefits Agency, Pynes Hill, 
Exeter.
114 15/600 Stephen Hewitt, Policy Director, Department of Social Security, The 
Adelphi, London
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115 20/7/00 Alexis Cleveland, Chief Executive, Benefits Agency, Richmond 
House, London.
Additional Interviews Conducted Jointly with the ’Bureaucratic 
Gamekeeping’ Project
IA1 11/1/96 (17) John Gieve, Deputy Director, Budget and Public Finance 
Directorate, HM Treasury
IA2 16/1/96 (18) John Colling, Procurement Unit, HM Treasury 
I A3 18/1/96 (19) Andrew Likierman, Chief Accountancy Advisor to the 
Treasury, Head of the Government Accounting Service, Treasury Principal 
Finance Officer, HM Treasury.
IA4 12/2/96 (113) Sandra Brown, Grade 5, Head of Departmental Pay Systems, 
HM Treasury.
IA5 13/2/96 (114) Nicholas Holgate, Grade 5, Strategy, Finance and Purchasing, 
HM Treasury.
IA6 20/2/96 (115) Joe Cavanagh, Director of Corporate Policy, National Audit 
Office.
IA7 22/2/96 (116) John Oughton, Grade 3, Head of Efficiency Unit, Office of 
Public Service, Cabinet Office.
IA8 26/2/96 (117) Jamie Mortimer, Grade 3, Treasury Officer of Accounts, HM 
Treasury.
IA9 1/3/96 (118) Genie Turton, Director Citizen’s Charter Unit, Office of Public 
Services, Cabinet Office.
IA10 25/6/96 (123) William K. Reid, Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration, Health Service Commissioner.
IA11 27/6/96 (124) Sir Peter Woodhead, Prisons Ombudsman.
IA12 1/6/96 (125) Martin Pfleger, Assistant Auditor General, National Audit 
Office.
IA13 11/10/96 (133) John Dowdall, Comptroller and Auditor General, Northern 
Ireland Audit Office.
IA14 7/4/97 (136) John Semple, Permanent Secretary, Department of Finance 
and Personnel and NI Civil Service Commisissioner, Civil Service Commission, 
Department of Finance and Personnel Northern Ireland.
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IA15 8/4/97 (137) John MacQuarrie, Deputy Commissioner, Northern Ireland 
Ombudsman.
IA16 11/9/96 (IEE7) Richard Tilt, Director General of the Prison Service, HM 
Prison Service
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